VICKI COOTS v. THE ALTON BLAKLEY COMPANY, INC. D/B/A ALTON BLAKLEY MAZDA
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RENDERED:
November 1, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002444-MR
VICKI COOTS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00352
THE ALTON BLAKLEY COMPANY, INC.
D/B/A ALTON BLAKLEY MAZDA
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE: On April 12, 1999, Vicki Coots allegedly
fell and sustained injuries in the parking lot of the Alton
Blakley Mazda dealership.
On April 12, 2000, the 365th day
following her alleged fall, Coots’ attorney faxed a complaint to
the Pulaski Circuit Court requesting that summons be issued upon
Alton E. Blakley, Jr., individually and as agent for the Alton
Blakley Company d/b/a/ Alton Blakley Mazda.
No filing fee was
paid until April 13, 2000, when the complaint and fee were
received by the circuit clerk via U.S. mail.
Coots’ counsel
contends that he faxed the complaint with assurances from Sharon
Dalton, a deputy clerk in the Pulaski County office, that the
faxed complaint followed by a mailed complaint and the filing fee
would be sufficient to commence the action.
Dalton did not
recall a specific conversation with counsel on April 12, 2000.
The trial court found that the faxed copy of the complaint was
insufficient for purposes of commencing the action within the
one-year statute of limitations.
We agree with the trial court
and affirm the dismissal of the case.1
There is no debate that KRS2 413.140, requiring
personal injury actions to be filed within one year after the
action accrued, is applicable or that the last day to file the
action was April 12, 2000.
The question is whether a complaint
and a request for summons to issue faxed to the clerk on the
final day of the statutory filing period, with the filing fee
unpaid until the following day, is sufficient compliance with
CR3 3.
CR 3 states that “[a] civil action is commenced by the
filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a
summons or warning order thereon in good faith.”
CR 3.02
provides that “filing fees for a civil case in Circuit Court
(including original actions of administrative agencies, special
districts or boards) shall be paid to the circuit clerk at the
time the case is filed. . . .”
When read together, the civil
1
By order dated July 16, 2001, this appeal was placed in
abeyance pending rehabilitation of Reliance Insurance Company,
and returned to the active docket by order dated May 3, 2002.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2-
rules require that a complaint along with the applicable filing
fee be presented to the clerk and that summons be issued.
A
faxed complaint alone is the same as if nothing were done and is
insufficient to commence the action.4
Coots’ counsel attempts to elude the requirement of our
civil rules by advancing an argument of detrimental reliance,
specifically, that he relied on the assertions of Dalton that the
faxed complaint would be sufficient to commence the action.
It
is beyond argument that an attorney is responsible for his
client’s case.
Reliance upon the advice or legal interpretations
of lay people is a dangerous path for counsel to follow.
More
important, our civil rules concerning the commencement of actions
are clear and unambiguous.
In Casey v. Newport Rolling Mill,5
the plaintiff filed an amended complaint before the expiration of
the statute of limitations but summons did not issue until after
the statutory time.
The court rejected counsel’s argument that
his request to the clerk to issue the summons was sufficient.
If the broad rule contended for by plaintiff
were adopted, it would lead to endless
confusion. The commencement of an action
would be determined by parole evidence
instead of the actual issuance of the
summons. . ., thus making important property
rights depend on an issue of veracity between
the clerk and the litigant or his attorney.
In our opinion, such was not the purpose of
the law-making power. The statute and the
code make it clear that an action is
4
See Hawkins v. Colbert, 292 Ky. 84, 165 S.W.2d 984 (1942)
(where the court held that the filing of a petition contesting
the results of an election within the statutory time without the
required filing fee was not timely filed).
5
156 Ky. 623, 161 S.W. 528 (1913).
-3-
commenced by the issuance of the summons, and
not be a request to have the summons issued.6
Our civil rules are unequivocal that the filing fee must be paid
when the complaint is filed and summons issued to commence an
action.
Counsel cannot avoid the requirements by introduction of
evidence that he relied upon some authority outside those rules.
The judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel W. James
Lexington, Kentucky
R. David Clark
CLARK, WARD & CAVE
Lexington, Kentucky
6
Id. at 530.
-4-
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