GARY WAYNE CHAPMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 31, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001383-MR
GARY WAYNE CHAPMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00076
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, HUDDLESTON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: The appellant, Gary Wayne Chapman, appeals from
an order of the Perry Circuit Court that denied without a hearing
his RCr1 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence for the offense of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000
yards of a school.
We affirm.
On August 21, 1996, appellant Gary Wayne Chapman pled
guilty to the offense of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000
yards of a school.
Having entered his plea, Chapman accepted the
Commonwealth’s pre-trial diversion offer.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
Accordingly, Chapman’s
sentencing was diverted for a period of five years upon the
following conditions: (1) the defendant shall have no further
arrests; (2) the defendant shall regularly attend any AA or NA
meetings as prescribed by the court; (3) the defendant shall
undergo periodic drug screens; and (4) in the event of a
violation as set forth above, the case may proceed to sentencing
upon Motion of the Commonwealth or by the Court, sua sponte.
The
matter was dismissed without prejudice on September 9, 1997.
In February 1999, Chapman filed a motion to vacate the
pre-trial diversion order and judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Following a response by the Commonwealth, the circuit court
denied Chapman’s motion without a hearing.
The circuit court
found, inter alia, that Chapman was not “in custody” for purposes
of RCr 11.42 and thus he was barred from bringing a claim under
RCr 11.42.
Moreover, the circuit court found that even if
Chapman were able to bring a claim under RCr 11.42, by pleading
guilty Chapman had knowingly and voluntarily waived each basis
for review of his RCr 11.42 Motion.
This appeal followed.
Chapman’s complaints on appeal are threefold.
First,
Chapman claims that the circuit court erred in finding that he is
not “in custody” for purposes of RCr 11.42.
Chapman also claims
that the circuit court erred in finding that even if Chapman is
properly able to seek relief under RCr 11.42, then by pleading
guilty to trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school
that he has knowingly and voluntarily waived each basis for
review of his 11.42 Motion.
Finally, Chapman claims that the
-2-
circuit court erred in denying his motion for relief under RCr
11.42 without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Chapman contends that the circuit court abused its
discretion by finding that Chapman was not “in custody” for
purposes of RCr 11.42 and thus that RCr 11.42 is inapplicable to
the case at bar.
The plain language of RCr 11.42 provides that
“a prisoner in custody under sentence” or “a defendant . . . who
claims a right to be released on the ground that sentence is
subject to a collateral attack” may bring a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel under RCr 11.42. (Emphasis Added).
Although Chapman was charged with the offense of trafficking
marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, he was never sentenced
for committing such a crime.
Rather, by accepting the plea
agreement offered by the Commonwealth, any sentence resulting
from his committing the crime was suspended for a period of five
years.
Because the pre-trial diversion order and agreement do
not constitute a sentence, Chapman has no redress under RCr
11.42.
Even if Chapman is afforded a remedy under RCr 11.42,
the record is insufficient to support a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In order to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy a two-part test
showing both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
the deficiency caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome of
the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.
-3-
Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986).
Where an appellant challenges
a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must
show both that the counsel made serious errors outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance and that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the
plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the appellant would not have pled
guilty, but rather would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203 (1985); Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 51 S.W.3d 456, 459-60
(2001); Casey v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 18, 22
(1999).
It is well established that counsel is presumed to be
constitutionally sufficient and that the movant of an Rcr 11.42
Motion has the burden of overcoming this presumption.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v.
Pelphrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
In his brief, Chapman
makes several references to the plea transcript in order to
overcome the presumption that his counsel was efficient.
However, this transcript is not part of the record on appeal.
Under CR 75.07(5), it is the duty of the appellant to see that
the record is properly certified.
Moreover, a silent record is
presumed to support the circuit court.
Commonwealth v. Thompson,
Ky., 697 S.W.2d 143, 144-145 (1985).
Chapman has also failed to plead the prejudice prong of
the Strickland test with sufficient specificity to invalidate his
guilty plea.
In order to prove actual prejudice in the context
-4-
of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.”
Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 51 S.W.3d 456,
459-460 (2001) citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct.
366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d. 203 (1985).
Nowhere in Chapman’s
pleadings does he allege that but for his counsel’s professional
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.
Therefore, on this ground, Chapman fails to
establish entitlement to relief.
Finally, Chapman claims that the circuit court abused
its discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on his RCr 11.42
motion.
It is well established that where a trial court has
denied a defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on his RCr
11.42 Motion, appellate review is limited to “whether the motion
on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by
the record, and, which, if true, would invalidate the
conviction.”
(1967).
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322
Moreover, “[w]here the movant’s allegations are refuted
on the record as a whole, no evidentiary is required.”
Sparks v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (1986) citing Hopwell
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1985).
Generally, pleading guilty waives all defenses except that the
indictment did not charge an offense.
Hughes v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1994) citing Bush v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
702 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1986).
Thus, Chapman’s guilty plea alone
constitutes sufficient record to rule on his RCr 11.42 Motion.
-5-
In conclusion, Chapman has no redress under RCr 11.42
because he has not been sentenced.
Moreover, even if RCr 11.42
is applicable to his claim, Chapman has failed to show with
specificity that his counsel was deficient and that as a result,
he was actually prejudiced by such ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Finally, the circuit court properly denied an
evidentiary hearing on Chapman’s RCr 11.42 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Perry
Circuit Court is affirmed.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary Wayne Chapman, pro se
Ashland, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.