JAMES HANSEL v. FRUIT OF THE LOOM; SPECIAL FUND; J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: February 2, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001459-WC
JAMES HANSEL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-88570
v.
FRUIT OF THE LOOM; SPECIAL FUND;
J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge;
and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the
Workers' Compensation Board (Board), which affirmed the
administrative law judge's determination that the petitioner,
James Hansel, is limited to an award of permanent partial
disability benefits equal to twice the degree of his functional
impairment rating because following his injury, he returned to
his previous job at a wage equal to or greater than that which he
earned before the injury.
KRS 342.730(1)(b).
James Hansel suffered a work-related back injury in
September 1995.
He underwent lumbar surgery and returned to work
at Fruit of the Loom in February 1996.
He worked briefly on
light-duty and then returned to his pre-injury job in the
factory's ink room.
According to Hansel's last Application for
Adjustment of Claim, his condition was aggravated on May 12,
1996, when he lifted two five-gallon paint buckets at work.
He
was examined by Dr. Allen Haddix, who recommended "bed rest two
days when not at work" and light-duty for two weeks.
Hansel
returned to work pursuant to his light-duty restrictions; he then
saw Dr. Bothwell Lee.
According to Dr. Lee, Hansel's symptoms
indicated lumbar strain.
He provided a work-release statement
that authorized Hansel's return to full-duty after two weeks.1
A
follow-up examination was not scheduled.
Although he had been released to light-duty and was
being accommodated by Fruit of the Loom, Hansel erratically and
frequently missed work during June.2
Advised that he had
violated the company attendance policy, Hansel was terminated on
June 20, 1996.
This claim followed.
The claim was originally decided by Administrative Law
Judge J. Landon Overfield (ALJ Overfield) by opinion and award
entered August 6, 1997.
In evaluating the testimony, ALJ
Overfield found that Hansel's termination was not related to his
back problem and consequently that his "off-work status . . .
does not alter his status as having returned to work in a manner
1
Dr. Lee's case history indicates that Hansel was re-injured
at work "while lifting a screen filled with ink weighing about
22-30 lbs."
2
His direct supervisor also described occasions where Hansel
was found sleeping at his work station and was asked to get up
and move about.
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so as to subject him to the limitations of KRS 342.730(1)(b)."3
He then awarded Hansel benefits equal to two times his functional
impairment rate attributable to the injury he sustained while
employed by Fruit of the Loom.
Thereafter, Hansel filed a Petition for
Reconsideration, pointing out that ALJ Overfield had failed to
award him temporary total disability benefits from June 20, 1996
through August 26, 1996, according to the parties' stipulation.
Additionally, Hansel argued that the stipulation constituted a
judicial admission that his employment had been terminated
because of his work injury -- not because of excessive
absenteeism -- and, consequently, that the provisions of KRS
342.730(1)(b) were not applicable to him.
By order entered
September 8, 1997, ALJ Overfield awarded Hansel the additional
3
The 1994 Amendment to KRS 342.730(1)(b), which applies
here, reads in part:
(1) Except as provided in KRS 342.732,
income benefits for disability shall be paid
to the employee as follows:
(b) For permanent, partial disability,
where an employee returns to work at a
wage equal to or greater than the
employee's preinjury wage, sixty-six and
two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the
employee's average weekly wage but not
more than seventy-five percent (75%) of
the state average weekly wage as
determined by KRS 342.740, multiplied by
his percentage of impairment caused by
the injury. . . unless the employee
establishes a greater percentage of
disability as determined under KRS
342.0011(11), in which event the
benefits shall not exceed two (2) times
the functional impairment rate. . . .
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period of temporary total disability benefits but refused to
change his opinion as to the reason for Hansel's discharge and
the applicability of KRS 342.730(1)(b).
Hansel appealed ALJ Overfield's ruling and award of
benefits, both of which were affirmed by the Board.
Subsequently, Hansel sought review in this court.
By opinion
rendered May 5, 1999, this court, J. Dyche dissenting, vacated
the order of the Board and remanded the case with instructions to
direct the ALJ to re-evaluate the reasons for Hansel's dismissal,
weighing all appropriate evidence, including the stipulation
regarding temporary total disability benefits.
We specifically
concluded, however, that Fruit of the Loom's decision to pay
additional temporary total disability benefits to Hansel
following his discharge was not a conclusive admission that the
discharge was related to Hansel's injury.
Through his order on remand, ALJ Overfield again
summarized the evidence relative to Hansel's discharge and
specifically considered the temporary total disability
stipulation as directed.
Again, ALJ Overfield found that
Hansel's employment had been terminated for reasons unrelated to
his work injury.
Because Hansel had returned to work at a wage
equal to or greater than that which he had earned before his
injury, ALJ Overfield concluded that his recovery is limited to
twice his functional impairment rating by operation of law.
Hansel's subsequent Petition for Reconsideration was
denied, and he once again appealed to the Board.
The Board
affirmed the decision of ALJ Overfield, concluding that he had
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analyzed the totality of the evidence as directed by this court
and that substantial evidence supported his determinations.
This
petition for review followed.
Hansel again argues that the ALJ erred by finding that
his termination was unrelated to his work injury and by
interpreting KRS 342.730(1)(b) in such a way as to limit his
benefits to two times his impairment rating.
Having reviewed the
record and the Board's opinion, we are unable to conclude that
the Board committed an error in construing the law or in
assessing the evidence.
Thus, we affirm.
