ANDREW BECKER v. CLEMCO FABRICATORS; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 16, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001635-WC
ANDREW BECKER
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-95-23075
v.
CLEMCO FABRICATORS; and WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE: This is a petition for review filed by Andrew
Becker after the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed and
remanded the opinion and award of the Administrative Law Judge.
The rather unique nature of this case requires that its
procedural history be detailed.
Becker and a co-employee were working on a job for
Clemco Fabricators in Seymour, Indiana, and were returning from
lunch on June 6, 1995, when they were involved in an automobile
accident.
As a result of the accident, Becker sustained
fractures at the L-2 and L-3 vertebral sites.
In addition to a
workers’ compensation claim, he filed a personal injury action
and a declaration of rights against the driver of the automobile,
his co-employee.
Clemco and its insurance carriers were joined
as parties to the declaration of rights action to determine
whether Becker was within the course and scope of his employment
at the time of the accident.
Clemco defended the workers’
compensation action on the basis that Becker was not acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The trial court issued an order finding that Becker was
within the course and scope of his employment and that workers’
compensation was his exclusive remedy.
At approximately the same
time, the workers’ compensation arbitrator found that Becker was
not in the course and scope of his employment and dismissed the
workers’ compensation claim.
Clemco appealed the civil action
and Becker appealed the workers’ compensation action, which was
held in abeyance pending the civil appeal.
On September 18, 1998, this court affirmed the trial
court.
Clemco’s motion for discretionary review filed in the
Supreme Court was denied.
The workers’ compensation claim was removed from
abeyance and the parties proceeded with their proof.
A hearing
was held on November 9, 1999, and on December 21, 1999, more than
four years after the accident, the Administrative Law Judge
rendered an opinion and order finding that Becker had reached
maximum medical improvement in September 1996, and was unable to
obtain gainful employment until September 1999.
During the
pendency of the appeals, Becker, who at the time of the accident
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was twenty-five-years old, had returned to school and obtained an
Associates Degree in the computer field in September 1999.
At
that time, he secured employment at a wage equal to, or greater
than, his pre-injury employment.
Based on these facts and
recognizing that except for the rehabilitative initiative taken
by Becker his occupational disability would have been much
greater, the ALJ found as follows:
I will conclude that the plaintiff is
entitled to a 50% permanent partial
disability award from September 15, 1996,
through September 1, 1999, the date upon
which he apparently secured employment “at a
wage equal to or greater than” his preinjury
wage. During that period of time it appears
that he chose to work only part-time,
however, I see no reason why he could not
have maintained full-time employment,
however, it certainly would have been at or
near minimum wage. This was, of course,
roughly one-half of what he was able to earn
for the defendant-employer, and, therefore, I
believe that a 50% permanent partial
disability award for that time fairly and
accurately reflects his loss [sic] earning
capacity.
Effective September 1, 1999, the
provisions of KRS 342.730(1)(b) as effective
on June 6, 1995, “kick in.” At that time he
is entitled to receive permanent partial
disability benefits at or no more than two
times his functional impairment rating.
Having considered the plaintiff’s age,
education, occupation, past work experience,
transferable skills, and his current physical
condition and limitations, I believe he has
established, at the present time, an
occupational disability of 10%. Effective
September 1, 1999, and continuing for a
period not to exceed 425 weeks in the
aggregate from September 26, 1996, he will
receive benefits based upon a 10% partial
disability. This is, of course, within the
parameters of KRS 342.730(1)(b).
-3-
The Workers’ Compensation Board found that there is
substantial evidence to support either a 50% occupational
disability or 10% disability; it did not, however, approve of the
ALJ’s “splitting” of a permanent partial disability.
Although
recognizing that the ALJ “crafted a creative and probably common
sense right thing to do in connection with splitting permanent
partial disability benefits,” the Board explained as follows:
Essentially, the ALJ awarded Becker a
period of “temporary partial disability.”
The problem is our statute does not provide
for an award of “TPD.” Interestingly, when
Kentucky created its first workers’
compensation law, the 1916 General Assembly
enacted, in Section 17 of the Act, a
provision for “temporary partial disability.”
That statute provided:
A weekly compensation equal to sixtyfive percent (65%) of the difference
between his average weekly earnings
before the injury and the average weekly
earnings which he earns or is able to
earn in some suitable employment after
the injury and during such disability,
not to exceed three hundred thirty-five
(335) weeks from the date of injury nor
exceeding the sum of twelve dollars
($12.00) per week nor the maximum sum of
four thousand dollars ($4,000.00). . . .
This statutory provision was repealed
decades ago. And, although from time to time
a General Assembly has briefly considered its
re-enactment, the Legislature has chosen not
to do so. For a commentary of the provision
of “temporary partial disability,” see
Workmen’s Compensation Law of Kentucky,
annotated and explained by Nicholas H.
Dosker, (1916).
We agree with the Board that there is no specific
statutory provision providing the remedy fashioned by the ALJ.
However, it is clear that permanent disability benefits are
subject to review under our reopening statute.
-4-
As pointed out by
Becker, had this case proceeded in the usual course of time, he
would have received his award until such time he was employed at
an equal or greater wage and the employer moved for reopening.1
To quote from the well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Board
Member Lovan:
While the Board has never been faced with an
issue identical to the one now before us, we
have been faced with the converse. Shortly
after the 1994 change, we frequently
addressed the issue of whether an individual
having returned to work for a short period of
time before ceasing employment was limited to
one or two times functional impairment if he
later left that employment. In those
situations, we acknowledge that since KRS
342.125, the reopening statute, permitted
reopening under those circumstances, it would
be illogical to prohibit the ALJ from
considering those issues during the original
claim.
A basic tenet of workers’ compensation is to protect
the injured worker and the purpose of the law is to compensate
injured workers.2
If Becker is permitted an award of only 10%
disability for the duration of his disability, the purpose of the
law has not been obtained and the basic tenet of workers’
compensation is rejected.
We believe that the ALJ reached a
correct solution to a unique case.
The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
reversed and the opinion and award of the ALJ is reinstated.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
1
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CLEMCO
See Peabody Coal Company v. Gossett, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 33
(1991).
2
Campbell v. Sextet Mining Company, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25
(1995).
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David L. Sage
Louisville, Kentucky
FABRICATORS:
Carla Foreman Dallas
Louisville, Kentucky
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