RAYMOND HALL v. J & V COAL COMPANY; J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
April 13, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002372-WC
RAYMOND HALL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-99-00690
v.
J & V COAL COMPANY; J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Raymond Hall petitions for review of a decision by
the Workers' Compensation Board affirming a decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The issue presented is whether
Hall's claim for benefits is barred by the pertinent statute of
limitations.
Hall was employed by J & V Coal Company ("J & V") from
October 1996 until December 12, 1997, when he was laid off.
He
testified that he injured his neck and back while working in the
mine on April 19, 1997.
While operating a scoop that day, Hall
struck a large rock and was thrown against the roof of the mine.
Hall notified his supervisor within the hour, and the two men
repaired Hall's damaged hard hat.
According to Hall, he worked in pain and without
medical attention for about three weeks.
He advised his shift
boss and then saw a doctor at a local hospital.
When his pain
continued, a supervisor insisted that he report to Mud Creek
Clinic.
He was seen by Dr. Abu Salahuddin on May 19, 1997, who
referred him to Dr. Scott C. Mirani of the University of Kentucky
Medical Center.
Additionally, J & V prepared a statement on its
letterhead, dated July 7, 1997, that provided as follows:
"Raymond Hall was injuied [sic] in a [sic] accident on our
property.
Please send his bills to our address."
The statement
was signed by "Donna Rice, Secretary."
Hall testified that he had missed at least one week of
work sometime in November following his April accident.
Hospital
records confirm treatment and an extended work absence during
November 1997.
While medical benefits had been partially paid,
Hall's employer never filed a First Report of Injury (form SF-1A)
as specifically mandated by KRS 342.038(1) (requiring such a
filing within one week upon an employee’s absence from work for
more than one day).
No TTD benefits were paid and no disability
status report (form SF-3A) was filed with the Board indicating
nonpayment or termination of benefits.
KRS 342.0401
Hall filed his claim on May 27, 1999, and J & V
contended that it was barred by the two-year period of
1
KRS 342.040 also places a duty upon the Board to notify an
employee of his or her right to prosecute a claim.
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limitations set forth at KRS 342.185.
While finding that Hall
had given due and timely notice of his work-related injury, the
ALJ nonetheless concluded that the employer was not estopped from
asserting the statute-of-limitations defense even though it had
failed to comply with KRS 342.038.
Acknowledging that the
employer appeared before him with "unclean hands," the ALJ
concluded that dismissal was nevertheless required since Hall had
not been prejudiced by the employer's failure to comply with its
statutory duty.
Instead of taking KRS 342.038 into account, the
ALJ relied on KRS 342.040 and noted that its provisions are not
called into play unless an employee's disability continues for a
period of more than two weeks.
Thus, he reasoned that the
employer's duty to notify the Board and the Board's concomitant
duty to notify the employee of his right to prosecute a claim had
never come into being.
In accepting the ALJ's analysis, the Board acknowledged
a line of cases holding that evidence of bad faith or employer
misconduct with respect to the requirements of KRS 342.038 and
KRS 342.040 may be sufficient to invoke the equitable principle
of estoppel to preclude an employer from asserting the statuteof-limitations defense.
However, it then concluded:
It does not matter whether J & V's motives
for not filing the SF-1 were utterly evil and
corrupt. As we noted above, even if J & V
had filed the SF-1, Hall would have been
entitled to no more notice of the statute of
limitations than he received. Failure to
follow the provision of KRS 342.040 results
in tolling of the statute of limitations
because that statute provides for notice to
the employee of his right to prosecute a
claim. KRS 342.038 contains no employee
notice requirement, therefore failure to
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follow its provisions only subjects the
employer to the penalty provisions of KRS
342.990(7)(a), and does not otherwise estop
it from relying upon other provisions of the
act.
Board opinion at 8.
In Newberg v. Hudson, Ky, 838 S.W.2d 384 (1992), the
employer never gave notice to the Board that there had been an
injury as required under KRS 342.038.
The employee filed a claim
more than two years after the date of the injury.
The court held
that whether the statute of limitations should be tolled due to
an employer's failure to give notice to the Board depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
Id. at 388.
The
Newberg court concluded that even though the employee gave notice
of his injury, the employer had no obligation to notify the Board
at that time since the employee had missed only one day of work.
The obligation imposed by KRS 342.038 did not arise until
approximately one month later when the employee had missed more
than one day of work.
At that time, the employer sent a form to
the employee requesting a brief description of the accident, but
the employee failed to explain how the injury was work-related.
Consequently, the employer was unable to send notice of a workrelated injury to the Board as required, and the court concluded
that there was no evidence that the employer's noncompliance with
the notice provision in the statute was the result of bad faith.
On the contrary, the evidence indicated that there was a good
faith attempt to ascertain the reason for the employee's absence.
Newberg, supra, at 389; see also, Colt Management Co. v. Carter,
Ky. App., 907 S.W.2d 169 (1995).
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The facts and circumstances in Newberg differ markedly from
those involved in this case.
Hall properly notified his employer
of the accident and his injury.
As the ALJ determined, the
employer was well aware of the work-related nature of the injury.
Consequently, after Hall had missed work for more than one day, J
& V was obligated by KRS 342.038 to report the injury to the
Board.
Instead, the employer failed to prepare and to file the
required report and initially refused to notify its carrier of
the injury.
The failure to file the notice of injury (KRS
342.138(1) deprived the Board of any awareness of Hall’s
predicament, frustrating later Board action to notify him of his
right to pursue a claim (KRS 342.020).
We agree that fairness should be a component
of any statutorily based decision when bad
faith in the blatant manufacture of a defense
is involved. Fortunately, fairness is not a
stranger in this area of the law, and we have
repeatedly held that a false representation
or fraudulent concealment will toll the
statute of limitations.
Newburg, supra, at 390.
Hall never received income benefits pursuant to KRS
342.040.
Essentially, then, he is being penalized doubly: he has
been stripped of the right to notice that would have arisen upon
payments of such benefits — in addition to never receiving any
remuneration whatsoever.
Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the ALJ erred in permitting J & V to raise the statute-oflimitations defense in reliance upon KRS 342.040 alone.
We hold
that KRS 342.038(1) (the more than one-day absence requiring
employer notice of injury to the Board) and KRS 342.040 (employee
notice of suspension of income benefits, triggering the Board’s
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duty of notice to the employee) are correlative and
interdependent, intended by the legislature to operate together
to prevent an employee caught in such a time-warp from slipping
through the cracks in the system.
Both notice requirements are
mandatory, and failure to comply with one cannot equitably permit
an employer to invoke the other in order to raise the statute-oflimitations defense.
We are not persuaded that a different analysis of this
issue is required since temporary total disability benefits were
not paid on the claim.
Newberg.
The same situation was present in
Nevertheless, the Newberg court undertook an extensive
evaluation of the employer’s failure to comply with the notice
provision of KRS 342.038.
We are aided by that precedent.
The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
reversed and remanded.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE J & V COAL
COMPANY:
Miller Kent Carter
Pikeville, KY
Paul E. Jones
Pikeville, KY
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