BELINDA L. PRIEST v. KURT E. PRIEST
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 31, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001419-MR
BELINDA L. PRIEST
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00999
v.
KURT E. PRIEST
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Belinda L. Priest, pro se, has appealed from an
order of the Hardin Circuit Court awarding sole custody of her
daughters, Julie and Cynthia Priest, to her former husband, Kurt
E. Priest; dividing the couple’s property and debt; and ordering
that Belinda pay Kurt $648.20 in additional child support for the
period of June 2, 1999, through February 29, 2000.
Having
concluded that all of Belinda’s claims of error are without
merit, we affirm.
Kurt and Belinda were married on March 12, 1987, in
Texas.
Two children were born of their marriage.
Julie was born
on July 19, 1988, and Cynthia was born on March 4, 1995.
It was
later shown through DNA testing that Kurt was not the biological
father of either child.1
least.
The marriage was stormy to say the
During their approximate twelve-year marriage, there were
five to seven different domestic violence incidents reported,
with each spouse accusing the other as being the aggressor.
Problems regarding child neglect began to surface in 1997.
Army
Community Services intervened at one point and temporarily took
custody of the children.
In addition, the Cabinet for Families
and Children has been involved with the family since February 2,
1998.
The procedural history of this case is both tortured
and voluminous, but the important points to consider in this
appeal are as follows:
On June 23, 1998, Kurt filed for
dissolution of the marriage and asked to be awarded sole custody
of the two children.
A hearing was scheduled before the Domestic
Relations Commissioner of the Hardin Circuit Court on September
15, 1998.2
The Commissioner recommended that Belinda be found
not suitable as a joint custodian and that Kurt be awarded sole
1
Kurt Priest
away from Belinda
time. The record
by the biological
was a member of the armed services and he was
on different occasions for extended periods of
is void of any involvement in these proceedings
fathers of the two children.
2
Amid great confusion, it was later decided by the trial
court that each parties’ counsel had apparently agreed that the
September 15, 1998 hearing was a final custody hearing.
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custody of the children.
The Commissioner also recommended that
Belinda not be allowed visitation until she underwent extensive
counseling.
On December 9, 1998, the marriage was dissolved, but
the trial court reserved ruling on custody of the children and
division of the couple’s property and debt.
On December 10,
1998, Kurt was awarded temporary custody of the children, and
Belinda was granted limited, supervised visitation.
On March 26,
1999, the trial court adopted the recommendations from the
previous Commissioner’s reports and awarded Kurt sole custody of
the children.
On April 24, 2000, following extensive disclosures
regarding the couple’s property and debt, the Commissioner filed
a report recommending division of their property and debt and the
setting of child support.
These recommendations were adopted, in
part, by the trial court on May 19, 2000. The parties filed
various motions seeking modification of the trial court’s
pendente lite orders.
The trial court held a hearing on June 20,
2000, on all pending motions; and in a final and appealable order
entered on June 22, 2000, denied the motions to modify its
previous orders.
This appeal followed.
Belinda claims (1) Kurt failed to prove de facto
custodianship and the trial court erred in awarding him sole
custody; (2) there was insufficient evidence to warrant a denial
of joint custody; (3) the division of property and debt was
inequitable; and (4) the trial court erred in increasing her
child support obligations retroactively.
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Belinda argues that Kurt failed to establish his status
as a de facto custodian:
KRS3 403.270(1)(a) states[,] “Any period
of time after a legal proceeding has been
commenced by a parent seeking to regain
custody of the child shall not be included in
determining whether the child has resided
with the person for the required minimum
period.” Since Belinda began legal
proceedings in Hardin Juvenile Court in June
1997 to regain custody of her children, the
time from June 1997 to present does not, by
law, apply for determining if Kurt qualifies
as a de facto custodian [citation to record
omitted].
We are limited in our review of this issue since we
have not been provided with a record of the evidence regarding
this matter.4
It is well-settled that “[i]n the absence of the
presentation of facts in the manner prescribed by law, an
appellate court must assume that the findings are sufficiently
supported.”5
Therefore, in the absence of any evidence before us
that would refute the trial court’s findings, we must assume that
the facts support Kurt’s status as a de facto custodian.
In this regard, the trial court found as follows:
Kurt had full custody of the children
from June of 1997 through February of 1998.
