LARRY RAY FREEMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 21, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002033-MR
LARRY RAY FREEMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00043
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and DYCHE, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: Larry Ray Freeman, pro se, appeals from the Boone
Circuit Court’s July 18, 2000, denial of his RCr1 11.42 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his judgement and sentence.
Having
concluded the circuit court did not err, we affirm.
On or about July 20, 1994, Freeman was operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Freeman was involved in an
accident in Boone County, Kentucky which led to the death of Ms.
Diane Washer.
In an effort to conceal the accident, Freeman
buried Ms. Washer’s body under some rocks in a creek.
Freeman
was arrested for the manslaughter death of Ms. Washer on December
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
10, 1998.
He was indicted for manslaughter by the Boone County
Grand Jury in February of 1999.
On March 22, 1999, Freeman filed
a motion to enter a guilty plea based upon a plea agreement with
the Commonwealth.
On April 20, 1999, he was sentenced in
accordance with the plea agreement to twenty years in the state
penitentiary.
On August 18, 1999, Freeman filed a motion pursuant to
RCr 11.42 to vacate or set aside his judgement and sentence.
He
argued that his guilty plea had not been made voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly and that his counsel had been
ineffective.
The Boone Circuit Court granted Freeman’s motion
for appointed counsel in his RCr 11.42 proceeding and for the
newly appointed counsel to file a supplemental memorandum in
support of his RCr 11.42 motion on April 7, 2000.
The Boone
Circuit Court then denied Freeman’s RCr 11.42 motion on July 18,
2000, leading to this appeal.
On appeal, Freeman contends the circuit court erred:
(1) in finding that his guilty plea was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily and (2) in holding that he did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
There is no evidence
in the record to indicate that the circuit judge in any way
abused his discretion in denying Freeman’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Thus, we will not disturb his ruling pursuant to Bowling v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 548 (1998).
Freeman’s claim that his plea was not made voluntarily,
intelligently or knowingly is refuted by the record.
A review of
his claim pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 295 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
-2-
1709, 23 L.Ed2d 274 (1969), reveals that Freeman signed both the
Commonwealth’s offer and his own motion to enter a guilty plea.
The form signed by Freeman indicates that he understood what he
was doing and that his attorney had addressed the relevant issues
with regard to the consequences of his plea.
A form like the one
signed by Freeman satisfies the Boykin standard.
Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461, 1466
(1938); Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978).
In reviewing Freeman’s plea under the totality-of-thecircumstances test of Commonwealth v. Crawford, Ky., 789 S.W.2d
779, 780 (1990), we still believe that Freeman entered a
voluntary and knowing plea.
The record reveals that Freeman
confessed to causing the death of Ms. Washer.
It discloses that
he had hidden her body for some four years prior to his
confession.
Despite his claim, there is no indication in the
record that he sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
These facts,
considered in conjunction with the forms signed by Freeman,
indicate a voluntary and intelligent plea.
In order for Freeman to prove his second argument that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he bore the burden
of showing:
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that his
performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance and (2) that the deficient performance was
so prejudicial that the outcome of the defense would very likely
have produced a different result but for that deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366,
-3-
88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724
S.W.2d 223 (1986).
Freeman argues his counsel failed to properly
investigate the events that transpired on the evening of the
accident and that his attorney failed to advise him concerning
the law pertaining to the charge pending against him.
review of the record refutes these claims.
A careful
Freeman’s confession
as to what had occurred was a part of the record.
Additionally,
the motion to enter a plea signed by Freeman indicated that his
attorney had reviewed the charges and the relevant law with him
prior to his plea.
Freeman’s argument that his counsel was
ineffective is unpersuasive.
For these reasons, the order of the Boone Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Ray Freeman
West Liberty, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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