CHARLES BROOKS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002792-DG
CHARLES BROOKS
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-XX-00018
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MCANULTY, MILLER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Charles Brooks brings this appeal from a
November 9, 2000, order of the McCracken Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
On June 29, 2000, Brooks was in the Dillard's
department store in Paducah, Kentucky with a woman.
Security
guards Floyd Habeck, and James Boyett were dispatched to the
ladies' dress department after being alerted to unusual activity
from Brooks and the female.
Upon their arrival, Habeck and
Boyett observed Brooks crouching behind a sales display.
Brooks
then came from behind the display, walking toward the front door
of the store, carrying a Sears shopping bag.
The bag had a hole
in it, with merchandise still on hangers protruding from it.
Both guards followed Brooks as he headed toward the front doors.
When Habeck stepped in front of Brooks, Brooks turned and went
into the junior department.
Brooks made no attempt to pay for
the merchandise before leaving the ladies' department.
After entering the junior department, Brooks went
behind another display still carrying the bag.
behind this display without the bag.
the middle of the display.
He emerged from
Boyett retrieved it from
Both guards then stopped Brooks
before he could exit the store.
When Boyett spoke with Brooks
about the bag, Brooks initially stated he did not know anything
about it.
He sought, however, to acquit himself of any
wrongdoing by pointing out that he did not leave the store with
it.
The bag contained nine items of women's clothing, valued at
$187.82, still on Dillard's store hangers.
No sales receipt was
in the bag.
At a bench trial in the McCracken District Court on
August 22, 2000, Brooks was found guilty of theft by unlawful
taking (TBUT) under $300.00 (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
514.030(2)).
He was sentenced to six months in the county jail,
with thirty days to serve, $200.00 fine, court costs, and two
years' probation.
The McCracken Circuit Court affirmed the
district court November 9, 2000.
Discretionary review was
granted by this Court by order dated February 9, 2001.
Brooks' sole assignment of error is that there was
insufficient evidence upon which to find him guilty of TBUT.
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To
commit theft by unlawful taking under KRS 514.030, an individual
must unlawfully (1) exercise control over another's movable
property, and (2) do so with intent to deprive him thereof.
Relevant to our disposition of this appeal, we concern ourselves
only with the second element, intent to deprive.
When determining intent to deprive relative to
shoplifting, KRS 433.234(1) is some times applicable, and reads
as follows;
Willful concealment of unpurchased
merchandise of any store or other mercantile
establishment on the premises of such store
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
deprive the owner of his property without
paying the purchase price therefor.
(Emphases added).
By juxtaposing KRS 514.030(1)(a) and KRS 433.234(1),
Brooks contends that the Commonwealth may convict a person of
TBUT upon proving willful concealment of merchandise and without
proving that person's intent to deprive.
Stated differently,
Brooks argues that by enacting KRS 433.234(1) the legislature has
effectively substituted willful concealment for the element of
intent to deprive required under KRS 514.030(1)(a).
Brooks
argues such “substitution” is unconstitutional as it creates a
mandatory presumption that a person is guilty of TBUT upon a
finding of willful concealment of merchandise.
Brooks maintains
such mandatory presumption is constitutionally violative because
the Commonwealth is relieved of the burden of proving each
element of TBUT beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., the element of
intent to deprive.
It is, of course, fundamental that the
Commonwealth bears the burden of proof of each element of an
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offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
This rule is codified in KRS
500.070.
Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that KRS 433.234(1)
only creates a permissive inference as to the element of intent
to deprive.
Specifically, the Commonwealth maintains the
language of the statutes operates to merely allow the trier of
fact to find intent to deprive from proof of willful concealment.
We agree with the Commonwealth.
We think KRS 433.234(1) creates
but a permissible inference or presumption.
Relating to criminal
law, permissible inference or presumption has been defined:
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely
permissive inference or presumption, which allows--but
does not require--the trier of fact to infer the
elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the
basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the
defendant.
County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Court v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
A
permissible inference or presumption imposes neither a burden of
production nor a risk of non-persuasion upon the defendant.
R.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §10.00 (3d ed. 1993).
Such inference or presumption represents the most common type of
presumption in criminal law.
Id.
A permissible presumption is
constitutional as there is a “rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. . . .”
Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943).
Upon the whole, we conclude there obviously exists a rational
connection between an individual's willful concealment of
merchandise and that individual's intent to deprive the owner
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thereof.
In sum, we hold that KRS 433.234(1) merely creates a
constitutionally permissible inference.
In the case at hand, while shopping at Dillard's,
Brooks was carrying a Sears bag containing unpurchased Dillard's
merchandise; he made no attempt to pay for the merchandise; he
avoided the security guard; and hid the bag of merchandise inside
a display.
Viewing these facts most favorably to the
Commonwealth, we think there was sufficient evidence to find
Brooks guilty of TBUT.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Misty Dugger
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Frankfort, Kentucky
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