KEITH A. MOORE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 21, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002043-MR
KEITH A. MOORE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 84-CR-00059
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE: JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Keith A. Moore appeals from a July 12, 2000,
opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his CR1
60.02 motion to amend the sentencing provisions of a 1984
judgment.
We affirm.
On January 17, 1984, Moore was indicted under
Indictment No. 84-CR-59 on two felony counts of receiving stolen
property over $100.2 and one count of being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (PFO II),3 involving the possession
of a video game that had been stolen from Radio Shack and stolen
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 514.110.
amount was increased to $300 in 1994.
3
KRS 532.080.
The requisite
Apple Computer equipment.
In a transaction recorded on
videotape, Moore sold the stolen merchandise to a police officer
in October 1983 in an undercover sting operation.4
On March 2, 1984, Moore entered a guilty plea pursuant
to a plea agreement to all three counts.
Under the plea
agreement, the Commonwealth recommended five years on each of the
two counts of receiving stolen property and moved to dismiss the
PFO II count.
The Commonwealth made no recommendation on running
the sentences concurrently or consecutively.
After receiving the
guilty plea, the trial court postponed final sentencing pending
review of a presentence investigation report.
At the plea
hearing, Moore requested that he be allowed to take a polygraph
(lie detector) test, which the trial court granted without
objection from the Commonwealth.
Based upon his review of the
answers involving whether Moore had been involved in stealing the
merchandise or had received it from a third-party, the polygraph
examiner opined that Moore had not been completely truthful.
The
polygraph report states that Moore admitted knowing that the
merchandise was stolen but claimed that he was selling it for a
third-party.
Moore also acknowledged receiving a small sum in
return for selling the items.
On March 23, 1984, after reviewing the polygraph
examination report and the presentence investigation report that
4
Also on January 17, 1984, Moore was indicted under
Indictment No. 84-CR-58 on one count of receiving stolen property
over $100., and being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree involving the sale of stolen computer equipment to a
police officer in November 1983 in the same undercover sting
operation. Moore pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and
received a five-year sentence.
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showed Moore had a prior conviction for armed robbery,5
shoplifting, and theft by unlawful taking, the trial court
sentenced Moore to serve two consecutive sentences of five years
on each of the receiving stolen property counts to run
consecutively with the five-year sentence he had received for
receiving stolen property in Indictment No. 84-CR-58.
On March
27, 1984, Moore’s attorney filed a motion to modify the sentence
arguing that running the sentences consecutively resulted in an
unduly harsh total sentence of fifteen years for two incidents of
selling stolen property in a single sting operation.
On April 3,
1984, the trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in
part by ordering that the two five-year sentences for receiving
stolen property in Indictment No. 84-CR-59 run concurrently with
each other, but stating that these sentences would still run
consecutively to the sentence in Indictment No. 84-CR-58.6
On June 15, 1984, Moore filed a pro se motion pursuant
to RCr7 11.42 seeking to modify his sentence.
He alleged that
the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process by running the sentences
consecutively.
On July 13, 1984, the trial court denied the RCr
5
Moore received a twenty-two year sentence for armed robbery
in Indictment No. 77-CR-3013.
6
Another attorney for Moore filed a second motion to modify
sentence arguing for a ten-year sentence instead of a fifteenyear sentence on the two indictments consistent with an alleged
similar modification in the sentences of a co-defendant
prosecuted with Moore on the same offenses. The trial court
granted the second motion consistent with its order granting the
first motion in part and modifying the sentence.
7
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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11.42 motion stating that under KRS 532.110(1), it had the
discretion to order sentences to run concurrently or
consecutively.
On April 19, 2000, Moore filed a motion to amend
judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and (f).
He asked the court to
amend his sentence in Indictment No. 84-CR-59 to run concurrently
with the twenty-two year sentence he received for armed robbery
in 19778 based on KRS 532.110(1)9.
He argued that under the rule
of statutory interpretation giving priority to later enacted
statutes, KRS 532.110(1) controlled over KRS 533.060(2)10 because
the 1998 amendments to KRS 532.110(1) rendered it the later
enacted statute.
He also contended that the 1998 amendments to
KRS 532.110(1) indicated an intent by the Legislature to change
the law and thus was properly raised in a CR 60.02 motion.
