JOE A. CHAPMAN, Administrator of the Estate of J. G. Chapman, deceased v. A. G. EDWARDS & SONS, INC. DEBBIE ALLEN, LUCILLE HILSMEIER v. HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR. JOE A. CHAPMAN, Administrator of the Estate of J. G. Chapman, deceased
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RENDERED: AUGUST 9, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000986-MR
JOE A. CHAPMAN, Administrator of the
Estate of J. G. Chapman, deceased
v.
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00664
A. G. EDWARDS & SONS, INC.
TO BE HEARD WITH:
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR.
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00664
JOE A. CHAPMAN, Administrator of the
Estate of J. G. Chapman, deceased
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEE
2000-CA-001457-MR
DEBBIE ALLEN,
LUCILLE HILSMEIER
v.
APPELLANT
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
APPELLEE
MILLER, JUDGE:
Joe A. Chapman, Administrator of the Estate of J.
G. Chapman, deceased, brings Appeal No. 2000-CA-000986-MR from a
summary judgment entered by the Warren Circuit Court on January
19, 2000.
We affirm.
Debbie Allen and Lucille Hilsmeier bring Appeal No.
2000-CA-001457-MR from a judgment of the same court, and in the
same matter, entered March 23, 2000 upon a jury verdict.
We
affirm.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-000986-MR
On June 11, 1998, the instant action was filed by Joe
A. Chapman, Administrator of the Estate of J. G. Chapman,
deceased, naming as defendants A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (A. G.
Edwards), Debbie Allen and Lucille Hilsmeier, Allen's mother.
The complaint made two claims against A. G. Edwards, one under
the doctrine of respondeat superior and the second predicated
upon the theory of negligent hiring.
This latter claim was
voluntarily abandoned by the complainant.
The claim under the
doctrine of respondeat superior was dismissed on summary
judgment, thus precipitating Appeal No. 2000-CA-000986-MR.
The facts are these.
Allen was a financial adviser who
worked as a stock broker for A. G. Edwards from May 1992 until
May 1998.
It was alleged that during this period Allen
unlawfully acquired approximately $200,000.00 of J. G. Chapman's
funds.
The mode of acquisition was predicated upon Allen's
cultivating a close friendship with Chapman during his later
years, and ultimately causing him to place a large sum of money
with Putnam Investments in Providence, Rhode Island.
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This was
done by two investments in February and April 1996.
Ultimately,
it appears the funds found their way into the hands of Allen
and/or Hilsmeier.
It is the Providence account that became the
basis of this litigation.
The estate claims that J. G. Chapman lacked the mental
capacity to open the Putnam account and/or that Allen exerted
undue influence upon J. G. Chapman while acting as agent of A. G.
Edwards.
At the time of the Putnam transactions, Allen was
employed by A. G. Edwards, but J. G. Chapman had ceased to be a
customer of A. G. Edwards, his relationship with that firm having
ended in 1994.
The essence of the administrator's suit was to hold A.
G. Edwards liable for any wrongful acts of Allen.
It is upon
this issue that the circuit court granted summary judgment in
favor of A. G. Edwards.
We review the granting of summary judgment under the
precepts of Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Absent the existence of a material
issue of fact, the case may be disposed of as a matter of law.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 56.03.
In this case, there is no dispute as to the facts and
the matter is one of law only.
The controlling law is enunciated
in Fournier v. Churchill Downs-Latonia, Inc., 292 Ky. 215, 166
S.W.2d 38 (1942).
Therein, the necessary elements for
establishing the liability of an employer for acts of an employee
were enumerated as follows:
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(1) the act is of the kind the offender is
employed to perform; (2) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and
space limits of the employment, and, (3) the
offender is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master. (Citation
omitted).
Id. at 40.
The parties to these proceedings generally agree that
the test set forth in Fourtnier is the applicable law.
They
differ as to whether the conduct of Allen met the test.
The fundamental rule to be gained from Fournier and
like cases is that a master is never liable for the acts of an
agent unless the acts are performed pursuant to authority of the
master, either expressed or implied.
See Slusher v. Hubble, 254
Ky. 595, 72 S.W.2d 39 (1934); and Reynolds' Administrator v.