He provided the sole care for these children
and the sole financial support during that
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
We also note that we have gained little insight from the
parties’ briefs. Furthermore, appellee failed to comply with
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv) which
requires, “. . . ample supportive references to the record and
citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law . . . .”
5
Oeltjen v. Oeltjen, 251 Ky. 739, 65 S.W.2d 1004 (1933).
-4-
time. However, even prior to that time Kurt
was the primary caregiver and financial
supporter of these children. Belinda has
been highly unstable for quite some time, and
Kurt has struggled to keep this family
together. If not for Kurt, these children
would remain in foster care indefinitely
[emphasis added].
It is the finding of this court that by
clear and convincing evidence Kurt has proven
that he meets the definition of de facto
custodian as set out pursuant to KRS
403.270(1)(a).
Absent any evidence to the contrary, we certainly cannot hold
these findings to be clearly erroneous.6
Belinda also argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the denial of joint custody:
We find that a great deal of the
Commissioner’s report regarding custody
references Belinda’s conduct that did not
affect her relationship with the children . .
. . KRS 403.270(3) specifically states, “the
court shall not consider conduct of a
proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.”
As can been seen from the Commissioner’s report, this
argument is wholly without merit:
Among other episodes, Belinda has used
profanity in front of case workers and the
children. She has falsely accused a case
worker of kicking her. She has had to be
restrained from approaching a worker in an
intimidating and threatening manner . . . .
She has cancelled and not appeared for visits
with the children. On one occasion, she
demanded the return of all the children’s
clothing to her. She even demanded the shoes
off their feet during a visit. This demand
was made in [the children’s] presence.
6
See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
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Belinda’s activities and behavior
exhibit . . . an appalling lack of concern or
caring for her own children. On most of the
occasions mentioned above the children were
present.
Chris Long testified that he has
supervised visits of Kurt and Belinda
separately with their children. He echoes
the testimony of Helen Mudd in that Belinda
has never been cooperative, and in fact, the
children are often very upset after the
visits with their mother . . . . After
visits with Belinda, the children have
resumed troubling behaviors, such as bed
wetting and outbursts of temper.
Thus, contrary to Belinda’s claims, it is evident from
these findings that Belinda’s actions have had a direct and
negative effect on her children.
On the other hand, testimony
showed that following supervised visits with Kurt, the children
“elicit a positive emotional response” and that “the children are
always very happy to see him.”
Accordingly, there was ample
evidence to support the trial court’s decision to deny Belinda
joint custody.
Belinda makes a related argument that the trial court
erred by not joining the biological fathers as parties to this
action.
Even if Belinda were correct, this error would not
affect her rights.
Belinda further claims the trial court erred in the
division of the couple’s property and debt:
During the review of the record it has
come to the attention of Belinda that the
disclosure statement represented in the
record as her[s] is not the disclosure
statement she submitted to the court.
Someone has rewritten this statement,
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attaching the pages with Belinda’s signature.
Belinda’s real disclosure statement
shows that Kurt removed over $5,100.00 from
the joint checking account shortly after the
separation in June 1998 . . . . At no time
was Belinda give[n] credit for this money
that Kurt removed from the account.
[citations to record omitted].
It is unclear when Belinda learned of this alleged tampering with
the evidence.
However, from our review of the record, it appears
that this issue has never been presented to the trial court.
In Payne v. Hall,7 the former Court of Appeals stated:
The trial court was given no opportunity
to pass on these contentions, which is a
prerequisite here to appellate review. Com.,
Dept. of Highways v. Taylor County Bank, Ky.,
394 S.W.2d 581 (1965). In 7 Kentucky
Practice, Clay 215 it is said, 'Clearly
before a party may request appellate review
of such matters under those circumstances,
the trial court must be given an opportunity
to decide the questions raised.' [citations
omitted].
Accordingly, this claim of error cannot be considered
in this appeal.
If Belinda did not learn of this alleged
tampering of the evidence in sufficient time to raise the issue
in her CR 59 motion to alter, amend or vacate, then she should
have sought relief from the trial court pursuant to CR 60.02.
Then, if the trial court deems it necessary it can hold an
evidentiary hearing and make the appropriate findings.
