MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES v. REWARD WALLS SYSTEMS, INC. AND MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES v. KENNETH M. CHILDERS, SARAH CHILDERS, GREAT FINANCIAL BANK, F.S.B. and FARMERS NATIONAL BANK AND KENNETH M. CHILDERS and SARAH CHILDERS v. MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 14, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2000-CA-000907-MR
MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a
PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS GEORGE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00044
REWARD WALLS SYSTEMS, INC.
APPELLEE
AND
NO.
2000-CA-001225-MR
MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a
PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS GEORGE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00044
KENNETH M. CHILDERS, SARAH
CHILDERS, GREAT FINANCIAL BANK,
F.S.B. and FARMERS NATIONAL BANK
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2000-CA-001334-MR
KENNETH M. CHILDERS and
SARAH CHILDERS
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS GEORGE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00044
MARY ANN ANZELMO d/b/a
PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGY HOMES
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
These consolidated appeals come before us as a
result of a contract between Mary Ann Anzelmo, doing business as
Performance Technology Homes, and Kenneth M. Childers and Sarah
Childers under which Anzelmo was to construct a home for the
Childerses. Anzelmo appeals a summary judgment granted against her
in her suit against Reward Walls Systems, Inc., the maker of the
forms
used
by
Anzelmo
in
pouring
the
basement
walls
of
the
Childerses’ home, asserting that genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding her claim that Reward’s forms were defective.
Anzelmo also appeals from a judgment based on a jury’s award of
damages to the Childerses.
The Childerses cross-appeal claiming,
inter alia, that the circuit court erred in finding Anzelmo’s lien
against their home valid and in not granting their motion for a
directed verdict.
The
pursuant
to
Childerses.
Childerses
which
and
Anzelmo
Anzelmo
was
to
entered
construct
into
a
a
home
contract
for
the
The contract provided that the building of the home
would be a “lock and key” job and that the Childerses were to “pay
[Anzelmo] the sum of $140,000, payable in installments, upon
certificate of Builder[.]” During construction several changes and
upgrades were made to the home.
It is disputed as to whether these
changes were requested and approved by the Childerses.
-2-
During the
period of construction, the Childerses and Anzelmo frequently
conferred regarding the selection of items for the home, such as
windows and trim.
In June 1996, with two months of construction
still to be completed, Anzelmo presented the Childerses with a
statement showing that the Childerses were already obligated for
costs in excess of $140,000.00.
This information apparently came
as a shock to the Childerses, as they believed that they were not
obligated to pay any more than the contract price upon completion
of the home.
Anzelmo went on to complete the home, although testimony
reveals that many features included in the final architectural plan
were not included in the finished home.
Upon moving into the home,
the Childerses complained of several defects in their home.
primary complaint was that the basement leaked.
A
Anzelmo responded
by alleging that she was owed over $76,000.00 in addition to the
$140,000.00 contract price.
to
pay
the
additional
In response to the Childerses refusal
amount,
Anzelmo
filed
a
mechanics
and
materialman’s lien against the Childerses’ home in the amount of
$76,452.99.
On March 11, 1997, the Childerses sued Anzelmo alleging
defective workmanship, a breach of contract and warranty.
They
also aserted that Anzelmo’s lien was defective and constituted a
slander of the Childerses’ title to their property.
counterclaimed
alleging
that
the
Childerses
Anzelmo
breached
the
construction contract by failing to pay for additional costs and
upgrades to the home.
-3-
Anzelmo’s lien claim was referred to the circuit court’s
master commissioner who submitted recommended findings of facts and
conclusions of law on September 26, 1997.
The commissioner’s
report, however, only dealt with whether the Childerses’ “motion to
dismiss Count II of the counterclaim alleging that [Anzelmo’s]
statement of lien filed in the office of the Marion County Court
Clerk [was] defective.”
The commissioner recommended that the
Childerses’ motion be denied, as it appeared the lien was properly
“subscribed and sworn to” in accordance with Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 376.080(1).
Absent from the report was any finding
as to the validity of the lien.
The circuit court adopted the
master commissioner’s recommendation on November 4, 1997.
On June 25, 1999, Anzelmo filed a third-party complaint
against Reward Wall Systems, alleging that Reward had manufactured
and
sold
to
Anzelmo
defective
“stay-in-place”
forms
used
in
constructing the basement which did not hold concrete when used as
instructed, resulting in leaks, and that Reward breached its
warranty that the forms were fit for their intended purpose.
