MICHAEL FAUCETT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 31, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002550-MR
MICHAEL FAUCETT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CR-00009 AND 97-CR-00011
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, HUDDLESTON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: The appellant, Michael Faucett, appeals from an
order of the Hancock Circuit Court that denied his RCr1 11.42
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and
conviction for robbery, attempted assault, forgery, and
possession of drug paraphernalia.
We affirm.
On March 7, 1997, Faucett was indicted in the Hancock
Circuit Court on one count of first-degree robbery, one count of
third-degree attempted assault, one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, and four counts of second-degree forgery.
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Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
Faucett
was arraigned on these charges on April 4, 1997, and trial was
scheduled for June 12, 1997.
While awaiting trial, however,
Faucett attempted suicide and was ordered to undergo
psychological evaluation at Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center.
Although competent to stand trial, Faucett was found to
suffer from both depression and substance dependency.
On June 13, 1997, Faucett pled guilty but mentally ill
in Hancock Circuit Court to each of the charges for which he was
originally indicted.
His guilty pleas were made pursuant to a
plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
In accordance with that
agreement, on July 9, 1997, a final judgment was entered against
Faucett sentencing him to fifteen years in prison for firstdegree robbery, one year for third-degree attempted assault, one
year for possession of drug paraphernalia, and four years for
each count of second-degree forgery, with all sentences to run
concurrently.
On April 12, 1998, Faucett filed a motion pursuant to
RCr 11.42 to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed
by the Hancock Circuit Court.
In his motion, Faucett alleged
that his guilty but mentally ill plea was invalid because his
counsel had advised him that entering such a plea would result in
Faucett being placed in a mental health facility for treatment
rather than in prison.
This motion was denied by the circuit
court without conducting an evidentiary hearing on June 4, 1998.
Faucett appealed from the denial of his motion and this court
consequently ordered the Hancock Circuit Court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing into the validity of Faucett’s complaint.
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On
April 12, 2002, Faucett was afforded an evidentiary hearing on
his RCr 11.42 motion.
However, one month later Faucett’s motion
was denied by the circuit court and this appeal followed.
Faucett’s lone complaint on appeal is that the Hancock
Circuit Court erred by failing to consider the totality of the
circumstances when evaluating whether his guilty plea was made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
More specifically,
Faucett claims that but for his counsel’s alleged
misrepresentation that upon entering a plea of guilty but
mentally ill he would be sentenced to a mental health facility
for treatment rather than prison, Faucett would not have entered
such a plea and would have exercised his constitutional right to
a jury trial.
It is well established that the movant for the type of
post-conviction relief afforded under RCr 11.42 has the “heavy
burden” of raising doubt about the regularity of proceedings
under which he was convicted and must establish convincingly that
he has been deprived of some substantial right which would
justify such relief.
Commonwealth v. Campbell, Ky., 415 S.W.2d
614, 616 (1967), citing Wahl v. Commonwealth, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 774
(1965).
Where the record does not substantiate a movant’s
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, he is afforded
no relief under RCr 11.42.
S.W.2d 116, 117 (1971).
Wooten v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473
Moreover, a movant cannot substantiate a
claim that his guilty plea was involuntary and not properly
accepted by the court where the record indicates that before the
plea was accepted the movant answered the following questions:
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“(a) whether this was his personal decision, (b) whether such
desired plea on his part was voluntary, (c) whether he felt he
had been properly and efficiently represented by counsel, and
(d) whether he knew he had a right to a trial by jury with
assistance of counsel.”
400, 401 (1972).
Glass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d
Such is the case at bar.
The record is clear that Faucett entered his guilty
plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The plain
language of the Commonwealth’s plea offer indicates that upon
entering his guilty but mentally ill plea, Faucett was to be
sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections.
Moreover, when entering his plea at
trial, Faucett was asked, inter alia, whether his plea was made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Faucett claims that
counsel convinced him to plead guilty but mentally ill so as to
serve his sentence in a mental health facility rather than in a
prison.
counsel.
This conversation has been expressly denied by Faucett’s
However, even if credible, evidence of this
conversation alone is insufficient to meet the “heavy burden”
placed on Faucett by Campbell.
Campbell at 616, citing Wahl v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 774 (1965).
Therefore, the circuit
court properly denied Faucett’s RCr 11.42 Motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In conclusion, Faucett’s complaint that he did not
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently plead guilty is clearly
refuted by evidence addressed at the hearing.
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Therefore, the
Hancock Circuit Court did not err in denying his RCr 11.42
motion.
The order of the Hancock Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael Faucett, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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