JAMES W. HATTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 24, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002560-MR
JAMES W. HATTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00015
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
James Hatton appeals from a conditional guilty
plea pursuant to RCr 8.09 to a charge of burglary in the second
degree.1
He argues that the Scott Circuit Court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss due to the Commonwealth’s failure to bring
his case to trial within 180 days from the date he filed his
motion pursuant to KRS 500.110.
Although certain aspects of this
case are troubling, we conclude that Hatton’s failure to object
to the assignment of a trial date beyond the 180-day limit
1
KRS 515.030.
constituted a waiver of his rights under the statute.
Hence, we affirm.
Although the relevant facts of this action are not
seriously in dispute, the procedural time-line of this action
before the circuit court is significant.
On January 7, 2000, a
Scott County grand jury returned an indictment against Hatton
charging him with first degree robbery2 arising from his
participation in the robbery of a convenience store on October
28, 1999.
The indictment further charged him with several
traffic violations.3
On February 15, 2000, the Department of Corrections,
Roederer Correctional Complex lodged a detainer against Hatton
based upon a robbery charge arising in Fayette County.
On
February 24, Hatton filed a motion requesting final disposition
of the charges against him within 180 days, as provided by KRS
500.110.
On March 6, Hatton was arraigned in Scott Circuit
Court, where he entered pleas of not guilty to all charges.
A
disposition hearing was scheduled for April 3, but Hatton’s
counsel was not present and the hearing was continued.
On May 1,
Hatton appeared before the court to request a trial date.
However, the regular presiding circuit judge was not present, and
the substitute judge declined to assign a trial date in that
judge’s absence.
Over Hatton’s objection, the trial court passed
the motion to set a trial date to the following month.
When
Hatton appeared again on June 5, he had a new public defender.
2
KRS 515.020.
3
Driving without a headlight, KRS189.040; operating a motor vehicle without insurance,
KRS 304.39-080; operating a motor vehicle with an expired registration, KRS 186.170; and
failure to wear seatbelt, KRS 189.125.
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The trial court set the case for trial on September 27.
However,
Hatton’s counsel did not object to the court setting a date
beyond the 180-day limit.
On September 11, Hatton filed a pro se motion to
dismiss the indictment for failure to prosecute.
Following a
hearing on September 27, the trial court denied the motion,
finding that Hatton had waived his right to a trial within 180
days by failing to object to the assigned trial date outside that
limit.
Thereafter, Hatton entered a conditional guilty plea to
an amended charge of second degree robbery.
the indictment were dismissed.
The other charges in
The trial court sentenced Hatton
to ten years on the robbery conviction, to run concurrently with
another robbery conviction from Fayette County.
This appeal
followed.
KRS 500.110 allows a defendant who is incarcerated for
one offense and against whom a detainer has been lodged to answer
for another offense, to request a trial within 180 days.4
4
Specifically, KRS 500.110 provides:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment
there is pending in any jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought
to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he shall
have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final
disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or
his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
-3-
There
is no question that Hatton properly invoked the provisions of KRS
500.110.
Similarly, the trial court clearly failed to schedule
his trial within 180 days from the date the motion was served on
the Commonwealth, and there was no finding of good cause to
warrant a continuance.
The only question presented in this
appeal is whether Hatton should have raised this objection on
June 5, 2000, when the trial date was assigned.
KRS 500.110 is nearly identical to the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which is adopted in Kentucky
through KRS 440.450.
Thus, case law interpreting the IAD is
equally applicable to KRS 500.110.5
The IAD requires that a
prisoner against whom an interstate detainer has been filed must
be promptly notified of that fact and of his right to demand a
trial, and if he demands a trial then a trial must be held within
180 days.
The request is a waiver of extradition by the
prisoner.
If a trial is not held within 180 days and good cause
for delay is not shown, the charges are dismissed with
prejudice.6
The time limits set in the IAD are to be strictly
applied, and harmless error analysis is not applicable.7
In New York v. Hill,8 the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant implicitly waives the IAD's time limits
where he or his counsel agrees to a trial date outside those
5
Rushin v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 931 S.W.2d 456, 459-60 (1996).
6
Dunaway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 563, 566-67 (2001).
7
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153-57, 150 L. Ed. 2d 188, 196-97, 121 S. Ct.
2079, 2084-86 (2001).
8
528 U.S. 100, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560, 120 S. Ct. 659 (2000).
-4-
limits.
In rejecting the argument that waiver is possible only
by affirmative conduct, the Hill court stated:
Finally, respondent argues that even if
waiver of the IAD's time limits is possible,
it can be effected only by affirmative
conduct not present here. The New York Court
of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating
that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by
the IAD may be waived either "explicitly or
by an affirmative request for treatment that
is contrary to or inconsistent with those
speedy trial rights." 92 N.Y.2d at 411, 704
N.E.2d, at 545. The court concluded that
defense counsel's agreement to the trial date
here was not an "affirmative request" and
therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id. at
412, 704 N.E.2d at 546. We agree with the
State that this makes dismissal of the
indictment turn on a hypertechnical
distinction that should play no part. As
illustrated by this case, such an approach
would enable defendants to escape justice by
willingly accepting treatment inconsistent
with the IAD's time limits, and then
recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD
requires or even suggests a distinction
between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to.
In light of its potential for abuse--and
given the harsh remedy of dismissal with
prejudice--we decline to adopt it.9
Hatton contends that the facts presented in Hill are
distinguishable from his case because the trial date was not the
product of any negotiation between the parties.
Rather, the
trial court assigned the September 27 trial date because it was
the earliest available date.
Thus, Hatton asserts that his
failure to object was not evidence of acquiescence, because any
objection to the trial date would have been fruitless.10
9
Id., 528 U.S. at 118, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 569, 120 S. Ct. at 666.
10
See Commonwealth v. Mayle, 2001 Pa. Super 202, 780 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super., 2001).
-5-
It is apparent that Hatton’s motion for a speedy trial
was not handled in an ideal manner.
The Commonwealth conceded
that it misfiled Hatton’s motion after it had been served.
For
reasons which are not clear from the record, the substitute judge
declined to set a trial date and passed the motion, even over
Hatton’s objection.
And the disqualification of Hatton’s first
two public defenders, for reasons which were not related to any
conduct by Hatton, undoubtedly led to his motion for a speedy
trial being overlooked.
Nonetheless, if Hatton had raised his
objection on June 5, 2000, when the September 27 trial date was
set, the trial court might have been able to transfer the case or
have a special judge assigned for an earlier date.
The
Commonwealth might also have made a timely motion for a
continuance.
In any event, neither Hatton nor his trial counsel
objected to the assignment of a trial date beyond the 180-day
limit.
Pursuant to Hill, Hatton’s agreement to a trial date
beyond the 180-day limit constituted a waiver of his speedy trial
rights.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Scott Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Appellate Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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