On October 22, 1999, Reward moved for summary judgment
asserting that there was no evidence to support Anzelmo’s thirdparty complaint.
On December 3, 1999, the circuit court granted
Reward’s motion for summary judgment.1
The summary judgment was
entered nunc pro tunc, effective November 8, 1999.
1
The court
Reward did not participate in the trial held on November
11, 12 and 13, 1999.
-4-
dismissed with prejudice all claims by Anzelmo against Reward which
related to alleged water damage to the Childerses’ basement.2
A jury trial was held on all other claims on November 10,
11 and 12, 1999.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Childerses in the sum of $25,600.00, representing damages resulting
from defects in the home.
The jury awarded Anzelmo $37,042.33,
which represented amounts unpaid and still owed by the Childerses.
The result was a net award of $11,442.33 to Anzelmo.
based on the verdict was entered on March 28, 2000.
Judgment
These appeals
followed after the circuit court denied post-trial motions to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-000907-MR
Anzelmo contends on appeal that (1) the circuit court
erred in dismissing her claim on the merits when she allegedly
voluntarily dismissed her claim pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 41.01(2); and (2) that the circuit court erred in
finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to
Anzelmo’s claim against Reward.
Anzelmo insists that the court erred in dismissing her
claim
against
Anzelmo
with
prejudice
because
she
voluntarily
dismissed her claim pursuant to CR 41.01(2). CR 41.01(2), relating
to the voluntary dismissal of civil actions, provides, in relevant
part, that:
2
Anzelmo’s claims against Reward related to aesthetic
damages to the Childerses’ basement allegedly caused by defective
Reward forms, Anzelmo’s claims for costs allegedly expended to
correct “blow outs” in the forms, the cost of the alleged defective
forms and Reward’s counterclaim were, according to the circuit
court, to be pursued in a separate proceeding.
-5-
[A]n action, or any claim therein, shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper . . . .
Unless otherwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under this section is without prejudice.
The record does not disclose a CR 41.01(2) motion made by Anzelmo.
Anzelmo claims to have moved for a voluntary dismissal in her
response to Reward’s motion for summary judgment and during an
informal
conference
call
between
attorneys involved in this case.
the
circuit
judge
and
the
Assuming arguendo that Anzelmo
attempted to voluntarily dismiss her claim against Reward, her
attempts were insufficient for that purpose.
CR 7.02(1) provides
that “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in
writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and
shall set forth the relief or order sought.”
Anzelmo did not
comply with CR 7.02(1) in her attempt to voluntarily dismiss her
claim.
In her response to Reward’s motion for summary judgment,
Anzelmo stated that she “withdraws her claim for indemnification
for any damages as a result of leaks in the basement of the
Childers’ home” and that she did “not believe that the use of the
stay-in-place forms could in any way be related to the structural
integrity of the home or the leak in the basement.”
Although
“[i]t is not necessary to make a motion for relief that has been
-6-
demanded in a pleading,”3 a response to a motion for summary
judgment is not a pleading.4
Even if Anzelmo properly moved to
voluntarily dismiss her claim for indemnification, the circuit
court did not rule on the motion and Anzelmo did not insist on a
ruling. Anzelmo argues that the circuit court converted her motion
for voluntary dismissal into a dismissal on the merits.
not the case.
This is
The circuit court ruled in favor of Reward on its
motion for summary judgment.
If Anzelmo wanted the court to rule
on her “motion,” she should have timely and specifically requested
the court to do so.
Anzelmo next argues that the court erred in granting
Reward’s motion for summary judgment as a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to her claim for indemnification for the damages as
a result of the leaks in the basement of the Childerses’ home.
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant shows that the
adverse
party
could
not
prevail
under
any
circumstances.”5
However, “a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment
motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some
affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of
material fact requiring trial.”6
3
The circuit court must view the
Rives v. Pettit, Ky., 513 S.W.2d 475, 485 (1974).
4
Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 7.01. The oral motion allegedly
made by Anzelmo during the informal conference call does not
qualify as a hearing as this conference is not a part of the record
available for review.
