RICHARD S. SEXTON PETITIONER v. ORIGINAL ACTION REGARDING GRANT CIRCUIT COURT HON. STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE, GRANT CIRCUIT COURT AND GARY W. SKINNER
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RENDERED:
March 23, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000081-OA
RICHARD S. SEXTON
v.
PETITIONER
ORIGINAL ACTION
REGARDING GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HON. STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE,
GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
RESPONDENT
AND
GARY W. SKINNER
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING CR 76.36 RELIEF
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE: BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE.
Petitioner, Richard S. Sexton (Sexton) has filed
a petition for writ of prohibition.
The real party in interest,
Gary W. Skinner (Skinner) has filed a motion for additional time
in which to respond to the petition.
motion be GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that the
The tendered response is ORDERED FILED.
The
petition is hereby GRANTED.
Sexton asks this Court to prohibit the respondent trial
court from requiring him to use a physician of the court’s
choosing to perform an independent medical examination (IME) of
Skinner pursuant to Kentucky Rule Of Civil Procedure (CR) 35.01.
Sexton contends that, in so ordering, the respondent has either
acted without jurisdiction or has acted in error, and there is no
adequate remedy by appeal.
Sexton is the defendant to an automobile negligence
action filed by Skinner.
Following Skinner’s deposition and a
review of his medical records, Sexton noticed Skinner to present
himself for an IME at a certain date, to be performed by Dr.
Daniel D. Primm, Jr., an orthopedist from Lexington, Kentucky.
Skinner filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that
Sexton had failed to show good cause for an IME.
Skinner also
argued that Primm is a well-known “defense doctor”, thus has
“large economic incentive to ensure that his opinions are
conservative”, and that the examination was an attempt by Sexton
“to manufacture favorable testimony”.
Sexton responded that good cause was demonstrated by
the pleadings where Skinner has placed his physical condition in
controversy and is seeking damages.
Further, he noted that
Skinner is not challenging Primm’s credentials or competency,
only his being a “defense doctor”, a matter he could raise at
trial on cross-examination.
The trial court entered an order on October 10, 2000,
directing that the IME be conducted.
Without making specific
findings, the court stated that it had found good cause for the
IME and ordered that Skinner be examined by “any practicing
physician at the Lexington Orthopedic Associates, PSC, . . . .”
The trial court noted that it had chosen those physicians on its
own accord and over Sexton’s objection.
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The order further
provided that the IME would be at Sexton’s expense.
Sexton moved for reconsideration, citing a number of
federal decisions that stand for the principle that a plaintiff
is required to have a valid objection to overcome a defendant’s
choice of a physician to perform an IME.
However, the trial
court reached the same conclusion on reconsideration.
The court
supported its ruling by citing to 6 Bertelsmann & Philipps,
Kentucky Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, 4th
Edition, and the authors’ comment to CR 35.01 [itself referring
to Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § §
2234 and 2239] to wit:
[A] moving party has no absolute right to the
choice of a physician. . . . Although the
practice generally followed is not to object
to the physician selected by the moving
party, the Rule does not so require.1
In this original action, Sexton again relies on the
same federal cases on which he relied below and renews the
argument that a valid objection, not merely a general allegation
of bias or prejudice, must be made in order to deprive a
defendant of his choice of a doctor to perform an IME.
Further,
Sexton claims the respondent’s decision violates his right to due
process in that the court is choosing who will examine plaintiff
for the defense, while plaintiff has no similar restrictions.
1
In
In the Fifth Edition of the same treatise, the latter
portion of the comment now reads: “Although the practice is not
to object to the physician selected by the moving party, the Rule
contemplates this right to object to a bias [sic] or partial
expert.” 6 Kurt A. Phillips, Jr., Kentucky Practice, Rules of
Civil Procedure 654 (1995).
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addition, he will have to pay for an expert he did not select.
Sexton further contends that being required to use a
physician chosen by the Court would cause irreparable damage to
his ability to fully defend himself for which an appeal would not
be an adequate remedy and, in fact, would cause irreparable
damage to the adversary system itself.
In particular, he argues
that the expert, if called at trial, would be identified to the
jury as the defendant’s doctor and that any negative testimony
given by the expert could be construed by the jury as that of the
defendant’s own doctor testifying against the defendant.
Last,
but not least for Sexton, he claims that, because few qualified
physicians are willing to perform IME’s, if a plaintiff is able
to object to a particular doctor only because the doctor often
performs those examinations, he and all defendants to personal
injury actions will find themselves “in an impossible position.”
