ROBERTO DELGADILLO V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000944-MR
ROBERTO DELGADILLO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-01361-002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; EMBERTON and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Fayette Circuit Court convicting appellant of criminal
facilitation to trafficking in marijuana over five pounds.
We
are satisfied that even if the court erred by giving a
facilitation instruction herein, no palpable error occurred.
Hence, we affirm.
On November 13, 1999, Avelino Rodriguez and appellant
Roberto Delgadillo twice went to the Kentucky Horse Center tack
shop and inquired as to whether the shop had received a package
addressed to John Peterson.
Each time, one man entered the shop
while the other remained outside in a car.
Subsequently, the
tack shop indeed received a large package addressed to John
Peterson.
Upon learning that no one by that name worked at the
Kentucky Horse Center, the employee who received the package
turned it over to her supervisor, who opened the package and
discovered fourteen pounds of what was later confirmed to be
processed marijuana.
The police were contacted, and a drug sting
operation was set up to see who would claim the box.
According
to the testimony, appellant took possession of the package on
November 15 while Rodriguez waited in the driver’s seat of the
car.
When police asked appellant why he obtained the package,
appellant indicated that he was to later meet someone who had
given him one hundred dollars to pick it up.
Although a
narcotics officer was then dispatched to the location given by
appellant, no one was seen waiting for appellant.
The postal markings on the package indicated that it
was mailed from McAllen, Texas.
Papers found inside appellant
and Rodriguez’s car contained phone numbers traced to pay phones
in McAllen, as well as numerous examples of the signature of a
John Peterson which the Commonwealth maintained were practice
signatures.
Appellant and Rodriquez were jointly indicted on
December 21, 1999.
Count One of the indictment, charging them
with trafficking in marijuana over five pounds pursuant to KRS
218A.1421, stated that “[o]n or about the 15th day of November,
1999, in Fayette County, Kentucky, the above named Defendants
trafficked in over five pounds of marijuana.”
Rodriguez’s fiancée testified at trial that he told her
that on the day in question, he had to give a ride to appellant,
a stranger, to pick something up.
Appellant in turn testified
that when he was at a gas station looking for a job, two men
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asked him to pick up a United Parcel Service package at the
Kentucky Horse Center.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Commonwealth
requested an instruction on criminal facilitation to trafficking
in marijuana over five pounds, as well as instructions on both
possession and trafficking in marijuana over five pounds.
The
Commonwealth requested the facilitation instruction based on the
theory that either one of the defendants was helping the other,
or both were helping a third party.
Appellant’s counsel not only
did not object to the facilitation instruction, but in fact she
expressed satisfaction with the prospect of the court giving such
an instruction.
The jury found appellant not guilty of the
possession and trafficking charges, but convicted him of the
offense of criminal facilitation to trafficking in marijuana.
This appeal followed.
Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by giving an instruction on the offense of criminal
facilitation to trafficking in marijuana because he was not
indicted for the offense, and the offense is not a lesser
included offense to trafficking in marijuana.
However, even
though this argument may have merit, there is no basis for
reversing the court’s judgment.
In the first place, as appellant did not object to the
court giving a facilitation instruction, the issue was not
preserved for review.
RCr 9.54(2).
In fact, the agreement by
appellant’s counsel to the giving of such an instruction, and the
express waiver of any objection thereto, may have occurred as a
deliberate matter of trial strategy since the guilty verdict on
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the facilitation charge resulted in a misdemeanor rather than a
felony conviction.
Appellant therefore is in no position to
complain about the facilitation instruction on appeal.
Moreover,
appellant’s reliance upon the palpable error provision set out in
RCr 10.26 is misplaced, as the giving of an unwarranted
instruction, with the defendant’s consent and approval, simply
does not rise to the level of a palpable error justifying relief
under the rule.
Commonwealth v. Wolford, Ky., 4 S.W.3d 534
(1999).
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
EMBERTON, J., CONCURS.
