HENRY COLLINS v. EVELYN COLLINS
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RENDERED: JULY 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002610-MR
HENRY COLLINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 81-CI-00102
v.
EVELYN COLLINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND MILLER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Henry Collins appeals an order of the Logan
Circuit Court addressing various post-divorce decree issues.
We
affirm.
Henry and Evelyn Collins were married October 17, 1964.
The parties had four children during the marriage; in addition,
Henry legally adopted Evelyn’s two children from a previous
marriage.
Henry owned a 135-acre farm at the time of the
marriage, and, in 1968, the parties constructed a marital
residence on the farm property.
In 1979, Henry deeded Evelyn an
undivided one-half interest in the farm and marital residence.
On April 9, 1981, Evelyn filed a petition to dissolve
the marriage.
On May 27, 1981, the trial court entered an order
requiring Henry to pay Evelyn $200.00 per week in combined child
support and maintenance.
destroyed by fire.
In July 1981, the marital residence was
Between July 1981 and July 1984, Evelyn
brought several motions seeking to hold Henry in contempt for
failure to pay child support.
On July 20, 1984, the trial court entered a final
decree dissolving the marriage.
The decree reserved
determination of the division of marital property, child custody,
child support, and visitation.
The decree also indicated that
all prior orders, including child support orders, were to remain
in full force and effect.
On September 10, 1984, Evelyn filed a
“Notice of Submission of Case for Final Adjudication” along with
her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Subsequently, Evelyn filed periodic motions seeking to hold Henry
in contempt for failure to pay child support.
Following one such show cause motion, the trial court
entered an order finding that Henry’s child support arrearage was
$8,000.00 as of August 8, 1986.
The order required Henry to pay
off the arrearage at the rate of $100.00 per month at 12%
interest.
The trial court also entered a separate
order
reducing Henry’s child support obligation from $200.00 per week
to $300.00 per month resulting in a total payment, after
consideration of the arrearage, of $400.00 per month.
On January 16, 1987, Evelyn executed a deed conveying
her interest in the parties’ farm property to Henry.
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The deed
recited that the conveyance was in consideration of Henry
assuming all of the debt of the farm property.
In addition,
according to Evelyn, Henry also agreed to commence paying child
support if she executed the transfer.
On September 20, 1988, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the case without prejudice for want of prosecution
pursuant to CR1 77.02(2).
In December 1991, the parties’
youngest child turned eighteen; the child graduated from high
school in May 1992.
No action was taken in the case between
September 1988 and July 1998.
On July 21, 1998, Evelyn filed a motion moving that the
September 20, 1988, order dismissing the case be set aside and
that the case be reinstated to the court’s docket.
The trial
court reopened the case, evidence was presented, and on August 1,
2000, the trial court entered final judgment in the case.
On
October 6, 2000, the trial court entered an order denying Henry’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate.
The order, however, made
certain corrections to the August 1, 2000, final judgment.
As
corrected, among other things, Evelyn was awarded $51,375.00 as
her distribution of marital property, $24,980.00 in child support
arrearages, and $17,653.00 in interest on the child support
arrearages.
This appeal followed.
First, Henry contends that the trial court erred in
setting aside the January 16, 1987, deed conveying Evelyn’s
interest in the parties’ farm property to Henry.
The trial court
determined that Evelyn received nothing of legal value by way of
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the 1987 conveyance; that she was induced to make the conveyance
by Henry’s promises to pay child support and her inability to
obtain relief from the court; and that Evelyn did not intend by
the conveyance to settle her claims.
The trial court concluded
that the conveyance “should be declared void as between the
parties and ignored in determining the remaining claims.”
Henry’s premise that the trial court “set aside” the
January 16, 1987, conveyance is an incorrect premise.
At the
hearing on Henry’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate, the trial
court clarified that it did not intend to actually set aside the
conveyance and to declare the deed null and void, but, rather,
intended only to disregard the transaction insofar as the
conveyance would be relevant to the division of the parties’
marital property.
The trial court found that Evelyn was induced into
making the conveyance based upon Henry’s false statements that
the farm was facing foreclosure and that he would resume child
support payments; this is supported by Evelyn’s testimony.
This
finding is not clearly erroneous and must be upheld on appeal.
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986); CR 52.01.
The standard of review in matters concerning the distribution of
marital property is whether the trial court abused its
discretion.
(1994).
Russell v. Russell, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d 24, 25
Inasmuch as the conveyance was found to be a product of
false statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
disregarding the January 16, 1987, conveyance.
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Next, Henry contends that the trial court erred in
setting aside the October 12, 1988, order dismissing the case
without prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to CR
77.02(2).
We disagree.
CR 77.02(2) provides that, prior to a dismissal, notice
shall be given to each attorney of record.
mandatory.
This requirement is
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph, Ky. App.,
641 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1982).
In this record we find no notice of
a suggested dismissal being provided prior to the dismissal.
The
trial court’s determination that there was not proper notice was
not clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01.
Because the mandatory notice
was not given, the October 20, 1988, order purporting to dismiss
the case was ineffectual, and the trial court properly
disregarded it.
Hertz Leasing Corp., supra.
Next, Henry contends that the trial court erred in
awarding Evelyn an amount representing one-half the value of the
parties’ marital residence.
We disagree.
The parties’ marital residence was destroyed by fire in
July 1981.
The trial court made a finding of fact that Henry had
intentionally burned the residence.
erroneous.
CR 52.01.
