HAROLD SANFORD BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 5, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002256-MR
HAROLD SANFORD BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00137
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, and COMBS, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Harold S. Brown appeals the September 6, 2000
orders of the Laurel Circuit Court denying his motions:
to
vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr1 11.42, for an evidentiary
hearing, and that the trial judge recuse himself from the postconviction proceeding.
After a review of the record and Brown’s
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion seeking
collateral relief without a hearing.
Thus, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for a hearing.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On April 26, 1999, both Brown and his co-defendant,
Leslie Lawson, were sentenced to serve eighty years in prison
after a jury convicted them of second-degree arson and seconddegree burglary, finding each to be a persistent felony offender.
The judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal to the
Kentucky Supreme Court.
S.W.3d 534 (2001).
See, Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 53
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that
Brown did not testify; it characterized the cross-examination
strategy and closing argument of Brown’s counsel as “exclusively
present[ing] a ‘didn’t do it’ defense.”
Id. at 547.
The Court
rejected the argument that Brown and Lawson were entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal as follows:
Additionally, we hold that the trial court
properly denied Appellants’ motions for
directed verdict which alleged insufficiency
of the evidence. . . The Commonwealth built a
substantial, if circumstantial, case against
Brown and Lawson on the basis of their
incriminating statements, motives, presence
in the area of the home at the time the fire
began, and subsequent possession of items
taken from inside the home. . . . Although
[Brown and Lawson] bemoan the circumstantial
nature of the evidence against them,
“circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a criminal conviction as long as the
evidence taken as a whole shows that it was
not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find
guilt.”
Id., at 547-48 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
On June 6, 2000, Brown moved the trial court to vacate
his sentence based on the allegedly deficient representation of
his counsel.
Brown’s RCr 11.42 motion recited a number of errors
allegedly committed by trial counsel, which included: (1) failure
to call as alibi witnesses three persons who would have testified
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that Brown was home at the time the fire was set; (2) failure to
show to prosecution witness Tony Griffith (a neighbor of the
victim) a photograph of Darrell Blevins; Brown claims that
Griffith would have identified Blevins as the man he saw hiding
in the bushes near the victim’s home immediately prior to the
fire; (3) failure to object to misstatements of the evidence made
by the prosecutor during his closing argument; (4) failure to
object to evidence of prior bad acts; (5) failure to present
evidence that a prosecution witness, Barbara Flannelly, Brown’s
former girlfriend, had lied on other occasions about Brown’s
involvement in criminal activity; and (6) failure to impeach
Flannelly with a prior inconsistent statement given to police.
Brown’s motion was accompanied by the affidavits of
Helen Brown and Melissa Hood, both of whom stated that Brown was
at home prior to and after the time the fire and burglary
occurred.
They also averred that they had communicated that
pertinent information to Brown’s trial counsel.
Helen Brown
stated that she attended the trial in anticipation of being
called as a witness but was informed by trial counsel that she
was “not needed.”
Melissa Hood stated that she was never issued
a subpoena requiring her presence at trial.
Brown also claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to object during the sentencing phase of
the trial when the trial court allegedly took the jurors into his
chambers to discuss sentencing issues.
The allegation that the
judge improperly engaged in ex parte conversations with the
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jurors also formed the basis of Brown’s request that a special
judge be appointed to rule on his RCr 11.42 motion.
On September 6, 2000, the trial court entered two
orders from which Brown now appeals.
The judge denied Brown’s
motion for a special judge, stating that the jury which convicted
Brown “was not brought into his chambers for any purpose” and
that he had no contact with the jury except “on the record and in
the presence of counsel.”
In its second order, the trial court
denied Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence on the merits
without an evidentiary hearing after concluding that Brown had
failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to establish his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Brown argues that the trial court erred in summarily
dismissing his motion and in failing to afford him an evidentiary
hearing on his post-conviction motion.
We agree.
It is settled
that in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a movant must show that his counsel’s performance was
both deficient and prejudicial.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
In order to
establish prejudice, the movant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69.
Where the motion has been denied without a hearing, we must
determine whether the issues raised in the motion are refuted by
the record or whether the allegations — if true — would not be
sufficient to invalidate the conviction.
Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
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Stanford v.
In denying Brown’s RCr 11.42 motion, the trial court
stated that it reviewed the trial testimony and determined that
“the testimonies are very consistent and are overwhelming
incriminating” with respect to Brown.
Concluding that Brown
“failed to demonstrate that any additional witnesses would have
changed the outcome” of the trial, it stated as follows:
The Court will not speculate on the
outcome of the case based on any alleged or
speculative evidence other than what is in
the record before the Court. Further, this
court places a great deal of confidence in
the jury as to their deliberations as to the
credibility and weight to be given to the
testimonies of the investigating detective,
impartial witness, Ms. Lyons, and [sic] well
as the other Commonwealth witnesses.
These findings are not sufficient in light of the
recent Supreme Court case of Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68S.W.3d
338, 345 (2001), a similar case in which defense counsel failed
to introduce mitigating evidence.
The Court held as follows:
Before any possible mitigating evidence can
be weighed in a meaningful manner, that
evidence first must be determined and
delineated. This is a proper function of an
evidentiary hearing.