Hansel disputes the ALJ's conclusion that his
termination from employment was due to excess absenteeism rather
than his work-related back problem.
However, the record reflects
that in his re-evaluation of the reasons for Hansel's dismissal,
ALJ Overfield properly considered the meaning of Fruit of the
Loom's decision to pay temporary total disability benefits
following Hansel's termination -- the sole basis for our decision
to remand the claim.
ALJ Overfield specifically noted as
follows:
Plaintiff testified at his discovery
deposition and at his hearing that after he
returned to work after his surgical treatment
he only missed work because of his low back
problems. He was specifically questioned
concerning records indicating that he had
problems with his nerves and his pending
divorce as well as his low back problems. He
responded that the problems with his nerves
and his domestic relations problems did not
enter into his reasons for missing work.
According to the deposition testimony of Jana
Moore, Plaintiff's supervisor, and Tony
Pelaski, the plant manager, Plaintiff's
absenteeism had exceeded that allowed under
company policy. Some of the absentee days
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related to his back problems but others were
reported as being due to sickness. Prior to
Plaintiff seeing Dr. Lee on June 20, 1996,
Jana Moore had discussed the absenteeism with
him and had instructed him to meet with plant
manager Pelaski. Mr. Pelaski testified that
he terminated Plaintiff because Plaintiff had
violated the attendance policy and company
guidelines. Mr. Pelaski testified that he
had asked Plaintiff to explain where he had
been or what his problem related to and
Plaintiff explained that it was personal and
he had to attend a divorce hearing and that
he was having personal problems. Mr. Pelaski
testified that Plaintiff at no time mentioned
his low back pain.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Lee on June 20, 1996. This
was after he had been instructed by Jana
Moore to see the plant manager. Dr. Lee's
handwritten note indicated that Plaintiff
appeared unkempt and unshaven and noting that
his low back pain had gone down into his
lower extremities. Plaintiff also reported
to Dr. Lee that "last Thursday" he was called
to the factory office and pressured to do
more work. He went on to tell Dr. Lee that
he also had gone to a divorce hearing with
his wife and his troubles with his wife, at
the factory and with his back had caused his
nerves to be shot. Dr. Lee noted that
Plaintiff says he has to get off work and
noted that he had already had one heart
attack. Dr. Lee then issued an off-work
statement indicating that he should be off
"for three weeks until he sees Dr. Lee on
August 8, 1996." Of course, this would be a
much longer time than three weeks.
As noted in the original opinion and award,
the undersigned was not impressed with
Plaintiff's testimony. This was an attempt
to, in a delicate manner, indicate that after
observing Plaintiff testify and considering
all of the other evidence, the undersigned
had problems with Plaintiff's credibility.
This problem has not been rectified by the
re-evaluation of the evidence or by the fact
that Defendant Employer had stipulated to an
additional period of entitlement to temporary
total disability benefits.
Defendant Employer did, in May of 1997,
stipulate that Plaintiff was entitled to TTD
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benefits for the period from June 20, 1996
through August 26, 1996. As noted by the
Court of Appeals in its opinion, this
stipulation is evidence to be considered but
is not a conclusive admission that
Plaintiff's termination was related to his
low back injury. I have re-evaluated the
evidence, including the fact that Defendant
Employer stipulated Plaintiff's entitlement
to temporary total disability benefits after
his termination, and am still of the opinion
that Plaintiff's termination in June of 1996
was due to his excessive absenteeism and was
not related to his workers compensation
injury.
"The ALJ, as the finder of fact, and not the reviewing
court, has the sole authority to determine the quality,
character, and substance of the evidence[,]" in workers'
compensation proceedings.
Square D Co. v Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d
308, 309 (1993) (citation omitted).
Further, the reviewing court
is limited to determining whether the ALJ "committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice."
Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688
(1992).
As we noted in our previous opinion, it is not our role
to assess the weight to be given to the facts and to the
evidence.
This is a determination left to the fact-finder.
We
agree with the Board that ALJ Overfield's findings are responsive
to the directive in our earlier opinion and that they are
supported by substantial evidence.
Next, Hansel contends that the Board erred by affirming
ALJ Overfield's construction of KRS 342.730(1)(b).
He argues
that ALJ Overfield misinterpreted and misapplied the "return to
work" concept embodied in the provisions of KRS 342.730(1)(b).
We disagree.
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As observed in Ashland Exploration v. Tackett, Ky.
App., 971 S.W.2d 832 (1998), the provisions of KRS 342.730(1)(b)
were aimed at curbing economic abuses of the workers'
compensation system.
Through this provision, the General
Assembly
intended to limit the amount of workers'
compensation benefits an able-bodied claimant
may receive if he, at least, returns to work
at his pre-injury wage and is physically
capable of remaining in the job he returns to
permanently or indefinitely.
Id. at 834.
We agree with the Board that ALJ Overfield
accurately assessed the impact of the Tackett decision in his
ultimate conclusion.
Under the specific facts of this case, it
was properly within the purview of ALJ Overfield's discretion to
find that Hansel had returned to work at his pre-injury wage and
was capable of remaining at this job permanently or indefinitely
had his chronic absenteeism not deprived him of that position.
The Board did not err in affirming the ALJ's application of KRS
342.730(1)(b) to the facts of this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE FRUIT OF
THE LOOM:
Roy C. Gray
Frankfort, KY
Norman E. Harned
Amanda Anderson Young
Bowling Green, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SPECIAL
FUND:
John Burrell
Frankfort, KY
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