ANGELA DRAKE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and JAMES CAMPBELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002488-MR
ANGELA DRAKE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00898
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND:
APPELLEE
NO. 2000-CA-002490-MR
JAMES CAMPBELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00898
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
James Kelly Campbell ("Campbell") and Angela
Drake ("Drake") bring separate appeals from judgments of the
Fayette Circuit Court entered on conditional pleas of guilty.
As
the facts and the issues of law raised are identical, and in the
interest of judicial economy, we will dispose of their appeals by
way of a single opinion.
The facts are not in controversy.
Campbell was
indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury on August 24, 1999,
(hereinafter referred to as "the 1999 indictment") on one felony
count of theft by unlawful taking ("TBUT"), two misdemeanor
counts of TBUT, and first-degree persistent felony offender
("PFO").
Drake, Campbell's co-defendant, was charged under the
same indictment with two counts of felony TBUT, three counts of
misdemeanor TBUT, and PFO I.
The charges against both Campbell
and Drake arose from the theft of merchandise occurring at
Fayette County K-Mart stores between March, 1999 and May, 1999.
Two of the thefts occurred on consecutive days, i.e.,
May 26,
1999 and May 27, 1999.
On April 11, 2000, Campbell and Drake were again
indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury (hereinafter referred
to as "the 2000 indictment").
This indictment treated the
misdemeanor offenses occurring on May 26, 1999 and May 27, 1999,
as a single occurrence, thus combining them into one felony per
defendant.
The result was two counts of felony TBUT and a PFO I
as against Campbell, while Drake was charged with three felony
TBUTs, one misdemeanor TBUT, and PFO I.
Thereafter, Campbell and Drake moved to dismiss the
2000 indictment since it addressed the same charges already
pending under the 1999 indictment.
The Commonwealth responded by
moving to dismiss the 1999 indictment.
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On July 14, 2000, the circuit court rendered an order
denying the motion of Campbell and Drake to dismiss the 2000
indictment.
On September 6, 2000, it rendered an order
consolidating the two indictments.
The consolidated indictment
included one count of contempt for Campbell's failure to appear.
Campbell and Drake then entered guilty pleas,
conditioned on their separate appeals of the "combined
misdemeanor" issue.
Campbell and Drake each received a sentence
of one year in prison, enhanced to 10 years by operation of the
PFO I convictions.
These appeals followed.
Campbell and Drake now argue that the trial court
committed reversible error in allowing the Commonwealth to
combine two misdemeanor counts set forth in the 1999 indictment
into a single felony in the 2000 indictment.
They maintain that
the case law upon which the Commonwealth relied is
distinguishable from the facts at bar, and should not serve as a
basis for combining misdemeanors occurring on consecutive days
into a single felony.
Alternatively, they argue that if the
charges were properly combined, the court should have
consolidated all of the charges (both misdemeanor and felony)
into a single felony.
We have closely examined this argument and find no
error.
The case law cited by the Commonwealth, and which
Campbell and Drake attempt to distinguish, stands for the general
proposition that thefts occurring at different times and places
may be combined into a single offense if the acts were so closely
related as to be considered a single event.
-3-
Commonwealth v.
Caudill, Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 158 (1991).
In Caudill, we stated
as follows:
Where the offense alleged is a series of
successive takings, we believe the view
expressed in Weaver v. Commonwealth, 27
K.L.R. 743, 86 S.W. 551 (1905), is
applicable:
"If the taking was at one time,
then the value of all articles
taken at that time could be added
together in estimating the degree
of the offense. Or if the articles
were taken by appellant [defendant]
as the result of a single purpose
or impulse, though the asportation
was at intervals to better suit his
convenience, the degree of the
offense will not be lessened by the
fact that he could not or did not
carry away all the articles at one
load."
Caudill, 812 S.W.2d at 159.
See also, Fair v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
652 S.W.2d 864 (1983) (holding that three thefts occurring at the
same store on the same night constituted one offense); and,
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 84 S.W.2d 1 (1935) (holding that
separate thefts committed over a period of three days could
constitute a single offense).
In applying these principles to the facts at bar, we
cannot conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
the criminal acts at issue constituted a single offense.
It is
uncontroverted that the thefts occurred on consecutive nights, in
the same manner, by the same individuals, at the same discount
store chain.
Sufficient evidence exists on the face of the
record to reasonably support the conclusion that the thefts were,
in the language of Caudill, the result of a single purpose or
-4-
impulse.
As such, we find no basis for concluding that the trial
court committed reversible error on this issue.
As for the alternative argument that the Commonwealth
was bound to combine all offenses, both misdemeanor and felony,
into a single offense, we again find no error.
As the
Commonwealth properly notes, the misdemeanor offenses which were
combined into a single felony occurred on consecutive days, and
with the aid of a single third party (a store employee).
The
offenses which were not combined occurred as much as nine weeks
earlier, and were accomplished with the assistance of different
individuals.
As above, the record contains evidence sufficient
to support the trial judge's conclusion on this issue, and
accordingly we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final
judgments of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Raymond Larson
Commonwealth Attorney
Lexington, KY
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