BILLY JOE RICHARDS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 9, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001016-MR
BILLY JOE RICHARDS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 97-CR-00048
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND MILLER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Billy Joe Richards appeals from the Greenup
Circuit Court's denial of his Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42 motion seeking to vacate or set aside his plea of
guilty.
We affirm.
Richards was indicted by a Greenup County grand jury
for murder (Kentucky Revised Statute [KRS] 507.020), first-degree
burglary (KRS 511.020), attempted first-degree rape (KRS 510.040
and 506.020), and theft by unlawful taking, over $300 (KRS
514.030), in the May 9, 1997, death of Elsie Francis Taylor.
Richards, who was seventeen at the time, entered Taylor's home
armed with a knife, slashed her throat, partially tore her
clothes off and left in her truck.
He entered a plea of guilty
to the charges on November 13, 1997, and was sentenced on
December 15, 1997, to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for twenty-five years on the murder charge; twenty
years' imprisonment on the burglary charge; ten years'
imprisonment on the attempted rape charge; and five years'
imprisonment on the theft charge, all sentences to be served
concurrently.
He filed a RCr 11.42 motion to set aside the
sentence on October 4, 1999, which motion was denied on December
23, 1999.
This appeal followed.
Richards makes three arguments before this Court.
He
claims that he should have been sentenced as a youthful offender,
and not as an adult, under the auspices of Britt v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 965 S.W.2d 147 (1998).
He also argues that the trial court
imposed sentence prior to the submission of his pre-sentence
investigation.
Finally, he alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel did not act on the preceding
two purported errors, and also failed to inform him that a jury
could decide his punishment pursuant to RCr 9.84.
Richards's contention that he should have been
sentenced as a youthful offender is without merit, because it
relies on a statute wholly inapplicable to this case.
Richards
cites KRS 635.020(4), which relates to a juvenile's transfer to
circuit court if he is charged with a felony in which a firearm
was used, and claims that since there was no firearm involved in
the murder in this case, the statute does not allow for his
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transfer to circuit court.
This portion of the statute plainly
does not apply to Richards; however, KRS 635.020(2) states that:
[i]f a child charged with a capital offense,
Class A felony, or Class B felony, had
attained age fourteen (14) at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, the court
shall, upon motion of the county attorney
made prior to adjudication that the child be
proceeded against as a youthful offender,
proceed in accordance with the provisions of
KRS 640.010.1
KRS 640.010(2)(c) provides that, after a preliminary
hearing in which the district court finds the requisite factors,
the child may be transferred to circuit court where "[t]he child
shall then be proceeded against . . . as an adult . . . ."
KRS
640.030 then provides that if a youthful offender enters a plea
of guilty to a felony in circuit court, the child "shall be
subject to the same type of sentencing procedures and duration of
sentence, including probation and conditional discharge, as an
adult convicted of a felony offense . . . ."
This statute
enumerates certain exceptions, none of which are applicable in
this case.
Richards was charged with murder, a capital offense,
first-degree burglary and attempted first-degree rape, both Class
B felonies, and he was seventeen years of age at the time of the
offense.
He was properly transferred to circuit court as a
youthful offender.
He entered a plea of guilty to these offenses
1
The statute has since been amended by the General
Assembly to provide for consultation between the county attorney
and the Commonwealth's attorney prior to adjudication. This
amendment has no bearing on the outcome of this case.
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in circuit court, and was properly sentenced as an adult.
We
find no error.
Richards next argues that the trial court entered final
judgment and sentence against him without benefit of a presentence investigation.
The record, and the ruling of the trial
court, dispel this allegation.
Richards was scheduled for final
sentencing on December 11, 1997.
Sentencing was continued
because the pre-sentence investigation had not been completed.
When the pre-sentence investigation was received by the court on
December 15, 1997, the court entered its final judgment and
sentence on that date.
Richards's final argument is that his counsel was
ineffective by failing to object when Richards was sentenced as
an adult, failing to object when the trial court entered final
judgment without a pre-sentence investigation, and allowing the
trial court to sentence Richards in apparent violation of RCr
9.84.
As previously discussed, there were no errors in the first
two situations.
An attorney's failure to object to a proper
ruling of the trial court can not be considered ineffective
assistance of counsel.
See Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14 S.W.3d
9, 13 (1999)("[B]efore there can be ineffective assistance of
counsel, there first must be counsel error.").
RCr 9.84(2) states that "[w]hen the defendant enters a plea
of guilty the court may fix the penalty, except that in cases
involving offenses punishable by death the defendant may demand
that his or her punishment be fixed by the jury."
added.)
(Emphases
RCr 9.84 does not require a jury to fix a sentence when
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a defendant pleads guilty to an offense that is punishable by
death.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 229, 232
(1995)(Stumbo, J., dissenting).
Richards indicated in his guilty
plea colloquy with the trial judge that he knew the trial court
would impose his sentence, he was aware that the Commonwealth had
recommended a sentence on a plea of guilty, and that he was
satisfied with the services he had received from his attorney.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel where the defendant
pled guilty, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient relative
to current professional standards, and that
had counsel's performance not been deficient,
the defendant would not have pled guilty and
the outcome would have been different.
Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1999)
(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed.
2d 203 [1985]).
In determining effectiveness of counsel, a
reviewing court must be highly deferential in analyzing counsel's
performance, and must avoid the temptation to second-guess.
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998).
Richards has not demonstrated that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient.
He alleges that he was not advised of
his right to have his punishment fixed by a jury.
Even if we
assume this to be true, Richards does not claim that he would
have pleaded not guilty, nor does he make any showing that the
outcome would have been different.
Because both elements of the
Russell standard have not been met, we find no ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Billy Joe Richards
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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