In his response, Skinner now asserts that he has no
objection to an IME.
However, he continues to maintain that, by
his choice of an economically motivated physician, Sexton wants
the examination for the sole purpose of manufacturing favorable
testimony.
He too relies on federal authorities which provide
that a trial court may reject a defendant’s choice of a physician
“upon sufficient showing of bias or prejudice.”
This Court, having considered the parties’ arguments
and the appended record, has determined that this original action
is well taken.
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary and
discretionary remedy.
It is generally issued only when a lower
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court is proceeding, or is about to proceed, outside its
jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or when
it is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction,
and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and
great injustice and irreparable injury would result to the
petitioner if the court should do so.
See, e.g., Southeastern
United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d
195, 199 (1997).
Although we do not necessarily accept all of Sexton’s contentions
of irreparable harm, we believe that he has made a threshold
showing sufficient to prompt this Court’s exercise of its
discretion.
In addition, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that
it is appropriate for this Court to exercise its supervisory
authority in cases where “. . . the orderly administration of our
Civil Rules necessitates an expression of our views . . . as they
pertain to . . . the proper construction and application of the
Rule in question . . . .”
802 (1961).
Bender v. Eaton, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 799,
The absence of any Kentucky reported authority
construing and applying an important component of CR 35.01 by
itself would justify a review of the merits of the case sub
judice.
It is a well established principle that a trial court
has broad discretion over disputes involving the discovery
process.
However, this discretion is not unlimited, and we have
determined that the respondent’s outright rejection of Dr. Primm
to perform the IME is an abuse of that discretion for lack of
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proper legal basis.
In making this determination, we do not mean
to advance that a party does not have the right to object to the
opposing party’s choice of an examining doctor.
A review of
sister state and federal law shows that any party to an action is
clearly entitled to so object.
We also do not mean to advance
that the trial court does not have the authority to sustain the
objection and to appoint an expert of its choice.
We believe
that such authority is an inherent part of the aforementioned
discretion in discovery disputes.
In addition, we are mindful
that Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 706 specifically provides
that “The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by
the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection.”
However, KRE 706 does include a procedure providing
for the involvement of both sides in the appointment process.
CR 35.01, although it stands out by its requirement of judicial
intervention ab initio,2
does not specifically address court
appointment and the mechanics thereof.
The Rule provides as
follows:
When the mental or physical condition
(including the blood group) of a party, or of
a person in the custody or under the legal
control of a party, is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may
order the party to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a physician, dentist or
appropriate expert, or to produce for
examination the person in his custody or
legal control. The order may be made only on
motion for good cause shown and upon notice
2
For analysis of the various elements of the federal
equivalent to CR 35.01, see Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
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to the person to be examined and to all
parties and shall specify the time, place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom
it is to be made.
The respondent trial court construed this Rule to not
“. . . entitle a Defendant to select a physician to be used as
their expert” and to not . . . “require the Plaintiff to submit
to examination by that physician” because the Rule does not
expressly say so and the respondent was of the opinion that, had
the Supreme Court intended for such entitlement, “it would have
changed the rule to so read.”
While we agree with the trial
court that a defendant does not have an absolute right to select
a physician, we reject the position that a trial court must
automatically exercise its appointment power at any time a
plaintiff objects to a defendant’s selection.
The trial court
did recognize that the authors of Kentucky Practice, supra,
commented that an objection to an opposing party’s choice of a
physician should be supported by “cogent reasons”, yet the trial
court did not follow through with its application of that
comment.
CR 35.01 is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 35(a).
The latter Rule has been construed in a long line
of cases, including the very issue raised herein.
The respondent
declined to rely on the federal authorities submitted by Sexton
stating “this Court is not bound by the application of Kentucky
substantive law by the Federal Courts.”
However, when Kentucky
reported law is silent on a particular question pertaining to the
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Rules, Kentucky courts routinely accept guidance from federal
authorities that have spoken on the same question.
See, e.g.,
Scudamore v. Horton, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 142 (1968); Jackson v.
Metcalf, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 793 (1966).
There is even one
pronouncement from the Kentucky Supreme Court directly dealing
with CR 35.01 and opining that “federal court decisions
interpreting the latter rule may be accepted as persuasive
authority.”
Perry v. Com. Ex Rel. Kessinger, Ky., 652 S.W.2d
655, 658 (1983).
