MICHAEL GEORGE WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 30, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002670-MR
MICHAEL GEORGE WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00603
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Michael George Williams appeals from his
conviction of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
and possession of marijuana.
Having reviewed the record and the
applicable law, we affirm.
On April 24, 2000, police used a reliable confidential
informant to perform a controlled buy, in which the informant
purchased crack cocaine from Michael Williams at Williams's
residence at 773 Florida Street in Lexington, Kentucky.
On
April 26, 2000, police applied for and received a search warrant
for the residence based on the April 24 controlled buy.
Police
did not request a no-knock warrant, and the warrant was not
designated as such.1
Because of the time elapsed since the first
buy, prior to executing the search warrant, police arranged with
the same confidential informant to make another controlled buy
from Williams, which occurred on April 26 at approximately 11:30
p.m.2
After this buy, the informant reported that Williams was
carrying a 9 mm handgun in his waistband.
The informant reported
that Williams told him that he carried the gun because he was
afraid of being robbed by other drug dealers.
Knowing that
Williams was armed, the decision was made, for the purpose of
officer safety, to execute the warrant in a no-knock fashion.
Approximately one hour later, at 12:30 a.m. on April 27, 2000,
police executed the search warrant.
The officers opened the
front door, which was unlocked, announced their presence, and
repeatedly announced after crossing the threshold.
Williams was
found in bed, with the loaded gun next to the bed.
Williams
attempted to throw approximately 7.7 grams of crack cocaine into
a dog carrier.
Police also recovered approximately one and a
half grams of marijuana.
After receiving Miranda warnings,
Williams made unsolicited and incriminating statements to police
including that the "dope" and gun were his, and that he sells
"dope" because he has to make child support payments.
1
Detective Douglas Caldwell, a narcotics detective with the
Lexington Police Department, testified at the suppression hearing
that at the time the search warrant was obtained, police had no
information to lead them to request a no-knock warrant. When
debriefed following the April 24 controlled buy, the informant
made no mention of weapons or dangerous dogs.
2
Caldwell testified that because of the time lag, he wanted
to do another buy to make sure the intelligence was the same as
when he made the initial buy.
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Williams moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant
to the search warrant on the grounds that police officers did not
knock and announce their presence before entering the residence.
Detective Caldwell testified to the facts as stated above at a
July 6, 2000 suppression hearing.
was denied.
Williams's motion to suppress
The trial court found that the last minute
information that police received that Williams had a gun was an
exigency justifying a no-knock entry.
The court further found
that the police decision not to seek a no-knock warrant was
reasonable based on Detective Caldwell's testimony that the area
was known for mobile drug traffickers, and that a delay caused by
seeking a new warrant could have resulted in the drugs or
Williams being gone.
A jury trial was held on October 4, 2000.
Williams was
found guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance and possession of marijuana.
On October 31, 2000, the
court entered its final judgment and sentence of probation,
sentencing Williams to nine years’ imprisonment, probated for
five years, and a $500 fine.
This appeal followed.
Williams first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.
Williams contends that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers failed to
knock and announce their presence and purpose prior to entering
his residence.3
On appellate review, a trial court's findings of
fact pursuant to a motion to suppress are conclusive if supported
3
Appellant does not dispute the validity of the search
warrant, only the no-knock entry.
-3-
by substantial evidence.
RCr 9.78.
We conclude the trial
court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in
the present case.
When the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, the question then becomes, "whether the
rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated."
Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998)
quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S. Ct.
1657, 1662, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
"[T]he Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law
requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock
on the door and announce their identity and purpose before
attempting forcible entry."
Adcock, 967 S.W.2d at 8, citing
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d
976 (1995).
However, "[t]he Fourth Amendment's flexible
requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a
rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law
enforcement interests."
1918.
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, 115 S. Ct. at
Exigent circumstances can justify a police decision to
disregard the knock and announce rule.
Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997);
967 S.W.2d at 9.
Adcock,
"In order to justify a no-knock entry, the
police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing
the destruction of evidence."
Adcock, 967 S.W.2d at 9, quoting
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
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Although felony
drug investigations frequently pose risks of violence or
destruction of evidence, there is no blanket exception to the
knock-and-announce rule in such cases.
117 S. Ct. 1416.
Richards, 520 U.S. 385,
A reviewing court must evaluate on a case-by-
case basis the reasonableness of a police decision not to knock
and announce.
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
Under the circumstances of the present case, having
received information that Williams had been carrying a gun an
hour prior to the execution of the search warrant, we believe
that it was reasonable for the police to believe that knocking
and announcing would be dangerous.
Further, police were not
required to seek a new search warrant specifically authorizing a
no-knock entry.
Police officers may "exercise independent
judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time
the warrant is being executed."
S. Ct. at 1422.
Richards, 520 U.S. at 396, 117
The reasonableness of the police officers’
decision must be evaluated as of the time they entered the
residence.
Richards, 520 U.S. at 395, 117 S. Ct. at 1422.