On
June 12, 2000, Moore filed a supplement to his CR 60.02 motion
alleging the trial court inappropriately considered the results
of the polygraph examination prior to sentencing.
On July 12, 2000, the trial court denied the motion on
three grounds.
First, it held the motion was barred as a
successive motion.
Second, it held the motion was untimely.
Third, it held that KRS 532.110(1) and KRS 533.060(2) were not in
conflict and require consecutive sentencing in this situation.
This appeal followed.
8
See supra note 5.
9
KRS 532.110(1) allows for concurrent sentences when
multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed.
10
KRS 533.060(2)requires consecutive sentencing for offenses
committed while on probation or parole.
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A review of Moore’s brief indicates that he has
abandoned the grounds for relief initially raised in his CR 60.02
motion.
His brief does not mention any conflict between KRS
532.110(1) and KRS 533.060(2).
Consequently, his failure to
raise this argument in his appellate brief constitutes a waiver
of the issue.11
Additionally, we note that this Court recently
rejected the position that KRS 532.110(1) should be applied
retroactively or that it took precedence over KRS 533.060(2)
because of the 1998 amendments.12
Thus, this argument is without
merit and the trial court correctly found that the sentence for
Indictment No. 84-CR-59 must run consecutively to the 1977
sentence for armed robbery.
Moore’s primary argument involves the trial court’s
consideration of the polygraph test results for sentencing.
As
an initial matter, there is a discrepancy between the record and
Moore’s version of the facts.
The record indicates that Moore
requested the polygraph examination, while Moore asserts in his
brief that the trial court ordered him to take the polygraph
examination.
Clearly, if Moore requested the polygraph, he
waived any challenge to its use and his failure to raise this
issue until sixteen years after the sentencing seriously
undermines his version of the facts.
Nevertheless, he is not entitled to relief on the
polygraph issue for several additional reasons.
First, as
11
See Milby v. Mears, Ky. App., 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (1979);
R.E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Price, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1975);
Ballard v. King, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 591, 593 (1963).
12
White v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 32 S.W.3d 83 (2000).
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indicated earlier, consecutive sentencing was statutorily
required by KRS 533.060(2) because Moore was on parole for the
armed robbery conviction when he committed the receiving stolen
property offenses.
Furthermore, a sentencing court can consider
many types of evidence that would not be admissible at trial
including hearsay statements, uncharged criminal allegations, and
dismissed counts of an indictment.13
Moore’s reliance on the
inadmissibility of polygraph examination14 results at trial is
unavailing because the standard for admissibility of information
as evidence is stricter than that for use in sentencing.
Moore
has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
considering the polygraph examination report in this case.
Second, we agree with the trial court that Moore’s
claim was barred by the successive motions principle.
In Gross
v. Commonwealth,15 the Kentucky Supreme Court set out the
procedure for appellate review in criminal cases.
The Court
stated that the structure for appellate review is not haphazard
or overlapping.16
It held that a criminal defendant must first
bring a direct appeal when available, then utilize RCr 11.42 by
raising every error of which he should be aware, and only utilize
13
See Aaron v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 810 S.W.2d 60, 62
(1991).
14
See Morgan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 704 (1991).
15
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
16
Id. at 856.
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CR 60.02 for extraordinary situations not otherwise subject to
relief by direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42.17
In the current case, two motions to modify the sentence
were filed shortly after the guilty plea and sentencing.
The
trial court granted the motions in part by ordering that the
sentences for the two receiving stolen property convictions in
Indictment No. 84-CR-59 run concurrently, but that the sentences
run consecutively to the sentence Moore was then currently
serving.
In 1984, Moore filed an RCr 11.42 motion again seeking
to modify his sentence challenging the consecutive nature of the
sentencing.
Moore could and should have raised the polygraph
issue in his previous post-judgment motions.
Third, the trial court held that the CR 60.02 motion
was untimely.
his motion.
Moore waited approximately sixteen years to file
It did not involve new information unknown to him at
the time of sentencing.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in holding the motion was untimely.
For all these
reasons, the trial court properly denied the CR 60.02 motion on
both procedural and substantive grounds.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
17
Id. See also McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948
(1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130, 117 S.Ct. 2535,
1035 (1998) Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d
(1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 1266,
361 (1999).
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S.W.2d 415
138 L.Ed.2d
905, 908-09
143 L.Ed.2d
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Keith A. Moore-Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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