SHERILL D. HARSTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000468-MR
SHERILL D. HARSTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 79-CR-00024`
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Sherill D. Harston has appealed from an order of
the Warren Circuit Court entered on January 31, 2001, which
denied his motions to vacate his convictions for murder,1
manslaughter in the first degree,2 and theft by unlawful taking,3
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020.
2
KRS 507.030.
3
KRS 514.030.
filed pursuant to RCr4 10.06, RCr 10.26, CR5 60.02(f), and CR
60.03.
Having concluded that these motions are procedurally
barred, we affirm.
On December 28, 1978, Harston strangled his girlfriend,
Diane Marcum, during an argument.
The next morning, he drowned
Marcum’s three-year-old son, burned the bodies, and threw them
into the river.
furniture.
Over the next few days, he sold some of Marcum’s
After being apprehended in Indianapolis, Indiana,
Harston confessed to the killings.
He subsequently was indicted
on two counts of capital murder and theft by unlawful taking.
Prior to trial, he was examined by several psychiatrists and
found competent to stand trial by the trial court.
At the trial, the Commonwealth sought the death penalty
and Harston relied on a defense of insanity.
Two psychiatrists
testifying for the Commonwealth stated that Harston was sane at
the time of the crimes and was faking mental incompetence.
The
defense countered with three psychiatrists opining that Harston
was insane.
The defense also called Elya Bresler, an alleged
clinical psychologist who presented a long list of credentials,
who testified that Harston suffered from schizophrenia, was
legally insane, and represented a dangerous threat to kill again.
The jury found Harston guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
with respect to Marcum, murder of the child, and theft by
unlawful taking.
It recommended consecutive sentences of 99
years for murder, 20 years for manslaughter, and five years for
4
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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theft by unlawful taking.
On April 30, 1980, the trial court
sentenced Harston to 124 years in prison consistent with the
jury’s recommendation.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky affirmed the convictions and sentence.6
On September 1, 1998, Harston, acting pro se, filed an
RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds of the
lack of a sanity hearing, prejudicial statements by a deputy
sheriff and the trial judge concerning the lack of state
facilities for the criminally insane, an illegal confession, and
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In November 1998, the trial
court granted Harston’s request for appointment of counsel to
assist him.
In February 1999, counsel filed a supplement to the
RCr 11.42 motion which raised the issue of fraudulent conduct and
false testimony by Elya Bresler about his professional
qualifications.
Counsel later amended his supplemental filing to
raise the fraud/perjury issue under CR 60.02.
After conducting several hearings, the trial court
entered an order on November 17, 1999, denying both motions.
The
trial court held that Harston’s RCr 11.42 motion was barred by
the three-year time limitation stated in RCr 11.42(10), and even
if the fraudulent conduct by Bresler were considered newly
discovered evidence outside the proscription of subsection 10, it
would have been more appropriately raised under RCr 10.06 or CR
60.02.
6
The trial court found that under Commonwealth v.
Harston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 638 S.W.2d 700 (1982).
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Spaulding,7 the fraud/perjury claim was not time barred under the
one-year limitation in CR 60.02(d) and applied subsection (f),
but it rejected the claim based on the merits.
It ruled that
Harston failed to show that Bresler’s perjured testimony affected
the outcome of the trial given the testimony by several
psychiatrists, other than Bresler, supporting Harston’s insanity
defense.
The trial court held, alternatively, that the claim was
untimely as not being made within a reasonable time.
This Court on December 22, 2000, affirmed the trial
court and agreed with its analysis on the merits of the
fraud/perjury claim.8
In its opinion, this Court distinguished
the case of Skaggs v. Parker,9 wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed Skaggs’ death sentence based on ineffective
assistance because of defense counsel’s use of Elya Bresler as a
witness in the sentencing phase of his trial.
Discretionary
review was denied by the Supreme Court.
In January 2000, while the appeal on the RCr 11.42 and
CR 60.02 motions was pending in this Court, Harston filed in the
Warren Circuit Court a pro se motion to set aside the judgment of
conviction pursuant to RCr 10.06 and RCr 10.26.
In March 2000,
Harston filed a supplement to the motion challenging his
convictions and sentence based on alleged prejudicial statements
7
Ky., 991 S.W.2d 651 (1999).
8
This Court expressed no opinion on the RCr 11.42 claims
because Harston had not appealed that portion of the trial
court’s order and did not address the timeliness of the CR
60.02(f) motion given its decision affirming on the merits.
9
235 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____,
122 S.Ct. 322, 151 L.Ed.2d 241 (2001).
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by the original trial judge, Bresler’s fraud and perjury, and
inconsistent verdicts (murder as to the child and manslaughter as
to Marcum).
The trial court postponed consideration of these
motions pending resolution of the pending appeal.10
In November
2000, Harston filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence
pursuant to CR 60.02(f) and CR 60.03 based on Bresler’s
fraud/perjury citing the recent case of Skaggs.
