KEVIN HUDSPETH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 12, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002615-MR
KEVIN HUDSPETH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00052
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Kevin Hudspeth (“Hudspeth”), entered
an alford plea to charges of flagrant non-support.
In December
1997, Hudspeth was sentenced to three years probation.
The
judgment required Hudspeth to pay $100 per month on his child
support arrearage and remain current on his monthly child support
obligation of $262.
On March 31, 2000, an agreed order was entered holding
that Hudspeth would pay the sum of $2900 on the arrearage by
September 30, 2000, in exchange for the Commonwealth’s agreement
not to revoke his probation for failure to timely pay the
arrearage.
This agreement also required Hudspeth to remain
current on his regular monthly child support obligations.
On
August 28, 2000, the Commonwealth filed a motion for a warrant
claiming that Hudspeth had failed to make the current child
support payments.
Hudspeth argues that this warrant was in
violation of the agreed order, which gave him a deadline of
September 30, 2000, to bring the debt up to date.
Hudspeth filed
an affidavit with the trial court showing that his expenses
exceeded his income and averring that he had been hired to start
a second job.
Hudspeth also entered a motion to reduce his
monthly child support obligation showing that at the time the
child support was set he was earning $3000 a month, but since
that time he had only earned $1300 a month.
He argued that he
was unable to pay the arrearage and monthly child support on his
income.
No ruling was made on this motion by the trial court.
On September 12, 2000, two weeks before the deadline
imposed by the agreed order, Hudspeth was incarcerated.
At the
time of incarceration, Hudspeth was current on his child support
except for the month of October and had paid the majority of the
arrearage.
The trial court revoked Hudspeth’s probation and
ruled that Hudspeth would have to serve one year in jail.
Hudspeth argues that the trial court was in error when
it found that he had not paid his child support since March 2000.
Although Hudspeth testified during the hearing that he was behind
in his child support payments, the record showed that these
obligations were paid while he was in custody.
The Friend of the
Court testimony at the hearing showed that Hudspeth was current
in his child support obligations at the time of the hearing, with
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the exception of the month of October, and he had paid a
substantial portion of the arrearage at the time he was arrested.
Hudspeth argues that the trial court erred in
incarcerating him and revoking his probation prior to the
deadline agreed upon by the parties pursuant to the agreed order.
Hudspeth argues that the plea agreement and agreed
order were a “pledge of public faith”, pursuant to Shanklin v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 730 S.W.2d 535, 537 (1987) and should be
enforced as written.
Hudspeth claims that he should not have
been arrested unless he failed to pay off the arrearage by
September 30, 2000.
The Commonwealth asserts on appeal that the
revocation of probation had nothing to do with the payment of the
arrearage but was based solely on Hudspeth’s failure to remain
current on his child support payments.
supported by the record.
This argument is
The record shows that Hudspeth was
timely paying off the arrearage and could have met the deadline
imposed in the agreed order.
However, his failure to remain
current on the monthly child support obligations made the warrant
legally valid.
The record shows that Hudspeth was clearly unable to
pay off both the arrearage and continue monthly child support
payments.
Hudspeth filed documents with the trial court showing
his attempts to borrow the money and to obtain a second job to
help fulfill his obligations.
He argues that the trial court’s
revocation of probation based on a debt he could not pay off was
in error, and he asserts that jailing him only served to further
impair his ability to pay the debt.
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Hudspeth made a post arrest
motion to have his child support obligation reduced based on the
drastic decline in his monthly salary.
This motion as well as
Hudspeth’s ability to pay the past due amount was not addressed
by the trial court.
Kentucky law holds that inability to pay is a defense
to a charge of flagrant non-support.
S.W.2d 862 (1993).
Lewis v. Lewis, Ky., 875
The trial court must make a finding that the
defendant is able to pay the amount before imposing any sanctions
for failure to make child support payments.
made in the present case.
No such finding was
The trial court stated that it was
“not necessary to show that Hudspeth was able to pay” the amount
and declined to review Hudspeth’s financial records showing that
he could not pay the sums ordered by the court.
The commentary
to the flagrant non-support statute, KRS 530.050, states, in
pertinent part, “[t]he accused must possess ability to provide
this support . . . .”
The trial court is required to find that
the defendant can “reasonably provide” the support demanded.
the present case, the trial court did not make such a finding.
In
For this reason, the probation revocation must be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is reversed, and this case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Tammy Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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