Aside
from these bare allegations, there is no evidence in the record
before us to support Belinda’s claim that Kurt removed the
$5,100.00 from the checking account.
7
Ky., 423 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1968).
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Accordingly, there is no
basis for this Court to hold that the trial court erred in this
matter.
Belinda further argues that the trial court erred in
the division of the couple’s mutual funds:8
We also find that the court failed to
make an equitable distribution of the mutual
funds by failing to liquidate the funds prior
to division while knowing that the value of
stock based mutual funds fluctuates daily.
By awarding Belinda a set dollar amount and
delaying the order dividing the property by
eleven months, Kurt has enjoyed the benefit
of collecting the capital gains, dividends,
and interest on Belinda’s share of the funds,
thus giving Kurt a much more than equitable
share of the marital funds by about
$4,000.00. [citation to record omitted].
This argument is also unavailing.
In Quiggins v. Quiggins,9 this Court stated:
Finally, the appellant argues that the
trial court erred in its division of the
marital property given the guidelines set
forth in KRS 403.190. We disagree. That
statute does not dictate that marital
property be divided equally. Rather, it
states that the trial court "shall divide the
marital property in just proportions
considering all relevant factors . . . ."
The trial court's findings with respect to
the division of marital property will not be
disturbed unless shown to be clearly
erroneous.
In dividing the mutual fund, the trial court made the
following findings:
8
It should be noted that neither Kurt nor Belinda offered
any evidence to the Commissioner establishing the true value of
the mutual funds.
9
Ky.App., 637 S.W.2d 666, 669 (1982).
-8-
After Kurt’s $1500.0010 is deleted from the
Janus fund, there remains $12,700.00 to be
divided equally between the parties. That
would give each party $6,350.00. After
adding $550.0011 to Belinda’s share, she
should receive $6,900.00, however, as stated
previously, Belinda has already paid herself
$5,000.00 of this portion.12 Therefore,
Belinda should receive $1,900.00 from the
Janus fund. The balance of the Janus and
Berger funds should be awarded to Kurt.
We believe the trial court’s division of the mutual funds was
equitable.
The trial court considered the fact that Belinda had
already liquidated almost 1/3 of the Janus fund, and that she was
going to receive all of the household contents.
Accordingly,
based upon the limited record before us, we cannot hold the trial
court’s finding to be clearly erroneous.
Finally, Belinda argues the trial court erred in
awarding Kurt child support retroactively:
[T]he court retroactively increased Belinda’s
child support obligation thus reversing its
earlier decision, while failing to release
Belinda from her obligation to attend
expensive counseling and visitation sessions.
Belinda followed the recommendations of the
court in good faith expending literally
thousands of dollars to comply with the
orders of the court while believing that her
child support would only be $60.00 per month
during this time. For the court to
retroactively raise the child support
obligation of Belinda after the fact is
nothing less than a breech [sic] of contract.
10
Compensation to Kurt for Belinda receiving all of the
contents of the marital home.
11
Her half of the Berger fund.
12
Belinda liquidated $5,000.00 to pay for legal services.
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In Snow v. Snow,13 this Court stated:
Child-support awards may be modified
only as to installments accruing after notice
of the motion for modification and then "only
upon a showing of a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and
continuing." KRS 403.213(1). As with the
original determination of a child support
award, the decision whether to modify an
award in light of changed circumstances is
within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Price v. Price, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 44
(1995); Rainwater v. Williams, Ky.App., 930
S.W.2d 405 (1996). Under KRS 403.213(2), a
change in circumstances is rebuttably
presumed to be substantial if application of
the child-support guidelines (KRS 403.212) to
the new circumstances would result in a
change in the amount of child support of 15%
or more.
In the case at bar, Kurt filed a motion to modify child
support on June 2, 1999, because Belinda had obtained employment.
Her monthly income had more than doubled, going from $892.67 per
month to $1,9997.67 per month.
This increase in income certainly
was sufficient to constitute a material change in circumstances,
which warranted a modification in Belinda’s child support
obligation.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by retroactively increasing her monthly support
payments.
For these reasons, the orders of the Hardin Circuit
Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
13
Ky.App., 24 S.W.3d 668, 672 (2000).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Belinda L. Priest, Pro Se
Radcliff, KY
Russell L. Crusott
Radcliff, KY
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