GARY LYNN GILVIN v. GEORGE MILLION, WARDEN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 21, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002582-MR
GARY LYNN GILVIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00089
GEORGE MILLION, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: The appellant, Gary Gilvin, appeals from an
order of the Morgan Circuit Court dismissing his petition for
declaratory judgment.
Gilvin alleges that constitutionally
defective procedures were used during his prison disciplinary
hearing.
We agree that dismissal of the appellant’s action was
appropriate and thus affirm.
On February 13, 2000, Gilvin was charged with a
Category VII, Item 1, Inchoate B, violation of Corrections Policy
and Procedure, “soliciting another or others to commit the
offense of assault or physical action against an employee” (“CPP
15.2").
Gilvin received a copy of the incident report on the
same day.
The report stated that a thorough investigation had
revealed that Gilvin had previously expressed his intent to
assault or finance the assault of an employee of the Eastern
Kentucky Correctional Complex (“EKCC”).
On February 13, 2000,
Gilvin was formally charged with a violation of CPP 15.2.
The
appellant subsequently entered a plea of not guilty.
On February 17, 2000, Gilvin was brought before the
Prison Adjustment Committee (“Committee”).
Basing their decision
on information supplied by a confidential informant, Gilvin was
found guilty and sentenced to 180 days of disciplinary
segregation.
Gilvin filed a petition for declaratory judgment in
the Morgan Circuit Court to obtain an immediate release from
segregation and an award of $30,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages.
Gilvin’s petition was dismissed by the circuit court on
April 28, 2000.
Gilvin then filed a motion for a belated appeal
of the circuit court’s judgment in this Court on November 11,
2000.
This motion was subsequently granted on January 19, 2001.
However, after Gilvin’s motion to reconsider was denied by the
circuit court, this appeal followed.
On appeal, Gilvin contends that the Committee violated
his due process rights.
More specifically, the appellant alleges
that the Committee failed to make a written determination that
the information supplied by a confidential informant was
trustworthy.
Before considering the appellant’s claim, however,
we must first make a threshold determination of whether Gilvin’s
segregation deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.
-2-
A liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is implicated only by the Constitution or a state law
or regulation.
Mahoney v. Carter, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 575, 576
(1997) citing Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 875 (1986).
It is
well established that disciplinary segregation involves the
deprivation of a state-created liberty interest only if the
segregation imposes an “atypical and significant” hardship on the
inmate “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (1998) citing Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).
Moreover, a disciplinary segregation without regard to duration
does not involve the type of “atypical and significant” hardship
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Jones at 812.
Although Gilvin spends much of his brief contesting the
sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the Committee, Gilvin
has neglected to show that his segregation was “atypical and
significant.”
Id.
Gilvin was found guilty of the institutional
offense of assault or otherwise financing such an assault against
an EKCC employee.
As a result of his misconduct, Gilvin was
segregated from the general prison population for a period of 180
days.
Under Sandin, segregation periods as long as two and half
years have been deemed constitutional.
F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998).
See Jones v. Baker, 155
Thus, even if Gilvin had asserted that
his segregation had deprived him of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest it would be difficult to find that Gilvin’s
punishment was such that the due process protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been implicated.
-3-
Gilvin is correct in his assertion that due process
does afford a prisoner certain minimal procedural safeguards
before disciplinary action may be taken against him.
As
articulated by the United States Supreme Court, these safeguards
include: “(1) advance written notice of the charges against him
or her; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence, provided that to do so will not jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals, before a sufficiently
impartial hearing board; (3) a written statement by the fact
finder of the evidence relied upon and reasons for the
disciplinary action taken.”
Hughes v. Rowe 449 U.S. 5, 9, 66
L.Ed. 2d 163, 170, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176 (1980) citing Wolf v.
McDonnel 418 U.S. 539, 41 L.Ed. 2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974).
Gilvin’s complaint on appeal rests with the Committee’s written
determination that the information supplied to it by a
confidential informant was untrustworthy.
In order to satisfy the procedural rigors of due
process, a prison disciplinary committee must only make a good
faith determination that any information supplied by a
confidential informant is reliable.
Supp. 219, 220 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
Gable v. Wilson, 577 F.
However, the verification
procedure need not be comprehensive, but rather need only include
some reference to verification.
Id.
Gilvin was found guilty
based on the statements of a confidential informant.
The
disciplinary report form verifies that both the reporting officer
and the Committee found the information provided by the informant
to be reliable.
Thus, we find that the reliability and
-4-
trustworthiness of the informant was sufficiently verified by the
Committee.
The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution requires courts to set aside the
decision of a prison administrator only when there was no factual
basis for the decision.
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional
Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456, 86 L.Ed. 2d.
356, 365, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774 (1985).
Indeed, “prison
disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged
atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on
the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent
circumstances.”
Id.
An appellate court, then, may not disturb a
decision reached by a prison disciplinary body so long as “some
evidence” exists to support the body’s decision.
Hill at 455-56;
Smith v. O’Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d 353, 358 (1997).
In the
case at bar, the Committee has met this standard by basing its
decision on information provided by a confidential informant.
Moreover, this information was properly deemed trustworthy both
by the reporting officer and the Committee.
Therefore, Gilvin’s
due process rights have not been violated.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Morgan
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary Gilvin, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.