HENRY E. HUDSON v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 7, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002155-MR
HENRY E. HUDSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00620
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF AND MILLER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Henry E. Hudson has appealed from an order of
the Franklin Circuit Court entered on July 17, 2000, which denied
his petition for a declaration of rights requesting an award of
meritorious-good-time credits.
Having concluded that Hudson has
no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in meritoriousgood-time credits, we affirm.
The factual background of this case was set forth in
the prior Kentucky Supreme Court case, Hudson v. Commonwealth.1
On March 1, 1988, Hudson began serving a 14-year sentence under
the custody and supervision of the Indiana Cabinet of Correction.
On August 17, 1988, the Hopkins Circuit Court served Indiana
authorities with a detainer warrant pursuant to a Kentucky
indictment against Hudson.
Hudson appeared before the Hopkins
Circuit Court on March 6, 1989, and, pursuant to a plea
agreement, pled guilty to the charge pending against him in
exchange for a sentence of 20 years, to run concurrently with his
Indiana sentence.
Three days later, the Hopkins Circuit Court
entered judgment on the guilty plea and the Hopkins County
Sheriff delivered Hudson back to Indiana prison authorities.
Hudson remained imprisoned in Indiana until March 1, 1995, when
he was paroled.
Upon his release from prison in Indiana, that state’s
Corrections Cabinet officials immediately delivered Hudson to the
Kentucky Department of Corrections and he began serving his
Kentucky prison sentence.
On March 1, 1996, after Hudson had
completed one year of his conditional parole, the state of
Indiana released Hudson from its custody.
Since that date,
Hudson has remained under the sole authority of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections.
On May 19, 2000, Hudson filed a petition for a
declaration of rights against the Kentucky Department of
1
Ky., 932 S.W.2d 371 (1996).
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Corrections.
Hudson’s petition alleged that he should be awarded
meritorious-good-time credits pursuant to KRS2 197.045(3).
Since
Hudson served the first part of his Kentucky sentence in Indiana,
he argues that he was deprived of the annual reviews for
meritorious-good-time credits that Kentucky inmates typically
receive.
Hudson now asks for a retroactive award of good time
credits he might have received had he been serving his sentence
in Kentucky.
In support of his request, Hudson points out that
he maintained a clean record during his period of incarceration
in Indiana.
He also states that Indiana Corrections authorities
awarded him meritorious-good-time credits while he was imprisoned
in Indiana.
On July 17, 2000, the Franklin Circuit Court denied
Hudson’s petition and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Hudson argues that his constitutional due
process rights were violated when the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections summarily denied his request for
meritorious-good-time credits.
At the very least, Hudson seeks a
court order, requiring the Commissioner to grant him a formal
hearing on the matter.
Further, Hudson asserts that by failing
to award him meritorious-good-time credits, the Commonwealth has
reneged on its original plea bargain agreement.
In the absence of a legislative mandate, the
Constitution does not guarantee good time credit for satisfactory
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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behavior while in prison.3
Nonetheless, where a state has
provided a statutory right to good time, Fourteenth Amendment
“liberty” entitles the prisoner to the minimum procedures
appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due
Process Clause to ensure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated.
Meritorious-good-time credit is an important element of
our prison system in Kentucky.
The statutory provision that
created meritorious-good-time credit is contained in KRS
197.045(3).
It provides:
An inmate may, at the discretion of the
commissioner, be allowed a deduction from a
sentence not to exceed five (5) days per
month for performing exceptionally
meritorious service or performing duties of
outstanding importance in connection with
institutional operations and programs. The
allowance shall be an addition to commutation
of time for good conduct and under the same
terms and conditions and without regard to
length of sentence.
The Department of Corrections has set forth the procedures and
terms for awarding meritorious-good-time credit in CPP4 15.3.
It
provides that meritorious-good-time credit is “a good time credit
that may be awarded for clear conduct and program
participation.”5
CPP 15.3 also provides for final approval or
3
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951,
94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974).
4
Corrections Policy and Procedure.
5
CPP 15.3(IV).
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disapproval of a recommended award of meritorious-good-time
credit at the discretion of the Commissioner of Corrections.6
The leading Kentucky case interpreting the issue of
meritorious-good-time credit is Anderson v. Parker.7
Anderson
held that KRS 197.045(3) and CPP 15.3 grant broad discretion to
prison officials in determining whether an inmate is entitled to
meritorious-good-time credit.
It held that “[n]o inmate has a
right to meritorious good time” [emphasis added],8 but instead
meritorious good time is “a privilege bestowed at the discretion
of the Commissioner.”9
The Court stated that “[b]ecause the
award of meritorious good time under CPP 15.3 is left entirely to
the discretion of prison administrators, we hold inmates . . .
have no protected liberty interest at stake in its’ [sic]
denial.”10
Hudson argues that because he was not actually
incarcerated in a Kentucky prison that he was not even considered
for an award of meritorious good time, even though he was a model
prisoner in the Indiana penal system.
Given Hudson’s conduct
record in Indiana, it may be that he would have qualified for
meritorious good time had his petition been considered by
Kentucky officials.
Nevertheless, because meritorious good time
6
See CPP 15.3(VII)(F).
7
Ky.App., 964 S.W.2d 809 (1997).
8
Id. at 810.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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is a privilege and not a statutorily-created right in Kentucky,
Hudson has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest at
stake.
Hudson is therefore not entitled to either an award of
meritorious good time or a formal hearing on his petition.
Similarly, we fail to see how a denial of meritorious
good time constitutes a breach of the plea agreement between
Hudson and the Commonwealth.
The agreement merely stated that
Hudson’s 20-year Kentucky sentence would run concurrently with
his already existing Indiana sentence.
It did not specify that
while Hudson was incarcerated in Indiana that he would receive
the same privileges and considerations as a an inmate in the
Kentucky penal system.
It merely required that Hudson’s Kentucky
sentence run concurrently with his Indiana sentence.
Hudson has
already been credited in Kentucky with the seven years he spent
in Indiana custody, and he is not entitled to any additional
credits.11
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Henry E. Hudson, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Keith Hardison
Frankfort, Kentucky
11
See Hudson, supra, at 374.
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