JEFFREY LYNN VANDEVEER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 22, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002926-MR
JEFFREY LYNN VANDEVEER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-00215
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Jeffrey Lynn Vandeveer brings this appeal from a
November 2, 1999 order of the Kenton Circuit Court.
We affirm in
part and reverse and remand in part.
In 1986, appellant was charged in a petition before the
juvenile session of the Kenton District Court with criminal
attempt to commit rape in the first degree, first degree sodomy,
and first degree sexual abuse.
On July 9, 1986, the district
court entered an order transferring appellant to circuit court
for prosecution as an adult under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
208.170 (repealed July 1, 1987).
Following a jury trial, he was
found guilty of two counts of first degree sexual abuse, and one
count of first degree sodomy.
On December 9, 1986, the circuit
court entered judgment sentencing appellant to a total of twenty
years’ imprisonment.
On September 16, 1999, the circuit court entered an
Order For Sex Offender Risk Assessment pursuant to the Sex
Offender Registration Act (the Act)1(codified as KRS 17.500 et
seq.).
Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion challenging
the constitutionality of the Act and challenging the
applicability of the Act to him.
On November 2, 1999, the
circuit court denied same, and entered an Order Of Sex Offender
Risk Determination finding appellant to be a “high risk” sexual
offender.
This appeal follows.
By order entered October 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals
placed the above-styled appeal in “abeyance” pending disposition
in the Kentucky Supreme Court of Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 2000-SC0676-DG; Hall v. Commonwealth, 2000-SC-0820-DG; and Commonwealth
v. Sims, 2000-SC-1076-DG and 2000-SC-0961-DG.
The Supreme Court
handed down a decision in the aforementioned appeals on February
21, 2002 in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky. 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002).
The
Court of Appeals subsequently entered an order directing
appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be “summarily
affirmed under the authority” of Hyatt.
Appellant responded that
the constitutional issues were disposed of by Hyatt, but that an
issue remained concerning interpretation of the Act.
1
We
The Sex Offender Registration Act generally requires a
person to register in certain circumstances after having been
convicted of a sex crime.
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therefore summarily affirm upon the constitutional issues and
address the remaining issue upon the merits.
Appellant contends that the circuit court erroneously
concluded that he must “register” under the Act.
KRS 17.510(2)
of the Act specifies who must register thereunder:
Any person eighteen (18) years of age
or older at the time of the offense or any
youthful offender who has committed or
attempted to commit a sex crime shall, within
ten (10) days after his release by the court,
the parole board, or the cabinet, register
with the appropriate local probation and
parole office in the county in which he
resides. (emphasis added).
As appellant committed the “sex” crimes before the age of
eighteen, he would have to qualify as a “youthful offender” to
come within the purview of the Act.
KRS 17.510(2)
It is axiomatic that words having acquired a particular
meaning in law are to be afforded that same meaning when used in
a statute.
See Hawley Coal Company v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67
S.W.2d 703 (1934); Payton v. Norris, 240 Ky. 555, 42 S.W.2d 723
(1931).
The term “youthful offender” has been routinely used in
our Uniform Juvenile Code (the Code)(KRS Chapter 600) and has
been specifically defined in KRS 600.020(56) of the Code:
“Youthful offender” means any person
regardless of age, transferred to Circuit
Court under the provisions of KRS Chapter 635
or 640 and who is subsequently convicted in
Circuit Court.
We believe the term “youthful offender” has acquired a particular
meaning in the law and must be given such meaning in KRS
17.510(2).
Accordingly, we interpret “youthful offender” in KRS
-3-
17.510(2) as meaning a person transferred to circuit court under
KRS Chapter 635 or 640.
We are buttressed in our interpretation by the
legislature’s subsequent amendment of KRS 17.510(2), effective
July 15, 2000.
KRS 17.510(2), as amended, reads:
A registrant shall, on or before the date of
his or her release by the court, the parole
board, the cabinet, or any detention
facility, register with the appropriate local
probation and parole office in the county in
which he or she intends to reside. The
person in charge of the release shall
facilitate the registration process.
A registrant is thereafter defined by KRS 17.500(4):
“Registrant” means:
(a) Any person eighteen (18) years of age
or older at the time of the offense or
any youthful offender, as defined in
KRS 600.020, who has committed:
1. A sex crime; or
2. A criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor . . .
. . . .
By amendment, the legislature has specifically utilized the
definition in KRS 600.020(56) to define the term “youthful
offender” in KRS 17.510(2).
Because we define the term “youthful offender” in KRS
17.510(2) as a person transferred to circuit court under KRS
Chapter 635 or 640, we are constrained to conclude that appellant
does not meet such definition.
Appellant was transferred to
circuit court under KRS 208.170; he was not transferred under KRS
635 or 640.
The Commonwealth, however, argues that KRS 635.020
effectively supplanted KRS 208.170.
-4-
The Commonwealth urges this
Court to adopt a broad interpretation of 600.020(56); the
Commonwealth believes that the legislature intended a transfer
under KRS 208.170 be tantamount to a transfer under KRS 635.020.
We disagree.
In determining legislative intent, it is our duty to
consider words used in the statute rather than surmising what may
have been intended but was not expressed.
Ky., 30 S.W.3d 146 (2000).
and unambiguous.
See Hale v. Combs,
We view KRS 600.020(56) as specific
Therein, a “youthful offender” is defined as a
person transferred to circuit court under KRS Chapter 635 or 640;
the statute makes no reference to KRS 208.170.
We think the
legislature clearly signaled its intent by the words utilized
therein.
Thus, we decline to adopt the Commonwealth’s broad
interpretation of KRS 600.020(56).
In sum, we are of the opinion that a “youthful
offender” under KRS 17.510(2) is a person who is transferred to
circuit court under the provisions of KRS Chapter 635 or 640.
appellant was not transferred to circuit court under those
statutes, we conclude that the appellant is not a “youthful
offender” under KRS 17.510(2).
We thus hold that appellant is
not required to register under the Act.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in
part for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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As
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
`
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