CAROLYN HUDSON AND JERRY P. RHOADS v. HOPKINS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001053-WC
CAROLYN HUDSON AND JERRY P. RHOADS
APPELLANTS
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-74616
v.
HOPKINS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Carolyn Hudson, a workers’ compensation claimant,
and Jerry Rhoads, Hudson’s attorney, appeal from an April 3,
2000, opinion and order of the Workers’ Compensation Board
dismissing their petition for review of the attorney fee awarded
Rhoads.
Applying the fee-statute (KRS 342.320) as amended
December 12, 1996, the Administrative Law Judge who heard
Hudson’s claim limited Rhoads’s fee to $10,000.00.
fee the Board affirmed.
This is the
Hudson and Rhoads maintain that the
December 1996 amendments should not have been applied to this
claim and that, under KRS 342.320 as it existed prior to those
amendments, Rhoads was entitled to a fee of about $14,500.00.
For the following reasons, we affirm the Board’s decision.
Hudson sustained the work-related injury underlying her
claim in October 1996.
She and Rhoads contend that the December
1996 amendments to the fee statute were not intended to apply
retroactively, and thus that they do not apply to this claim for
fees.
During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court
rendered an opinion that refutes this contention.
“KRS 342.0015
made it clear,” the Supreme Court explained in Daub v. Baker
Concrete, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 124 (2000),
that the legislature intended for the changes
in the procedure by which claims were decided
to apply to all claims pending on or after
December 12, 1996, without regard to the date
upon which they arose. KRS 342.0015 also
made it clear that the legislature considered
the amendments to KRS 342.320 to be remedial.
In view of the legislature's express
declaration, we conclude that the amendments
to KRS 342.320 apply to all claims pending on
or after December 12, 1996.
Id. at 128.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court continued, the
amended statute necessarily implies that attorney-client
employment contracts entered after December 12, 1996, are subject
to the amended fee limits regardless of when the claim arose.
Id.
Rhoads undertook to represent Hudson’s claim in January
1997.
Under Daub v. Baker Concrete, then, the ALJ and the Board
did not err by applying the $10,000.00 fee limit to this claim.
If the amended KRS 342.320 applies retroactively,
Hudson and Rhoads next contend, then it violates sections 14 and
55 of our constitution.
is controlling.
Again, however, Daub v. Baker Concrete
Daub expressly held that the retroactive
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application of KRS 342.320 in circumstances closely analogous to
these did not violate section 14 of our constitution.
Having considered the [constitutional]
arguments raised by the claimant and his
attorney, we conclude that neither has
demonstrated how he was harmed by the
application of the amendments which are at
issue. The attorney asserts that he had a
vested right to be compensated at the rate on
the date of injury, as provided in the 1994
Act; however, he does not explain how that
right vested before December 12, 1996, when
the representation was not undertaken until
months later. Likewise, he does not explain
how the amendment could impair a contract
which did not exist until after the amendment
was enacted.
Any right which an attorney has to a fee
accrues from the date upon which the worker
and the attorney enter into a contract for
the representation. It is undisputed that
the attorney undertook the representation of
the claimant in June, 1997, after the
effective date of the 1996 amendments;
therefore, no vested right was impaired by
applying the limitations imposed by the 1996
amendments when determining the maximum
attorney's fee. Although the 1996 amendments
create two classes of attorneys who represent
workers with regard to claims which arose
before December 12, 1996, the classes are
based on the date upon which the
representation commenced, i.e., the date from
which the attorney's right to a fee vested.
Under those circumstances, we are not
persuaded that applying the amendments to
determine the maximum attorney's fee violated
any constitutional right of this attorney.
Claimant asserts that because he is
required to pay his attorney's fee, he had a
vested right to obtain the best
representation he could in view of the amount
of benefits which were at stake. He argues
that although an award for total disability
was at stake, the permissible attorney fee
was only $ 2,000.00 at the arbitrator level.