This Court has
been unable to locate a
reported Kentucky decision analyzing and resolving the specific
query before us.3
Unlike the respondent trial court, we find the federal
authorities cited by Sexton to be persuasive.
In fact, we also
find the federal authorities cited by Skinner to be persuasive in
the same vein.
The principle that clearly transpires from those
authorities is that a defendant may choose the examining doctor
and that such choice is entitled to respect but for a plaintiff’s
“valid objection”.
See, Liechty v. Terrill Trucking Company, 53
F.R.D. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1971);
Powell v. United States, 149
F.R.D. 122 (E.D. Va. 1993).
3
The Court has reviewed Keller & Brady Company v. Berry,
Ky., 121 S.W. 1009, (1909), where the appellate court stated, in
reference to an examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury
action requested at trial by the defendant: "Such examination
should always be made by some impartial physician appointed by
the court." However, this case does not construe CR 35.01. In
addition, because the defendant subsequently withdrew its request
for a physical examination, and the decision includes no
discussion and reports no findings regarding what showing of
partiality was made to the trial court, we take this language as
mere dictum.
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A party seeking a protective order bears the burden of
persuasion.
As previously stated, Skinner abandons his objection
to the IME in his response to this original action, and retains
his objection to the choice of Dr. Primm and his “significant
economic interest and track record.”
Neither the motion for
protective order, nor the response to this original action,
advances any specific facts substantiating that alleged “track
record”.
Further, although the motion asserted Skinner’s
“confidence” that, if a hearing were held, evidence of Dr.
Primm’s record would be adduced, that evidence, if any, is absent
from the record before us.
We also note that at no time did
Skinner assert that Dr. Primm is incompetent or unqualified to
perform the IME.
It is clear to this Court that Skinner’s stated
objections fall far below the requirement that such objections be
based on "valid" or "cogent" reasons,4 and the trial court erred
in failing to consider, or give any weight to, that requirement.
In conclusion, it is the holding of this Court that,
while a trial court has the authority under CR 35.01 to appoint a
4
In fact, in Douponce v. Drake, 183 F.R.D. 565 (D. Colo.
1998), a case on which Skinner relies in his response, the
objection to the selection of a Dr. Larson as the examiner
included that he had performed some 164 IME's over two and a half
years, most of them on behalf of the defense and also that an
attorney's affidavit stated that Dr. Larson had a bias against
plaintiffs and was not "an honest man." Although more specific
than Skinner's objections herein, these objections were deemed to
be insufficient to prohibit Dr. Larson from performing the
examination. Likewise in McKitis v. Defazio, 187 F.R.D. 225 (D.
Md. 1999), the plaintiff's objection that the physician was a
defense doctor and that "approximately 90% of his opinions are
contrary to the opinions of the physicians who actually treat the
patients" was also held to be insufficient to disqualify the
doctor from performing the IME.
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physician to perform an IME, and even to appoint one other than
selected by a defendant, it may do so only upon a valid and
substantiated objection regarding the physician's qualifications
or record, not upon a mere conclusory assertion discrediting the
selection.
We believe this is a sound principle because it
safeguards the purpose embodied in CR 35.01 to provide “a level
playing field between the parties.
Defendants have no say in
determining what physician plaintiff chooses as his or her expert
witness.”
Looney v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 142 F.R.D.
264, 265 (D. Mass. 1992).
In the case of an allegation of bias,
the soundness of the foregoing principle is further bolstered by
the awareness that the objection goes to the credibility of the
doctor and, thus, is a matter more appropriately raised through
cross-examination at trial.
Therefore, the respondent trial court is hereby
PROHIBITED from enforcing the portion of its order entered
October 10, 2000, appointing a physician other than the one
selected by Sexton.
BARBER and BUCKINGHAM, Judges, CONCUR.
COMBS, Judge, DISSENTS by separate opinion.
COMBS, Judge, DISSENTING.
I strongly believe that we
have made a mistake in intervening and interfering with the
discretion of the trial judge.
He is supported unequivocally by
federal precedent while Kentucky law is wholly silent.
I believe
that he acted correctly as a matter of law and within his
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authority as a matter of jurisdiction.
ENTERED:
March 23, 2001
/s/ David A. Barber
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
(SEXTON):
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST (SKINNER):
John W. Walters
Lexington, Kentucky
Larry Hicks
Florence, Kentucky
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