FELIX THOMAS BUCKMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
January 4, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002259-MR
FELIX THOMAS BUCKMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 82-CR-001808
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: Felix Thomas Buckman (“Buckman”) appeals from a
July 5, 2000, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, denying his
motion for the circuit court to reconsider its order denying his
motion to amend his sentence.
We affirm.
Buckman was convicted by a jury, in May 1983, of two
counts of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree
burglary, and of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender.
Buckman was sentenced, on May 23, 1983, to twenty-
years on each of the three counts, each count enhanced to fortyyears as a result of the persistent felony offender conviction
for a total of one hundred twenty years.
Buckman appealed to the
Kentucky Supreme Court which affirmed his conviction.
sentence became final in 1984.
Buckman’s
Buckman then filed a motion to modify his sentence on
January 11, 2000, which was denied on March 13, 2000.
Buckman
then filed a motion to reconsider the March 13, 2000 order which
was denied on July 5, 2000.
This Court then granted Buckman a
belated appeal by order entered May 11, 2001.
Buckman’s sole argument on appeal is that the circuit
court erred in not modifying his sentence to conform to changes
in the law.
When Buckman was sentenced in 1983, KRS 532.060 set
the maximum term for felony sentencing at life in prison.
Amendments to KRS 532.060 (2)1 effective July 15, 1998 set the
maximum sentence for a felony, when stated as a term of years, at
50 years.
Buckman argues that this 1998 amendment should apply
retroactively to his sentence based on either KRS 532.080 (9)2 or
KRS 446.1103.
Buckman’s reliance on KRS 532.080 (9) is
1
KRS 532.060 (2):
The authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for
felonies are:
(a) For a Class A felony, not less than twenty (20) years
nor more than fifty (50) years, or life imprisonment;
(b) For a Class B felony, not less than ten (10) years nor
more than twenty (20) years;
(c) For a Class C felony, not less than five (5) years nor
more than ten (10) years; and
(d) For a Class D felony, not less than one (1) year nor
more than five (5) years.
2
KRS 532.080 (9):
The provisions of this section amended by 1994 Ky. Acts ch.
396, sec. 11, shall be retroactive.
3
KRS 446.110:
No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law as to
any offense committed against a former law, nor as to any act
done, or penalty forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right
accrued or claim arising under the former law, or in any way
whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done,
(continued...)
-2-
misplaced.
KRS 532.080 (9) does provide for retroactive
application of certain amendments, but only those contained in
Ky. Acts ch. 396, § 11.
The changes in KRS 532.060 relevant to
maximum sentences were not included in Ky. Acts ch. 396, § 11.
Buckman even admits that KRS 532.080 (9) does not work, on page
three of his brief.
Buckman’s reliance on KRS 446.110 is also misplaced.
KRS 446.110 only provides for application of amended punishment
to judgments pronounced after a new law takes effect.
Buckman
cites Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106, 108 (2000) as
support for his argument that KRS 446.110 applies to the case sub
judice.
Phon dealt with a certification of the law where the
charged crime was committed prior to a change in the law, but
where a sentence would not be handed down until after the changed
law went into effect.
The Supreme Court in Phon held KRS 446.110
proper and relevant in the Phon situation.
However, in the case
sub judice, Buckman’s sentence became final in 1984, fourteen
years before the changes in the law he wants retroactively
applied to his sentence took effect.
Buckman has failed to show
that the circuit court erred in refusing to modify his sentence.
(...continued)
or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any
right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect,
except that the proceedings thereafter had shall conform, so far
as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such
proceedings. If any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment is
mitigated by any provision of the new law, such provision may, by
the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment
pronounced after the new law takes effect.
-3-
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael C. Lemke
Appellate Public Advocate
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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