CLARENCE D. DUNN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 23, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002800-MR
CLARENCE D. DUNN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CR-00687
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Clarence D. Dunn appeals from an order entered
by the Fayette Circuit Court designating him as a high risk sex
offender pursuant to KRS 17.570.
This appeal was held in
abeyance pending a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court
resolving the issue of the constitutionality of the Sexual
Offender Registration Act, KRS 17.500 et seq., commonly known as
“Megan’s Law.”
In Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566
(2002), the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of KRS 17.500 et seq.
On September 14, 1993, Dunn was indicted by a Fayette
County Grand Jury on two counts of first-degree rape, two counts
of first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent
felony offender.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, on October 29,
1993, Dunn pled guilty to one count of second-degree rape.
On
November 23, 1993, Dunn was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment
with the remaining charges dismissed.
Dunn was recommended for release on parole.
On
March 15, 1999, the Fayette Circuit Court entered an order
pursuant to KRS 17.570, directing that a sex offender risk
assessment be prepared for Dunn.
A risk determination hearing
was held on November 5, 1999, and, on November 8, 1999, an order
was entered finding Dunn to be a high risk sex offender.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Dunn first argues that the application of
the sex offender statutes to him violates constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.
Dunn concedes that these errors are not preserved for review.
In
Hyatt, our Supreme Court considered and rejected these arguments.
The sex offender statutes are constitutional as applied to Dunn.
Dunn additionally argues that the court erred in
increasing his risk level to "high” when the certified provider
assessed him as a moderate risk and the tests did not show him to
be a high risk for committing a future sexual offense.
Dunn
concedes that this error was unpreserved, but requests review per
RCr 10.26.
While KRS 17.570 requires the circuit court to review
the recommendation of the certified provider, the statute does
not require the trial court to assign a risk level based solely
on this recommendation.
Hence, it was not error for the circuit
court to assign a risk level different from the recommendation of
the certified provider.
KRS 17.570(6) requires the circuit court
to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order
designating the level of risk.
In the present case, these
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procedures were followed, with the court’s findings of fact
indicating that it believed a higher risk level was warranted for
reasons including that this was Dunn’s fourth incarceration, the
serious nature of the crime, and the need to protect the
community.
No palpable error occurred.
RCr 10.26.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court classifying Dunn as a high risk sex offender is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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