WILLIAM J. HUTTON v. ERIKA HUTTON
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RENDERED: MAY 3, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002622-MR
WILLIAM J. HUTTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CI-00526
ERIKA HUTTON
APPELLEE
TO BE HEARD WITH:
2001-CA-001814-MR
WILLIAM HUTTON
v.
ERIKA HUTTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CI-00526
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
William Hutton bring these appeals from a October
23, 2001 order of the Hardin Circuit Court.
We affirm.
The marriage of appellant and appellee was dissolved by
decree of dissolution entered in the Hardin Circuit Court on
February 7, 1991.
Appellee was awarded maintenance in the amount
of $695.00 per month, plus a share of appellant's military
retirement.
Appellee remarried on December 26, 1991; however,
such marriage was annulled by the Hardin Circuit Court on August
26, 1993.
terminated.
When appellee remarried, her maintenance, of course,
Kentucky Revised Statutes 403.250(2).
In March of
1998, appellee filed a motion to reinstate maintenance.
matter was referred to a Domestic Relations Commissioner.
The
commissioner recommended denying the motion.
The
On April 8, 1999,
the circuit court entered an order denying the motion.
Thereafter, appellee filed a second motion to reinstate
maintenance on August 11, 1999.
the commissioner.
The matter again was referred to
The commissioner recommended restoration of
maintenance by report entered October 2, 2000.
The circuit court
overruled exceptions to the commissioner's report, adopted and
incorporated it by reference into an order entered October 23,
2000.
The order required appellant to pay appellee the amount of
$695.00 per month in maintenance.
These appeals follow.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-002622-MR
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Appellant contends that appellee is barred from
relitigating the issue of restoration of maintenance by res
judicata or claim preclusion.
Appellant maintains that appellee
litigated the issue of reinstating maintenance in her first
motion for reinstatement.
Appellant points out that this motion
was referred to the commissioner, and that the commissioner
recommended denying same.
The circuit court eventually agreed
with the commissioner, and denied appellee's motion for
maintenance on April 8, 1999.
Appellant argues that “[t]he key
here is that, while the Commissioner's recommended order stated
that the Appellee could bring her motion again at a later time,
if certain prerequisites existed, the order of the Hardin Circuit
Court did not contain that language or provide that
authorization.”
As appellee failed to appeal the circuit court's
April 8, 1999 order, appellant argues that appellee is now bound
by the principle of res judicata or claim preclusion from
relitigating the issue of reinstatement of maintenance.
We must
disagree.
The circuit court's April 8, 1999 order clearly
incorporated by reference the commissioner's report.
As such,
the language that appellee could bring her motion at a later time
was incorporated into the circuit court's order.
We thus view
appellant's contention to be without merit.
Appellant next asserts that the circuit court abused
its discretion by ordering reinstatement of maintenance.
A
review of the record indicates that appellee's second marriage
was annulled by decree entered in the Hardin Circuit Court on
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August 26, 1993.
Appellee cites to a form from the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Department for Health Services, State Registrar of
Vital Statistics.
It states that an “absolute divorce” was
granted in appellee's second marriage rather than an annulment.
We, however, believe that the actual judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court takes precedence and accurately reflects that
appellee's second marriage was, in fact, annulled.
We are also of the opinion that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in reviving appellee's maintenance under
the precepts of McCord v. McCord, Ky. App., 558 S.W.2d 624
(1977).
Therein, the court held that the issue of whether to
revive maintenance following annulment is an equitable matter
requiring balancing of equities.
In the case at hand, the
circuit court found that appellee is without sufficient resources
to care for herself, and has several health issues.
The circuit
court also noted that appellee was to receive a share of
appellant's retirement benefits.
She began receiving that share
in 1992 when he retired from the military.
Thereafter, it
appears that appellant sought to convert his retirement benefits
to disability benefits, which are exempt from marital
distribution.
In the circuit court's order, appellant had been
declared 100% disabled.
benefits was $866.00.
In 1992, appellee's share of retirement
By April 1, 2000, her share was $80.50.
Upon review of the whole, we are unable to conclude that the
circuit court abused its discretion by reviving appellee's
maintenance.
The court made sufficient findings of fact, and
conclusions of law.
In the end, the balancing of the equities
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required revival of appellee's maintenance.
As such, we are of
the opinion that the circuit court did not err in requiring
appellant to pay $695.00 per month in maintenance.
APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001814-MR
In this appeal, appellant contends that the circuit
court committed reversible error by ruling on a “post-judgment
motion,” which had not been served upon appellant pursuant to
Rules of Practice of the Hardin Circuit Court 6.03(2).
this contention to be without merit.
served upon appellant's counsel.
We view
We note that the motion was
Simply put, we are of the
opinion that the circuit court acted well within its discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hardin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FURNISHES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
Despite the language in McCord v. McCord, Ky. App., 558 S.W.2d
624 (1977), which talks about courts of equity and public policy,
I believe the better path to be that which follows the strict
confines of the law.
If maintenance is terminated by remarriage
[see KRS 403.250(2)], I believe the obligation remains forever
terminated.
To allow the fiction of a later annulment to set
aside a statutorily permitted termination of maintenance can only
cause havoc on the finality of dissolution actions and cause
financial and emotional harm to the ex-spouse who believes he/she
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has been forever freed of the obligation.
I believe it is time
that this Court or the Supreme Court revisit this issue and
overrule McCord and put an end to this dangerous precedent.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Robert C. Bishop
Lawrence F. Smith
Radcliff, Kentucky
Barry Birdwhistell
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
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