JOE R. ROWE v. LORI ROWE
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RENDERED:
April 13, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001493-MR
JOE R. ROWE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE O. REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00299
v.
LORI ROWE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal in a domestic case from those
portions of a judgment and post-judgment order determining
custody, child support and dividing the parties’ marital assets.
We affirm on all issues except as to the court’s awarding
appellee her marital share of appellant’s police retirement
benefits already received during the marriage and before
separation.
On this issue, we reverse and remand for a
redistribution of said funds.
Appellant, Joe Rowe, and appellee, Lori Rowe, were
married in 1993 and separated on March 8, 1999.
One child was
born of the marriage, Samantha Rowe, born April 24, 1994.
On
March 18, 1999, Lori filed the petition for dissolution of
marriage herein.
The decree of dissolution was entered on
November 22, 1999, reserving issues of custody, child support and
division of marital and nonmarital assets.
At the time of the divorce, Lori was employed as a
school teacher, earning $2,519.19 a month, while Joe was retired
from the Kentucky State Police and had begun earning $3,273.50 a
month from his police retirement account in April of 1998.
After
retiring from the State Police in April of 1998, Joe began
working for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of
Insurance, earning $3,931.52 a month.
He was terminated from
said job in December of 1999 for unauthorized travel and usage of
state vehicles, discrepancies in time and attendance reporting,
insubordination, difficulty in relating to staff, and
inappropriate requests for expense reimbursement.
There was
post-judgment evidence presented that in December of 1999, Joe
had become self-employed as a private investigator, earning $60
an hour.
On March 15, 2000, the court entered its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order determining the issues of
custody, child support, and distribution of marital property.
The court found both parents fit to have custody and thus awarded
joint custody of the minor child, with Lori being designated the
primary residential custodian.
Joe was to have visitation of the
child every other weekend and on Thursday evenings.
In its determination of child support, the court found
that Joe was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed due to his
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termination from the job at the Department of Insurance for
reasons involving “poor decision-making and poor communication.”
Hence, the court imputed a gross monthly income to Joe of
$5,273.50 per month, which represented the $3,273 a month from
his State Police retirement, plus $2,000 a month as the amount
Joe was capable of earning.
Using these figures, the court
calculated Joe’s child support obligation to be $615.55 a month.
As to the parties’ property, the court awarded Lori the
marital residence valued at $104,500, but found that each party
had a one-half interest in the equity therein of $22,024.66.
Lori was to be responsible for the remaining debt on the
property.
Joe’s retirement benefits from the Department of
Insurance amounting to $5,173.27 were awarded to Joe free and
clear.
Lori’s retirement benefits from her teaching position
totaling $18,503.61 were awarded to Lori free and clear.
As for
Joe’s retirement benefits from the State Police, at the time he
retired, they totaled $87,878.51.
earned during the marriage.
Of that value, $40,806.03 was
From the time he began receiving
said benefits in April of 1998 until March of 2000, Joe had
already received $67,951.37 of those benefits.
The court
calculated Lori’s marital interest in those benefits to be
$9,356.90.1
In awarding this amount to Lori, the court offset
the amount, plus $1,800 in marital interest in one of the
parties’ vehicles, from the $11,012.33 Joe was awarded as his
1
From our review of the record, we could not discern how the
court arrived at this figure. However, neither party raises that
issue as error on appeal.
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share of the equity in the marital residence.
As for Joe’s
future earnings from the police retirement account, the court
awarded Lori 13.77% of any future disbursements thereof.
The court awarded Lori the deferred compensation from
her teaching job in the amount of $12,757.56.
Likewise, Joe was
awarded his deferred compensation in the amount of $11,642.69
from his state police job.
On March 24, 2000 (nine days after the aforementioned
judgment was entered), Lori and Joe engaged in a telephone
conversation which was recorded by Lori in which Joe repeatedly
threatened to kill Lori.
Consequently, Lori obtained an
emergency protective order (which was thereafter converted to a
domestic violence order) against Joe and filed a terroristic
threatening charge against him.