Having received last minute information that Williams was armed,
we conclude the police officer's decision was reasonable.4
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Williams's
motion to suppress.
Williams next argues that the "trial court's failure to
review the search warrant and affidavit prior to ruling on
4
Williams further argues that the search was illegal because
it was at night, an argument for which he cites no authority.
This argument was unpreserved and will not be considered on
appeal.
-5-
Williams's suppression motion, combined with the Commonwealth's
failure to file these documents in the record prior to trial" was
error which deprived him of his right to due process.
Our review
of those portions of the record cited by Williams reveal an
objection to the fact that the original warrant was not filed in
the record and a statement by the trial court that it could not
recall whether it had reviewed the original warrant or a copy at
the suppression hearing.
"The warrant and the affidavit should
be carefully preserved for filing with the appropriate court,
although no specific law requires their filing."
8 Leslie
Abramson, Kentucky Practice — Criminal Practice and Procedure,
§18.88 (3rd ed. 1997).
The record contains a copy of the search
warrant and the return.5
KRE 1003 provides that a duplicate is
admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or in
the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in
lieu of the original.
Williams offers no authority to support
the objection made at trial that a motion to suppress must be
granted if the original search warrant is not filed in the
record.
The record does not indicate that Williams requested the
original through a bill of particulars.
Accordingly, we conclude
the trial court did not err in overruling the objection.
Williams next contends that the trial court erred in
overruling his Batson challenge, thus denying him his right to a
jury of his peers.
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, our
review of the record indicates that this issue was preserved by
5
TR 65-66.
-6-
defense counsel's objection to the fact that all but one of the
four African-American venirepersons were struck.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90
L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court set forth a
three-part test for determining whether a prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner, thereby violating the equal protection clause.
First,
the defendant must establish a prima facie case showing that the
prosecutor made peremptory challenges based on race.
U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1722.
Batson, 476
The burden then shifts to the
prosecutor to articulate a racially neutral explanation for the
challenges.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
The
trial court must then determine whether the defendant has
established the existence of
purposeful discrimination.
Id.
"A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous."
Washington v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 34 S.W.3d 376, 380 (2000).
With regard to the first prong, it is arguable whether
Williams established a prima facie case of racial discrimination,
based solely on the fact that three out of four African-American
venirepersons were struck.
"Batson requires more than merely
stating that the prosecutor struck a certain number of blacks
from the jury panel."
919, 920-921 (1989).
Commonwealth v. Hardy, Ky., 775 S.W.2d
However, when, as in the present case, the
prosecutor offers race-neutral explanations for the peremptory
challenges, and the trial court rules on the issue, the
preliminary issue of whether the defendant made a prima-facie
-7-
showing becomes moot.
176, 179 (1992).
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d
We therefore turn to the issue of whether the
trial court's finding that the Commonwealth's strikes were based
on reasons other than race was clearly erroneous.
Id.
The Commonwealth stated that it struck Juror #180
because he was illiterate, Juror #127 because she stated that the
Commonwealth was prosecuting her brother, and Juror #220 because
he wrote "not applicable" on his juror questionnaire for
"employment", an answer the prosecutor described as "highly
unusual".
We opine that the Commonwealth's explanation for
striking Juror #220 is questionable - we believe "not applicable"
is an ambiguous response which could easily mean one is retired
or unemployed.
However, in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768,
115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995), the United
States Supreme Court held that the second prong of the Batson
test
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even
plausible."
"'At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is
the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.
Unless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'"
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771, quoting Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L. Ed.
2d 395 (1991).
Although we may believe the Commonwealth's
explanation with regard to Juror #220 is unconvincing, it is, on
its face, race neutral.6
Id.
As the prosecutor offered race-
6
Had we been the trier of fact, we would have inquired as to
why the prosecutor did not question the juror on voir dire
(continued...)
-8-
neutral explanations for the three challenges, and as Williams
offered no other evidence that the Commonwealth engaged in
purposeful racial discrimination, we cannot say the trial court's
finding that the Commonwealth exercised strikes based on reasons
other than race was clearly erroneous.
Williams's final argument is that his due process
rights were violated when the trial court allowed the prosecution
to introduce his child support payment record to the jury during
sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, Williams testified in
mitigation that he sold drugs to help his ill mother and to pay
child support.
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth introduced records
which showed that Williams had not paid child support.
The
admission of rebuttal evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
487 (1991).
Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484,
We conclude the introduction of the records was
proper as rebuttal evidence to Williams's mitigation defense that
he had sold drugs to pay child support.
Hence, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the records.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment and
sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Lexington, Kentucky
Matthew W. Boyd
6
(...continued)
regarding the answer. However, the trial court was not required
to do so. "The trial court may accept at face value the
explanation given by the prosecutor depending upon the demeanor
and credibility of the prosecutor. Stanford v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112 (1990). No additional inquiry or evidentiary
hearing is required under Batson." Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d at 179.
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A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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