Black Mountain Corporation, 240 Ky. 673, 42 S.W.2d 916 (1931).
In other words, if harm comes to another by virtue of an agent's
carrying out the work of his employer, then, in that event, the
employer may be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
In the case at hand, the record is void as to any
authority, either express or implied, for Allen to act for A. G.
Edwards in opening the Putnam account and making improper
dispersals therefrom.
A. G. Edwards had nothing to gain by
Chapman's opening of his account with Putnam Investments.
Indeed, it seems to us it was counterproductive for the account
to be opened with Putnam instead of A. G. Edwards.
One can only
conclude from the evidence that all the acts performed by Allen
were done in her own interest, and not in the interest of A. G.
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Edwards.
A. G. Edwards stood in no position to benefit from the
wrongful acts.
The best that can be said is that Allen embarked
upon her endeavor to ingratiate herself to Chapman while she was
employed by A. G. Edwards.
This alone is insufficient to expose
A. G. Edwards to liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
As such, we are of the opinion the circuit court was
correct in entering summary judgment.
See Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d
476.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-001457-MR
The claim of Joe A. Chapman, administrator of the
estate of J. G. Chapman, deceased, against Debbie Allen and
Lucille Hilsmeier came on for trial before jury in March of 2000.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate.
Judgment was
entered thereupon, thus precipitating Appeal No. 2000-CA-001457MR.
Allen and Hilsmeier raise three issues on this appeal.
They claim that (1) the trial court improperly received evidence;
(2) they were entitled to a directed verdict, and (3) the jury
was improperly instructed.
As to the claim of improper receipt of evidence, it
appears that the appellee's intestate, J. G. Chapman, underwent a
competency hearing in the Warren District Court in May of 1995.
The hearing terminated in favor of J. G. Chapman.
The jury
determined that he was not incompetent to manage his affairs.
The hearing was instigated by J. G. Chapman's three children.
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J. G. Chapman died in April 1997 at the age of ninetyone.
Between the competency trial in 1995 and his death in 1997,
J. G. Chapman disposed of a number of properties.
It was during
this period of February and April of 1996, that he opened an
investment account with Putnam Investments in Providence, Rhode
Island.
It appears this account later came into the hands of
Allen and/or Hilsmeier.
It is the Putnam account that forms the
basis of this litigation.
In filing the action on behalf of the estate, it was
the administrator's contention that Allen and Hilsmeier unduly
influenced J. G. Chapman, a person in declining years, to open
the Putnam account and to ultimately transfer the proceeds to
Allen and/or Hilsmeier.
The administrator further maintained his
intestate lacked the mental capacity to make a disposition of his
funds in favor of Allen and/or Hilsmeier.
At the beginning of trial, Allen and Hilsmeier moved
the court to take judicial notice that the inquest of 1995
resulted in J. G. Chapman's favor, and that he was therefore able
to care for his business affairs.
The court declined to grant
this motion and proceeded to allow the administrator to impeach
the verdict of the inquest jury.
Allen and Hilsmeier claim that
receipt of evidence attacking the inquest verdict was improper.
We assign no merit to Allen and Hilsmeier's contention.
We are aware that all evidence must be relevant.
401.
Ky. R. Evid.
However, the determination of relevancy is largely within
the discretion of the trial judge.
See Glens Falls Insurance
Company v. Ogden, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 547 (1958).
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We perceive no
abuse of discretion in receiving evidence concerning J. G.
Chapman's mental capacity either before or after the inquest.
Next, Allen and Hilsmeier argue that they were entitled
to a directed verdict.
We must reject this argument as the
record contains abundant evidence supporting submission.
Chapman was a man of advanced age and declining health.
J. G.
This
alone may form a basis for reasonable belief that he was not
capable of disposing of his property by gift.
Moreover, it would
support a conclusion that he could be easily subjected to
influence.
We note that the mental ability to execute a gift or
to perform a business transaction is more than that necessary to
make a will.
See Bye v. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
There is evidence in the record that Allen sided with J. G.
Chapman in his competency hearing.
There is also evidence that
J. G. Chapman gave Allen a general power of attorney to the
exclusion of his three children.