SCHRODER, J., DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
Appellant’s sole argument
on appeal is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
on the criminal facilitation to trafficking in marijuana charge
because he was not indicted for that offense and that offense is
not a lesser included offense of trafficking in marijuana, and I
agree.
The law requires instructions applicable to every state
of the case covered by the indictment and deducible from or
supported by the evidence.
818 (1987).
Reed v. Commonwealth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d
KRS 506.080(1) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation
when, acting with knowledge that another
person is committing or intends to commit a
crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly
provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime
and which in fact aids such person to commit
the crime.
In reviewing the evidence adduced at trial, there was
evidence that appellant was guilty of criminal facilitation to
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trafficking in marijuana.
However, appellant was not indicted
for criminal facilitation, nor were there sufficient facts in the
indictment to encompass a criminal facilitation charge, contrary
to the Commonwealth’s position.
It has been established by our Supreme Court that
criminal facilitation to trafficking in marijuana is not a lesser
included offense of trafficking in marijuana or possession of
marijuana.
Houston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925 (1998).
While Houston was a case in which the defendant sought a criminal
facilitation instruction and claimed error in being refused one,
as opposed to claiming he erroneously received such an
instruction as in the present case, I do not see that as
affecting the general principle set out above.
The Commonwealth further attempts to get around the
holding in Houston by relying on the following language in
Commonwealth v. Day, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 505, 509 (1999):
Generally, criminal facilitation is a lesser
included offense when the defendant is
charged with being an accomplice to an
offense, not the principal offender. E.g.,
Chumbler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488
(1995); Webb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d
226 (1995).
The Commonwealth contends that since appellant was charged along
with another defendant, that was sufficient to put appellant on
notice that he was also being charged with criminal facilitation
as an accomplice to the crime.
I disagree.
The indictment in
the instant case merely stated that appellant and Rodriguez
“trafficked in over five (5) pounds of marijuana.”
In our view,
charging a defendant along with a co-defendant does not alone
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allow for a criminal facilitation instruction.
In fact, there
was evidence in the case at bar that appellant was the principal
offender since he was the one who took possession of the package.
Since criminal facilitation is not a lesser included offense of
trafficking in marijuana, there must some indication in the facts
of the indictment that the defendant provided another person with
means to commit the offense of trafficking, which there was not.
The Commonwealth next argues that if it was error to
instruct the jury on criminal facilitation, appellant waived said
error by not objecting to it and, moreover, by expressing
satisfaction with it.
Defects in an indictment can be waived,
whereas the failure to state an offense in an indictment cannot
be waived.
RCr 8.18; Strunk v. Commonwealth, 302 Ky. 464, 194
S.W.2d 1002 (1946).
It has been held to be palpable error to
instruct the jury on an offense not contained in the indictment.
Caretenders, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 83 (1991),
(citing United States v. Jones, 647 F.2d 696 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S. Ct. 399, 70 L. Ed. 2d 214
(1981)).
To charge an offense, the offense must be named or
sufficient facts must be provided to put the defendant on notice
of the offense with which he is being charged.
Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446 (1996).
Thomas v.
As stated earlier,
criminal facilitation was not mentioned in the indictment, was
not a lesser included offense of the offenses named in the
indictment, and was not encompassed by any facts in the
indictment.
Hence, the indictment did not charge appellant with
criminal facilitation and it was palpable error to instruct the
jury on that offense.
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I recognize that the unfortunate result of my opinion
would be to permit the appellant to benefit from his silence in
allowing the erroneous instruction to be given.
However, under
the existing law on the issue, I see no other choice but to
reverse the conviction.
Unlike the case in Commonwealth v.
Wolford, Ky., 4 S.W.3d 534 (1999), where the Court adjudged that
if submission of the instruction was in error, it was waived by
the defendant’s withholding his objection thereto, the offense
instructed on in the instant case was not a lesser included
offense of the charged offenses, and I would reverse.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby Amburgey
Lexington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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