OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY v. ORVIS RIDNOUR
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 7, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002162-MR
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00005
v.
ORVIS RIDNOUR
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
On June 4, 1997, an administrative law judge
awarded Orvis Ridnour, the appellee, workers’ compensation
disability benefits for an injury he had suffered in December
1994.
The award provided for 520 weeks of benefits to be
apportioned evenly between Ridnour’s employer, the Hi View
Construction Company, and the Special Fund.
The employer was to
pay benefits during the first 260 weeks, and the Special Fund
thereafter.
The award noted that when Ridnour turned sixty-five
(in October 2000, shortly after the employer’s liability was due
to be satisfied) his benefits would become subject to the so
called tier-down reductions then provided for in KRS 342.730(4).
In August 1998, the employer’s insurer, Old Republic
Insurance Company, informed Ridnour by letter that, in light of a
recent opinion by our Supreme Court, Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree1, it
had determined that it was entitled to share in the tier-down
reduction of Ridnour’s benefits and had recalculated its
liability under Ridnour’s award accordingly.
It would pay a
reduced benefit until October 1999, it said, at which point its
payments would cease.
Ridnour could seek the difference, the
letter implied, from the Special Fund.
In January 2000, after Old Republic had indeed stopped
making benefit payments to Ridnour, he brought suit in the Marion
Circuit Court to enforce the June 1997 award.
The court ordered
Old Republic to pay the benefits the award originally
contemplated and to pay as well Ridnour’s costs in the
enforcement action including his attorney fee.
from which Old Republic has appealed.
This is the order
It contends that an
enforcement action was not the proper forum to settle this
dispute, that its actions were justified under Leeco, Inc. v.
Crabtree, and that the trial court should not have ordered it to
pay Ridnour’s costs.
Convinced by none of Old Republic’s
arguments, we affirm.
Ridnour’s suit asked the trial court to enforce his
worker’s compensation award according to its terms.
KRS 342.305
confers jurisdiction on that court to hear such suits.
Old
Republic contends, however, that the award was ambiguous with
respect to the tier-down effect and that the Workers’
1
Ky., 966 S.W.2d 951 (1998).
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Compensation Board was the proper body to resolve the ambiguity.
In fact, the award was not ambiguous.
At the time of the award,
the rule was that the tier down took effect upon the claimant’s
sixty-fifth birthday and benefitted whichever defendant happened
then to be liable, in this case the Special Fund.2
With Leeco,
Inc. v. Crabtree, our Supreme Court changed that rule, but there
is no indication in Leeco that, contrary to the general rule of
res judicata, the change would affect awards, such as Ridnour’s,
that had already become final.3
To argue for such an exceptional
application of Leeco, Old Republic might well have been advised
to petition the Workers’ Compensation Board, pursuant to KRS
342.125, but Ridnour had no such duty.
Nor need he have added the Special Fund as a party.
Although it is true that the Fund’s liability could not have been
increased in the manner Old Republic envisioned without its
having been made a party in an appropriate proceeding,4 it was
Old Republic’s duty as the proponent of the increase to initiate
such a proceeding.
There was no need for Ridnour to make the
Fund a party to an action that did not seek, not even indirectly,
to affect it.5
2
Southern v. R. B. Coal Company, Inc., Ky. App., 923 S.W.2d 902 (1996).
3
Keefe v. OK Precision Tool & Die Company, Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 804, 807 (1978)
(“The award of the Board once final may only be reopened upon a showing that the Board
misapplied the law as it was when the award was made. Subsequent interpretations of the law
will not warrant the reopening of awards made final under the doctrine of res judicata.”).
4
Middlesboro Tanning Company, Inc. v. Eldridge, Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d 464 (1996).
5
Whittaker v. Pollard, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 466 (2000).
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Finally, Old Republic complains that it should not have
been ordered to pay Ridnour’s costs.
KRS 342.310 provides that
costs may be imposed on any party who brings, prosecutes, or
defends a proceeding “without reasonable ground.”
We agree with
the circuit court that such an award against Old Republic was
appropriate.
As noted, Old Republic’s purported reliance upon
Leeco Inc. v. Crabtree flies in the face of well established
rules of finality.
And even if Old Republic’s reliance upon
Leeco was not, by itself, completely unreasonable, its manner of
asserting that reliance was.
By simply ceasing to make its
ordered payments, Old Republic in effect appointed itself judge
in its own case.
Its unilateral declaration that Ridnour’s award
would be modified comports with neither the letter6 nor the
spirit7 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
For the reasons
stated, we affirm the May 2, 2000, order of the Marion Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Philip J. Reverman, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
James L. Avritt, Sr.
Lebanon, Kentucky
6
KRS 342.125(4) (“No employer shall suspend benefits during pendency of any
reopening procedure except upon order of the administrative law judge.”).
7
Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Turner, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 544, 545 (1998) (“When an
award becomes final, relief from its terms may be obtained only if it is reopened pursuant to the
provisions of KRS 342.125.”).
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