The evidence further reflects a
deepening of Allen's relationship with J. G. Chapman as the
latter grew older and more infirm.
Thus, we believe that a
reasonable person could have found that J. G. Chapman was unduly
influenced by Allen and/or that J. G. Chapman lacked the mental
capacity to dispose of the funds in question.
See Lee v. Tucker,
Ky., 365 S.W.2d 849 (1963).
Finally, Allen and Hilsmeier complained that the
instruction to the jury which permitted a joint and several
judgment was erroneous.
They contend that a comparative fault
instruction should have been rendered.
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We observe the majority view is that comparative
negligence principles are inapplicable to intentional torts.
Whitlock v. Smith, 297 Ark. 399, 762 S.W.2d 782 (1989); Godfrey
v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1982);
Cruise v. Graham, 622 So.2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Hopkins v. First Union Bank, 193 Ga. App., 109, 387 S.E.2d 144
(1989); Fitzgerald v. Young, 105 Idaho 539, 670 P.2d 1324 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1983); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan. 2d App. 369, 642 P.2d 131
(1982); and, McLain v. Training & Development Corporation, 572
A.2d 494 (Me. 1990).
The sound basis of such view rests upon:
[T]he general assumption that comparative
negligence evolved to provide compensation to
tort victims, who were barred by the harsh
doctrine of contributory negligence, and
should not be used to diminish recovery where
the common law had previously treated an
intentional tort victim's contributory fault
as irrelevant to damage recovery where an
intentional tort was inflicted.
Annot. 18 A.L.R.5th 525, 533 (1994).
Upon the above authorities,
we are persuaded that this Commonwealth should adopt the majority
view that comparative negligence is inapplicable to intentional
torts.
Allen and Hilsmeier cite this Court to Roman Catholic
Diocese of Covington v. Secter, Ky. App., 966 S.W.2d 286 (1998).
While we neither approve or disapprove this case, we consider it
distinguishable.
That case involved apportionment between
negligent and intentional tort-feasors.
Where only intentional
tort-feasors are involved, we think comparative negligence
principles inapplicable and, instead, joint and several liability
applicable.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Warren
Circuit Court is affirmed.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
AND FURNISHES SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur in part and dissent in part.
majority as to Appeal No. 2000-CA-000986-MR.
I concur with the
I believe the
summary judgment granted A. G. Edwards and Sons, Inc. was proper.
However, I dissent as to appeal No. 2000-CA-001457-MR.
reverse and remand.
I would
I believe the evidence admitted at this
trial to impeach the verdict of the competency hearing held in
May of 1995 was improper.
A duly impaneled jury heard the
evidence and had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, including J. G. Chapman at the time of the inquest.
To allow the Chapman heirs a second bite of the apple in
determining the medical and mental status of Mr. Chapman was
improper and the trial court abused its discretion by permitting
such tainted testimony.
I also believe the jury instructions
used in this case were fundamentally flawed.
The instructions
failed to provide the jury with an opportunity to specify whether
its findings of liability was based on undue influence, unsound
mind or both.
I further believe that the instructions were
flawed by allowing the appellants to be held liable jointly and
severally only.
I believe under the present status of the law
and especially in light of this Court’s ruling in Roman Catholic
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Diocese v. Sector, Ky. App., 966 S.W.2d 286 (1995), that this
case should have included an apportionment jury instruction.
For the foregoing reason, I believe Appeal No.
2000-CA-001457-MR should be reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT, JOE A.
CHAPMAN, Administrator of the
Estate of J. G. Chapman,
Deceased:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, A. G. EDWARDS &
SONS, INC.:
David T. Royse
Lexington, Kentucky
Philip Huddleston
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, JOE A. CHAPMAN,
Administrator of the Estate of
J. G. Chapman, Deceased:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT,
JOE A. CHAPMAN, Administrator
of the Estate of J. G.
Chapman, Deceased:
Lee Huddleston
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Lee Huddleston
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, DEBBIE
ALLEN:
David T. Sparks
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, LUCILLE
HILSMEIER:
Thomas A. Noe, III
Russellville, Kentucky
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