On March 27, 2000, Lori filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate the court’s order of March 15,
2000.
Citing Joe’s threats to her kill her and the resulting
domestic violence order, Lori asked that the award of joint
custody be vacated and that she be awarded sole custody of the
parties’ child.
Further, she moved the court to suspend all
visitation by Joe.
Joe also moved the court to alter, amend or
vacate the judgment of March 15, 2000, citing various errors in
the division of marital property and the computation of child
support.
On June 13, 2000, the court entered an order granting
Lori’s motion to award her sole custody and suspend Joe’s
visitation with the child.
The court stated:
Events took place between the parties
subsequent to the hearing which gave rise to
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an emergency protective order and to criminal
charges being placed by Ms. Rowe against Mr.
Rowe. That incident and the attendant
circumstances give the Court reason to grant
Ms. Rowe’s motion and to award her sole
custody and to suspend overnight visitations
by Mr. Rowe.
The court denied all of Joe’s requests in his motion to alter,
amend or vacate except for one which is not at issue in this
appeal related to child support.
From the orders of March 15 and
June 13, 2000, Joe now appeals.
We will first address Joe’s argument that the court
erred in changing the joint custody order to sole custody in
Lori.
Although the audiotape of the conversation between Joe and
Lori is not in the record, Joe does not dispute that he
repeatedly threatened to kill Lori in that conversation.
Joe
merely argues that these threats against Lori had no effect on
his daughter or on his relationship with his daughter and, thus,
should not have been considered by the court pursuant to KRS
403.270(3) in determining custody.
KRS 403.270(2) sets out the factors to be considered by
the court in determining the best interests of the child with
regard to custody.
One of the factors is “[t]he mental and
physical health of all individuals involved.”
Another of the
factors is “[i]nformation, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.720.”
KRS 403.270(2)(f).
KRS
403.720(1) define “domestic violence and abuse” as “physical
injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the
infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical
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injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or
members of an unmarried couple.”
KRS 403.270(3) provides:
The court shall not consider conduct of a
proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship with the child. If domestic
violence and abuse is alleged, the court
shall determine the extent to which the
domestic violence and abuse has affected the
child and the child’s relationship to both
parents.
In our view, the court’s finding that Joe’s threats to kill Lori
warranted an award of sole custody to Lori was not in error.
The
court must consider “the extent to which the domestic violence
and abuse has affected the child and the child’s relationship to
both parents.”
KRS 403.270(3).
We do not see how Joe can
seriously contend that threats to kill one of the child’s parents
would not directly or indirectly affect the child and child’s
relationship to both parents.
We have all learned that threats
of domestic violence must be taken seriously.
If the parent is
capable of killing the other parent, which we must presume, we
question the safety and welfare of the child in the offending
parent’s custody.
Moreover, if the parent followed through and
actually did harm or kill the other parent, that would undeniably
and irrevocably damage the child and the parent’s relationship
with the child.
At the very least, such threats call into
question the mental stability of the threatening parent and
demonstrate excessive hostility toward the other parent, to which
it would be unhealthy to expose a child.
Accordingly, we affirm
the court’s decision to award sole custody to Lori.
Joe’s next argument is that the court erred in finding
him voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for purposes of
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computing child support.
At the time of the divorce, litigation
was pending wherein Joe was contesting his termination from the
Department of Insurance job.
Joe argues that since his
termination from the Department of Insurance was not voluntary or
justified, and certainly was not for the purpose of avoiding his
child support obligation, the court should not have found him
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed based on this job.
KRS
403.212(d) provides:
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed, child support shall be
calculated based on a determination of
potential income, . . . Potential income
shall be determined based upon employment
potential and probable earnings level based
on the obligor's or obligee's recent work
history, occupational qualifications, and
prevailing job opportunities and earnings
levels in the community. A court may find a
parent to be voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed without finding that the parent
intended to avoid or reduce the child support
obligation.
A trial court’s findings regarding child support will
not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e.
unsupported by substantial evidence.
