AND JAMES RAY ARMOUR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 21, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1999-CA-001195-MR
AND
1999-CA-002158-MR
JAMES RAY ARMOUR
APPELLANT
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00846
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING IN PART IN 1999-CA-002158-MR;
VACATING AND REMANDING IN 1999-CA-001195-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: These are consolidated appeals in which James
Armour challenges the use of KRS1 532.043 by the trial court in
sentencing him on a plea of guilty to sexual abuse in the first
degree.
He also appeals the trial court’s order classifying him
as a high risk sex offender.
The appeals were abated pending a
decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court resolving the issue of the
constitutionality of KRS 17.500, et seq., the Sexual Offender
Registration Act, commonly known as “Megan’s law.”
In Hyatt v.
Commonwealth, Ky., ___ S.W.3d ___ (2002), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme but reversed and
remanded for a new risk assessment hearing based on procedural
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Kentucky Revised Statutes.
due process grounds.
Hyatt is now final, and Armour’s appeals
are ripe for our review.
On August 24, 1998, Armour was indicted on two counts
of sexual abuse in the first degree arising from charges that he
engaged in the inappropriate sexual touching of an eleven-yearold child on May 4, 1998.
On September 25, 1998, Armour pled
guilty to one count in the indictment in exchange for the
Commonwealth’s recommendation that he serve one year in prison
and that the second count of the indictment be dismissed.
Sentencing was postponed pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
On October 23, 1998, pursuant to the Commonwealth’s
recommendation, the trial court sentenced Armour to serve one
year in the state penitentiary.
Additionally, pursuant to KRS
532.043, the trial court ordered that Armour serve a three-year
sentence of conditional discharge upon completion of his prison
term.
The trial court further ordered that Armour undergo
testing for HIV and DNA.
It also ordered that within sixty days
of his release from prison, Armour be assessed for purposes of
being classified under the sex offender registration act.
Armour moved the trial court to reconsider its
sentence.
He argued that both KRS 532.043 (mandating the
imposition of an additional three-year period of conditional
discharge for persons convicted of certain sex offenses) and KRS
17.500, et seq., became effective after the date of criminal
offense for which he was sentenced.
Therefore, he contended that
the trial court’s retrospective application of those statutes to
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his case violated both state and federal protections against ex
post facto laws.
The trial court took the matter under
advisement.
On January 4, 1999, with the motion to reconsider still
pending, the trial court ordered that a risk assessment be
performed and set a hearing date for the sex offender risk
determination on February 26, 1999.
Armour’s counsel did not
receive the risk assessment report until the day before the
hearing.
For that reason and because the expert who had
performed the risk assessment was not present in court, the
matter was continued on Armour’s motion to allow Armour time to
subpoena the expert.
Armour also moved the trial court to
authorize the release of funds to allow him to obtain his own
expert to evaluate the likelihood of his re-offending and to
assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth’s expert.
That
motion was denied.
At the risk assessment hearing on April 30, 1999, the
trial court overruled the motion to reconsider Armour’s sentence
with respect to the application of the sex offender registration
act.
The hearing proceeded with the testimony of the author of
the report, Katherine Peterson, a psychologist employed by the
Department of Corrections.
offered.
No other testimony or evidence was
The trial court concluded that Armour was a high risk
sex offender and found that he had “intellectual difficulties,”
“antisocial tendencies,” “suicidal tendencies,” and a “likelihood
of acting out against others” — all of which findings were based
on the testimony and/or report of Katherine Peterson, the
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Commonwealth’s expert.
On August 10, 1999, the trial court
denied Armour’s motion to reconsider the three-year conditional
discharge imposed after his period of incarceration.
Appeal # 1999-CA-001195
Armour argues that he was denied due process in the
risk assessment proceeding because the trial court denied his
request for funds to obtain a medical expert or another qualified
expert in order to prepare his own risk assessment and to testify
for him at the hearing.
In determining whether the trial court
erred in failing to allocate funds for an independent expert, our
inquiry is focused on whether the trial court abused its
discretion.
McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 499 (2001).
The issue of allocation of funds for an expert was not
directly considered in Hyatt, supra.
However, the Supreme Court
acknowledged and emphasized the need for procedural protections
in sexual predator proceedings.
Although the Court held that the
registration scheme was not penal in nature, it nevertheless held
that it was imperative:
that counsel have time to adequately
prepare for the hearing, that the author of the risk assessment
report be in attendance at the hearing, and that the sex offender
be afforded the opportunity to present expert testimony to rebut
the opinions expressed by the author of the risk assessment
report.
Id. Slip op. at 18.
We agree with Armour’s contention that the rights
articulated in Hyatt are meaningless to an indigent unless funds
are made available to allow him to obtain his own expert in the
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field of psychology or psychiatry.
The trial court gave
considerable weight to Peterson’s testimony in making its
findings concerning Armour’s potential to re-offend.
Therefore,
we are compelled to hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant Armour’s motion for funds to
employ his own expert.
Thus, we vacate the order of April 30,
1999, and remand for a new hearing consistent with this opinion.
Appeal # 1999-CA-002158
In this appeal, Armour challenges that portion of his
sentence imposing a three-year period of conditional discharge.
This sentence was not included in his plea agreement with the
Commonwealth but was imposed by the trial court sua sponte and
over Armour’s objection that KRS 532.043 did not apply to him.
Armour continues to argue that KRS 532.043 is an
unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him.
During the
period while this case was abated pending a decision on the
constitutionality of our version of “Megan’s law,” the Kentucky
Supreme Court also resolved this issue.
In Purvis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 21, 24 (2000), a case involving a
situation identical to the case now before us, the Court held:
As both elements of the ex post facto law
tests are satisfied, KRS 532.043 is
unconstitutional as applied to offenses
committed before the effective date of the
act.
There is no dispute that Armour committed the offense of sexual
abuse in the first degree in May 1998 — well before the effective
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date of KRS 532.043.
Consequently, the trial court erred in
applying the statute to enhance Armour’s sentence.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court sentencing
Armour to a three-year period of conditional discharge is
vacated.
The order of the Fayette Circuit Court determining
Armour to be a high risk sexual offender is vacated, and the
matter is remanded for a new hearing.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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