An evidentiary hearing must be held in this
case to determine whether the failure to
introduce mitigating evidence was trial
strategy, or “an abdication of advocacy.”
Austin [v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.1997)]
at 849. And, if defense counsel’s advocacy
was deficient, then a finding must be made of
what mitigating evidence was available to
counsel. Thereafter, the trial court must
then determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have weighed
the mitigating and aggravating factors
differently.
(Emphasis added).
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court stated:
“The trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in
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the absence of evidence in the record refuting them.”
Fraser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (2001), citing Drake v.
United States, 439 F.2d 1319,1320 (6th Cir. 1971).
The record of the trial reveals that Brown’s conviction
was based solely on circumstantial evidence.
There was no
witness nor was there physical evidence placing him in the
victim’s house at the time of the arson and burglary. Since there
is no direct evidence of his guilt, there remains a possibility
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial
counsel produced mitigating evidence; i.e., that Brown was
elsewhere at the time of the crime, that another person was seen
lurking near the victim’s house at the time of the fire, or that
Flannelly had previously fabricated incriminating stories about
Brown.
The record does not reveal why trial counsel failed to
call the three alibi witnesses, why counsel failed to question
the victim’s neighbor regarding the photograph, or why he
neglected to question Flannelly about her previous false
accusations against Brown.
Thus, an evidentiary hearing is
necessary under the rule of Hodge in order to delineate the
possible evidence that counsel failed to introduce and/or to
explain counsel’s conduct or strategy with respect to that
evidence.
Only then can a proper analysis of counsel’s
performance and any resulting prejudice under the Strickland
standard be performed.
Hodge, supra.
See also, Norton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 175 (2001).
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We agree with the Commonwealth’s argument that certain
of Brown’s allegations are refuted by the record or that they do
not involve issues for fact requiring further evidence.
Specifically, trial counsel’s failure to impeach Flannelly with
her prior inconsistent statement to police would not entitle
Brown to relief since counsel for his co-defendant, Lawson,
impeached her with the statement.
Thus, the jury was made aware
of her prior statement as well as her motives for changing her
statement.
Additionally, counsel’s failure to object to evidence
of prior bad acts cannot form the basis for relief here since
that issue was resolved previously on direct appeal and now
constitutes the law of the case for purposes of this appeal.
Both Appellants argue they suffered
prejudice as a result of trial testimony
ranging from Brown’s former girlfriend’s
testimony that Brown was “crazy” and “insane”
and abused both cocaine and prescription
pills to a juror’s statement during voir dire
that he knew Lawson because of the juror’s
employment at the detention center.
Appellants concede that they made no
objections in the trial court to any of the
testimony they identify as prejudicial on
appeal, and, after a thorough review of the
claims, we do not find a substantial
possibility that the exclusion of this
testimony would have resulted in a different
verdict.
Lawson, supra, at 549.
Issues “raised and rejected” on direct
appeal cannot be “relitigated” as ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 909
(1998).
Finally, the record reveals no error with respect to
the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself from the proceedings.
Nor is there any basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of
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counsel based on Brown’s allegations that the court engaged in ex
parte communications with the jury panel.
Brown alleges that the
following sequence of events occurred during the sentencing phase
of his trial:
During the sentencing phase of
Appellant’s trial the jury sent a note out to
the judge and told the court that they [sic]
didn’t know how to sentence Appellant.
The trial court then told the jury they
[sic] could watch the tape of the parole
officer and after the tape was shown to the
jury the jury told the court they [sic] still
did’nt [sic] understand how the PFO worked.
The trial judge then told the jury he would
explain it to them in chambers. Appellant
nor his co-defendant were allowed in chambers
when the trial judge took the jury into
chambers and talked with them.
Not only did the trial judge take the
jury into chambers but the entire sentencing
phase of Appellant’s trial is not part of the
record as it some how got erased.
(Appellant’s brief at pp. 14-15.)
The Commonwealth’s responds that this alleged
occurrence in fact never happened.
As noted earlier, the trial
court also denied taking the jury into chambers or engaging in
any discussion with the jurors outside the presence of counsel.
Despite Brown’s contention that the recording of the
sentencing phase was erased from the record, our review reveals
otherwise.
The entire trial, including the sentencing phase, is
contained in the video tapes of record.
During the sentencing
portion of the trial, the tape was stopped only when the jury was
absent from courtroom during its deliberations.
Brown is correct
in asserting that the jury had a question concerning the PFO
sentence.
The jurors were then returned to the courtroom.
-8-
With
permission of both counsel, the judge made a brief statement and
then replayed the testimony of the probation and parole officer.
At the conclusion of the replay, the jury returned to the jury
room.
After further deliberation, it reached its verdict with
respect to sentencing.
After all the verdicts were read, the
trial judge sent the jurors back to the jury room.
After a few
minutes, he asked all those persons remaining in the courtroom
(except counsel) to leave.
He then asked that the jury be
returned to the courtroom.
At that point, the tape recording was
turned off and no further record was made.
Thus, while the judge
may have entertained questions or engaged in a dialogue with the
jurors at that time, all phases of the trial against Brown and
Lawson had been concluded.
As there was no impropriety on the
part of the court, there was no reason for Brown’s counsel to
object.
The judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed in
part and vacated in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harold Brown
Burgin, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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