Following completion of the first appellate proceeding,
several supplemental filings by Harston, and a response by the
Commonwealth, the circuit court entered an order denying
Harston’s RCr 10.06, RCr 10.26, CR 60.02(f), and CR 60.03 motions
for relief on January 31, 2001.
It ruled that the claims raised
in the motions were procedurally barred under the doctrines of
res judicata and the law of the case doctrine.
The circuit court
noted that the issues raised in the motions and supplemental
filings either had been decided adversely to Harston or were not
raised, but could have been raised in earlier proceedings.
On
March 2, 2001, the circuit court denied Harston’s motion for
reconsideration.
This appeal followed.
We agree with the circuit court that Harston’s claims
are procedurally barred.
Several related legal doctrines apply
to prevent Harston from relitigating issues that were raised and
decided in prior proceedings or could have been raised.
First,
under the successive motions principle set out in Gross v.
10
A special judge was assigned to the case because of civil
litigation by Harston against all the judges of the Warren
Circuit Court, the prosecutors, defense counsel, and others.
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Commonwealth,11 a criminal defendant must first bring a direct
appeal when available, then utilize RCr 11.42 by raising every
error of which he should be aware, and use CR 60.02 only for
extraordinary situations not otherwise subject to relief by
direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42.12
More recently, in
McQueen v. Commonwealth,13 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
procedural requirements set out in Gross when it said:
A defendant who is in custody under sentence
or on probation, parole or conditional
discharge is required to avail himself of RCr
11.42 as to any ground of which he is aware,
or should be aware, during the period when
the remedy is available to him. Civil Rule
60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
opportunity to relitigate the same issues
which could “reasonably have been presented”
by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.
RCr 11.42(3); Gross v. Commonwealth, supra,
at 855, 856. The obvious purpose of this
principle is to prevent the relitigation of
issues which either were or could have been
litigated in a similar proceeding.14
The successive motions principle applies even though an appeal
was dismissed on procedural grounds and the merits of the first
motion were not addressed in the earlier appeal proceeding.15
Similarly, res judicata is a doctrine that bars
relitigation of matters decided by a court of competent
11
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
12
Id. at 856.
13
Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130,
117 S.Ct. 2535, 138 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1997).
14
Id. at 416. See also Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454
S.W.2d 672 (1970)(courts have more to do than occupy themselves
with successive reruns of RCr 11.42 motions); Land v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 986 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1999); and Barnett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (1998).
15
Lycans v. Commonwealth, Ky., 511 S.W.2d 232 (1974).
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jurisdiction in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction.16
but related principles:
Res judicata encompasses two separate
(1) claim preclusion; and (2) issue
preclusion (sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel).17
Claim preclusion bars a party from
relitigating a previously adjudicated cause
of action and entirely bars a new lawsuit on
the same cause of action. Issue preclusion
bars the parties from relitigating any issue
actually litigated and finally decided in an
earlier action. The issues in the former and
latter actions must be identical. The key
inquiry in deciding whether the lawsuits
concern the same controversy is whether they
both arise from the same transactional
nucleus of facts [citations omitted].18
In the current case, Harston has filed several motions
involving the same or similar claims.
His initial RCr 11.42
motion was denied as untimely by the circuit court and he did not
appeal that decision.
Several of the issues raised in his RCr
10.26 motion and supplement either were raised in the initial RCr
11.42 proceeding or could have been raised during the period RCr
11.42 relief was available.
The issue of Bresler’s
fraud/perjury, which Harston asserts he was unaware of until 1999
although Bresler’s false qualifications were exposed in 1984, was
addressed and rejected on the merits by the circuit court in the
proceeding on the initial CR 60.02 motion.
This Court affirmed
16
See Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd., Ky., 983
S.W.2d 459, 464 (1998); and BTC Leasing, Inc. v. Martin, Ky.App.,
685 S.W.2d 191, 197 (1984).
17
Moore v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky.,
954 S.W.2d 317, 318 (1997).
18
Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465. See also City of Louisville v.
Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass’n, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 804,
806 (1991).
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the denial of the CR 60.02 motion and specifically distinguished
the Skaggs case, which Harston cited as new evidence supporting
his second CR 60.02 motion.
Harston’s attempt to relitigate the
same issue in a second CR 60.02 motion is barred by res
judicata.19
In conclusion, all of Harston’s claims are barred by
either res judicata or the successive motions principle.
Furthermore, his assertion that the Warren Circuit Court lacked
jurisdiction to rule on the motions is without merit.20
The order of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sherill D. Harston, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
19
See e.g., Richardson v. Brunner, Ky., 328 S.W.2d 530
(1959)(involving multiple CR 60.02 motions), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 902, 80 S.Ct. 610, 4 L.Ed.2d 554 (1960).
20
See KRS 23A.010(1); Commonwealth v. Basnight, Ky.App., 770
S.W.2d 231 (1989); and Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d
710 (1966).
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