596 S.W.2d 31 (1980).
Ghali v. Ghali, Ky. App.,
The court found that Joe brought about his
termination from the Department of Insurance job due to
misconduct which was within his control.
There was evidence of
said misconduct introduced at the hearing in this matter.
this finding was not clearly erroneous.
Hence,
The court did not find,
and was not required to find per the above statute, that Joe got
fired from this job for the purpose of avoiding or reducing his
child support obligation.
Whether the firing was justified or
not, we do not believe the court erred in imputing income to Joe
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based on his salary at the Department of Insurance, as that job
would at least have been an indication of his probable earnings
level.
Joe did not allege that he could not seek other
comparable employment after his termination from the Department
of Insurance.
In fact, there was post-judgment evidence in the
record that in December of 1999, Joe had become employed as a
private investigator, earning $60 an hour (although he maintained
at the time of the hearing that he was unemployed).
Accordingly,
we cannot say the trial court erred in finding Joe voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed and thereby calculating his potential
income based on the Department of Insurance job.
Finally, Joe argues that the trial court inequitably
divided the parties’ marital assets.
In particular, Joe argues
that under KRS 403.190(4), the court erred in awarding Lori her
teaching retirement benefits free and clear pursuant to KRS
161.700(2) without exempting an equal portion of Joe’s retirement
benefits from his insurance and police retirement accounts from
marital division.
As stated earlier, the court awarded Joe his
insurance retirement benefits free and clear, but divided the
marital portion of his police retirement benefit.
In reviewing
the record, we see that the first time Joe made the argument that
he was entitled to an equal portion of Lori’s teaching retirement
benefits was in his motion to alter, amend or vacate.
order on this motion, the court stated as follows:
The reason that Mr. Rowe was not awarded a
marital interest in her retirement account
was that no calculations concerning the
marital interest in that account was
available to the Court. In addition, Mr.
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In the
Rowe’s proposed findings did not ask for a
share of her retirement.
Accordingly, this argument was not preserved for our review.
See
Payne v. Hall, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 530 (1968).
Joe also argues that the court should not have awarded
Lori her marital portion of the amount he received from his
police retirement account during the time the parties were still
married and living together because it was household income
already spent by both parties during the marriage.
Joe began
receiving his police retirement in April of 1998, and it is
undisputed that the parties separated in March of 1999.
Although
the court did not specifically find that Joe dissipated the funds
he received from his police retirement account during this time,
the court impliedly so found when it required Joe to pay Lori her
marital share of these funds which were received during the
marriage.
“The court may find dissipation when the marital
property is expended (1)during a period when there is a
separation or dissolution impending; and (2) where is a clear
showing of intent to deprive one’s spouse of her proportionate
share of the marital property.”
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky. App.,
974 S.W.2d 498 (1998), quoting Robinette v. Robinette, Ky. App.,
736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (1987).
The parties were not separated
during the period in question and the divorce was not filed until
March 18, 1999.
Joe maintains that said funds were used by both
parties as household income during this time.
Lori did not
present any evidence that Joe did anything with the police
retirement funds received during this time demonstrating an
intent to deprive her of her marital share thereof, such as
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depositing it in a separate account or spending it for a
nonmarital purpose.
Unless Lori could trace the funds to such an
account or expenditure, we must presume that the funds received
during the marriage and before separation were co-mingled with
other marital funds and spent by or on behalf of both parties
just as any other income would have been.
Accordingly, we
reverse that portion of the court’s order requiring Joe to pay
Lori her marital share of the police retirement funds received
during the marriage prior to separation and remand for a
redistribution of these funds consistent with this opinion.
Joe’s remaining argument is that the court erred in
considering the amount he receives from his police retirement
account in calculating child support.
KRS 403.212(2)(b)
specifically includes retirement benefits in the definition of
“gross income” for purposes of computing child support.
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edwin A. Logan
Stewart C. Burch
Frankfort, Kentucky
Paul C. Harnice
Frankfort, Kentucky
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