This finding was not clearly
Evelyn testified that Henry admitted to
her that he had burned the home.
Other witnesses provided
deposition testimony which tended to corroborate Evelyn’s claim.
The trial court may find dissipation of assets when
marital property is expended (1) during a period when there is a
separation or dissolution impending;
and (2) where there is a
clear showing of intent to deprive one's spouse of her
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proportionate share of the marital property.
Robinette v.
Robinette, Ky. App., 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (1987).
Under these
circumstances, the court will deem the wrongfully dissipated
assets to have been received by the offending party prior to the
distribution.
(1998).
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky. App., 974 S.W.2d 498, 500
In view of the testimony that Henry had intentionally
burned the marital residence, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by treating the destroyed value in the home as a
dissipated marital asset.
Next, Henry contends that the trial court erred in
determining the marital and nonmarital portions of the farm
property.
The trial court determined that Collins purchased the
farm prior to the marriage for $20,000.00; that $7,500.00 of the
purchase price was paid during the marriage; that Henry had a
nonmarital interest in the farm of $12,500.00 ($20,000.00 $7,500.00); and that the value of the farm at the time of
separation was $156,000.00.
Henry argues that because $12,500.00 of the original
$20,000.00 purchase price of the farm was found to be nonmarital
property, the trial court should have determined the appreciated
value of his nonmarital interest in the property in accordance
with Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, Ky. App., 617 S.W.2d 871 (1981).
We disagree.
The trial court’s finding that Henry had a $12,500.00
nonmarital interest in the original $20,000.00 purchase price of
the farm seems, at first appearance, to compel the conclusion
that Henry has a 67.5% ($12,500.00/$20,000.00) nonmarital
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interest in the farm property, and that this percentage of any
appreciation of the property not related to the joint efforts of
the parties should be assigned to Henry as his nonmarital
property.
Brandenburg, supra.
However, on August 16, 1979, the
parties executed a straw deed transaction which conveyed to
Evelyn a 50 percent undivided interest in the farm property with
the remainder in fee simple to the survivor.
Henry’s argument
ignores the 1979 transaction, which, it appears, would have the
effect of realigning the marital/nonmarital interests of the
parties and confer each with an equal interest.
If this was not
the intention of the parties, Henry should have submitted proof
to rebut this impression.
Further, Henry has failed to provide an illustrative
computation of what he believes would be a proper marital
distribution under Brandenburg.
The divorcing party asserting
that he should receive appreciation upon nonmarital contribution
as his nonmarital property carries the burden of proving the
portion of the increase in the value of the property attributable
to the nonmarital contribution; failure to do so will result in
any increase being characterized as marital property.
Travis, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 904 (2001).
Travis v.
In view of the 1979
conveyance and Henry’s failure to provide a suggested Brandenburg
computation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
choosing not to apply a Brandenburg formula in calculating
Henry’s nonmarital share of the property.
Finally, Henry contends that the trial court erred in
awarding Evelyn child support arrearages by failing to sustain
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his affirmative defenses of waiver, accord and satisfaction,
laches, payment, and res judicata.
First, KRS2 413.090(1) provides that an action upon a
judgment or decree of any court of this state must be commenced
within fifteen years after the cause of action first accrued.
Fifteen years is the applicable Statute of Limitations in this
case.
Harvey v. McGuire, Ky. App., 635 S.W.2d 8, 9 (1982).
The decree in this case was entered on July 20, 1984; the initial
judgment for child support arrearage of $8,000.00 was entered on
August 8, 1996; and the $300.00 per month child support order
which led to the additional arrearages was entered on August 8,
1986.
Evelyn filed her motion to reopen on July 21, 1998, within
fifteen years of all of the relevant dates.
Second, it is well established that "[u]npaid child
support payments for the maintenance of children become vested
when due and courts are without authority to ‘forgive’ vested
rights in accrued unpaid maintenance."
873 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1994).
Mauk v. Mauk, Ky. App.,
Child support payments become vested
when due, so "each installment of child support becomes a lump
sum judgment, unchangeable by the trial court when it becomes due
and is unpaid."
Price v. Price, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 44, 46
(1995)(quoting Stewart v. Raikes, Ky., 627 S.W.2d 586, 589
(1982))(emphasis in original).
"[I]nactivity and alleged laches
on the part of [appellee] cannot be attributed to the children
for whose benefit the original maintenance award was made."
Holmes v. Burke, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 915, 918 (1971);
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Glanton v.
Renner, 285 Ky. 808, 149 S.W.2d 748 (1941).
Child support is a
statutory duty intended to benefit the children rather than the
parents.
Clay v. Clay, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 352 (1986).
The
right to child support belongs to the child not the parents.
Gaines v. Gaines, Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 814 (1978).
Generally,
child support cannot be waived or diminished solely by agreement
or action of the two parents.
711 S.W.2d 857 (1986).
See Whicker v. Whicker, Ky. App.,
Accordingly, it is possible for parties
to enter a binding oral agreement to reduce future child support
payments, but past-due child support payments cannot be reduced
retroactively.
Henry does not discuss his affirmative defenses in
detail, and cites to little, if any, authority as to why the
defenses would apply in these circumstances.
We likewise will
not discuss the defenses in detail; however, we are not persuaded
that Henry is entitled to escape his child support arrearages
under waiver, accord and satisfaction, laches, payment, or res
judicata.
The judgment of the Logan Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles R. Orange
Russellville, Kentucky
Kenneth E. Dillingham
Dillingham, Ritchie, & Petrie
Elkton, Kentucky
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