We note, however, that claimant does not
explain how his right to competent
representation was impaired by the $ 2,000.00
limitation or how the limitation deprived him
of a remedy, particularly in view of the fact
that he was able to obtain competent counsel
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and was awarded benefits for a total
disability in an informal proceeding in which
he submitted only a medical report and his
affidavit as evidence. In return, he was
required to pay a maximum attorney's fee
which was substantially less than the maximum
in effect on the date of injury. Under those
circumstances, we are not persuaded that
applying the amendments in order to determine
the maximum attorney's fee violated any
constitutional right of the claimant.
Id. at 129.
The Daub v. Baker Concrete opinion does not address the
constitutionality of the contested fee limits under section 55 of
our constitution, but it suggests, for the reasons just quoted,
that relief is not available under that section either.
Section
55 provides in part that, in cases of emergency, a legislative
act may become effective in less than 90 days after the
adjournment of the session in which it was passed, when,
by the concurrence of a majority of the
members elected to each House of the General
Assembly, by a yea and nay vote entered upon
their journals, an act may become a law when
approved by the governor, but the reasons for
the emergency that justifies this action must
be set out at length in the journal of each
house.
The act amending attorney-fee limits was passed as
emergency legislation during the first extraordinary session of
the 1996 General Assembly.
The modification of the attorney-fee
statute, of course, was only a small part of that act (often
referred to as House Bill 1), which sought to streamline claims
procedures generally and to make the entire workers’ compensation
system more efficient.
Focusing narrowly on the attorney-fee
provisions, however, Hudson and Rhoads assert that the General
Assembly failed adequately to justify its emergency treatment of
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those particular amendments, and that thus those amendments were
not eligible, under section 55, for expedited effectiveness.
We
disagree.
First, as did the appellants in Daub, Hudson and Rhoads
have failed to indicate how they were injured by the alleged
constitutional violation and thus have failed to establish a
ground for relief.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has observed
that, with respect to determining whether a legislative emergency
exists, the General Assembly’s judgment
must be accorded the same presumption of
validity that it enjoys in other instances of
constitutional inquiry. That is, if there is
any rational basis for concluding that the
circumstances cited as constituting an
emergency justified more expeditious action
than would ordinarily be true, the courts
should not interfere with the legislative
discretion.
American Insurance Association v. Geary, Ky., 635 S.W.2d 306, 307
(1982).
Section 90 of House Bill 1,1 the emergency clause,
provides as follows:
The General Assembly finds and declares that
workers who incur injuries covered by KRS
Chapter 342 are not assured that prescribed
benefits will be promptly delivered,
mechanisms designed to establish the longterm solvency of the special fund have failed
to reduce its unfunded liability, and many of
the Commonwealth’s employers are placed at a
competitive disadvantage due to the cost of
securing workers’ compensation insurance
coverage. These circumstances threaten the
vitality of the Commonwealth’s economy and
the jobs and well-being of its workforce.
Whereas it is in the interest of all citizens
that the provisions of the Act shall be
1
1996 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 90.
-5-
implemented
is declared
effect upon
Governor or
law.
as soon as possible, an emergency
to exist, and this Act takes
its passage and approval by the
upon its otherwise becoming a
We are persuaded that the cited circumstances
adequately support the Generally Assembly’s exercise of its
discretion to declare emergency legislation in this instance,
both with respect to its broad reform efforts in general and with
respect to the attorney-fee modifications in particular.
Given
the precision with which the General Assembly addressed the fee
provisions, it seems clear to us that it regarded those
provisions as integral aspects of the overall reform.
Expeditious passage into law of the overall reform being
justified, the like passage of this integral part of the reform
was justified too.
The December 12, 1996, amendments of KRS
342.320, therefore, were not violative of section 55 of our
constitution.
For this and the above reasons, we affirm the
April 3, 2000, opinion and order of the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BARBER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
No brief was filed for the
appellees.
Jerry P. Rhoads
Rhoads & Rhoads, P.S.C.
Madisonville, Kentucky
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