TOMMY LYKINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002296-MR
TOMMY LYKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LARRY MILLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00015
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; DYCHE and TACKETT, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty
plea entered by the Breathitt Circuit Court.
In March 2000,
appellant pled guilty to felony offenses of rape, sodomy, and
sexual abuse stemming from incidents which occurred in 1997.
A
final judgment sentencing appellant was entered on August 26,
2000.
At that time, over his objection, the court applied to him
the provisions of KRS 532.043 and KRS 197.045(4), whereby he was
ordered both to serve a three-year period of conditional release
after completion of his sentence, and to undergo a sex offender
treatment program before he could claim good time credits against
his sentence.
On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred
by applying either statute to him because they both were enacted
after his commission of the charged offenses, with the result
that their application to him violated the ex post facto clause
of the constitution.
In light of recent decisions by the supreme
court and this court, we agree with appellant’s argument as to
the application of KRS 532.043, but we disagree with him in
regard to the application of KRS 197.045(4).
Hence, we affirm in
part and reverse in part.
In Purvis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 21 (2000),
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS 532.043 could not be
applied retroactively to offenses which occurred prior to its
effective date without violating the ex post facto clause of the
constitution.
Here, the record shows that appellant committed
the offenses in 1997 and was convicted of them in 2000.
Pursuant
to Purvis, therefore, KRS 532.043 could not be applied to
appellant since the statute became effective in 1998.
Although
the Commonwealth concedes this point, it argues that it was not
given proper notice as to the constitutional issue, and that the
issue was not preserved for review.
However, the Commonwealth’s
argument overlooks the fact that on November 5, 1998, appellant
filed a motion setting forth his ex post facto constitutional
arguments.
That motion was denied on April 23, 1999, before
appellant pled guilty.
It is clear, therefore, that the attorney
general was given proper notice that appellant claimed the
statutes were being unconstitutionally applied to him, and that
the constitutional issue was adequately preserved for review.
Moreover, as the March 2000 rendition date of Purvis preceded
appellant’s sentencing by almost six months, certainly everyone
involved should have been aware of, and should have adhered to,
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the Purvis decision on the date of sentencing.
Accordingly, we
hold that the final judgment herein is reversed insofar as it
applies KRS 532.043 to appellant.
Appellant’s second contention on appeal concerns this
court’s decision in Lozier v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 32 S.W.3d
511 (2000), wherein we held that because KRS 197.045(4) merely
delays rather than deprives the accused of good time credits
earned, its retroactive application does not violate the ex post
facto clause.
Although appellant attempts to factually
distinguish Lozier from the matter now before us, we are
unpersuaded by his argument.
In short, we hold that Lozier
controls the ex post facto issue presented herein regarding KRS
197.045(4).
For the reasons stated, the court’s judgment is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher F. Polk
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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