5
See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991), reaffirming Paintsville Hosp. v. Rose,
Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
6
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
-7-
record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.”7
“The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide
any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists.”8
This Court has said that the standard of review on appeal
of a summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found
that there were no genuine issues of material fact that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court since
factual findings are not at issue.”9
Because the order granting summary judgment was entered
nunc pro tunc, we must view the record at the effective issuance of
the order, November 8, 1999.
Although both parties argue that the
evidence presented at trial support their respective arguments, we
must review the evidence that was in the record before trial, on
November 8, 1999, and ignore any evidence that was presented at the
trial.
“In the analysis, the focus should be on what is of record
rather than what might [have been] presented at trial.”10
Anzelmo responded to Reward’s motion for summary judgment
by unequivocally stating that:
Based on recent discovery depositions, Anzelmo withdraws
her claim for indemnification for any damages as a result
7
Steelvest, supra, n. 5.
8
Id.
9
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
10
Welch v. American Publishing Co., Ky., 3 S.W.3d 724, 730
(1999).
-8-
of leaks in the basement of the Childers’ home.
Anzelmo
does not believe that the use of the stay-in-place forms
could in any way be related to the structural integrity
of the home or the leak in the basement.
Although Anzelmo did point to deposition testimony in an attempt to
establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed in order to
defeat Reward’s motion for summary judgment, none of this evidence
was sufficient to meet the causation element needed to prove that
the forms were defective.
In short, Anzelmo produced no relevant
testimony, expert or otherwise, to establish causation in her claim
against Reward.
Anzelmo argued below that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur bridged the gap between the alleged defective nature of
the forms and the leaking basement in the Anzelmo’s home.
To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three
essential elements must be met:
1) the instrumentality
must be under the control or management of [Reward]; 2)
the circumstances, according to common knowledge and
experience,
must
create
a
clear
inference
that
the
accident would not have happened if [Reward] had not been
negligent; and 3) [Anzelmo’s] injury must have resulted
from the accident.11
Anzelmo’s argument that res ipsa loquitur bridges the causation gap
fails upon an analysis of the first essential element.
11
The forms
Helton v. Forest Park Baptist Church, Ky. App., 589 S.W.2d
217, 219 (1979), citing Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v.
Burchett, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 577 (1967).
-9-
were not under the control or management of Reward after the forms
left its plant:
individuals not associated with Reward were in
control of the forms at the work site.
Reward did not pour the
concrete to form the walls, nor was Reward in any other way
connected with the building of the home.
The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply, and the court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of Reward.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-001225-MR AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-001334-MR
Anzelmo alleges two errors on appeal:
that the jury’s
award of damages to the Childerses to correct “defects” in the home
was not supported by the evidence and the jury should not have been
permitted to determine the damages to which Anzelmo was entitled
after the master commissioner had determined that Anzelmo had a
valid lien on the Childerses’ home.
Anzelmo argues that the jury erroneously based its award
to the Childerses on the testimony of the Childerses’ expert
witness, David Clements.
damage
done
by
the
In estimating the cost to repair the
leaking
basement,
Clements
gave
what
he
classified as an “educated guess” and estimated the cost of repairs
would be $25,000.00
Anzelmo correctly points out that “[j]uries should not be
permitted
to
indulge
in
speculation
-10-
and
guesswork
as
to
the
probable damages resulting from an alleged act of negligence[.]”12
“[F]acts must be shown which afford a basis for measuring or
computing damages with reasonable certainty.”13
Two other cases,
Bryan v. Gilpin14 and Welch v. L.R. Cooke Chevrolet Co.,15 are cited
by Anzelmo for this proposition. However, these cases speak not to
the certainty of damages, but to the certainty of liability;
therefore, Anzelmo’s reliance on these two cases is misplaced.
Anzelmo
argues
that
because
Clements
classified
his
opinion of the cost to repair the damages as an “educated guess,”
the jury impermissibly relied on his testimony in awarding damages
to the Childerses. However, a review of Clements’s testimony shows
that his opinion was more than a mere guess.
having
over
construction.
twenty-five
years’
Clements testified to
experience
in
residential
He recited numerous, detailed steps that he would
recommend in correcting the problems with the home.
Such steps
included digging around the perimeter of the house, digging up and
cleaning a pipe from the basement to a ditch, checking the foam
blocks and checking the foundation drain system for silt.
Kentucky’s highest court has explained the nature of the
term “guess.”
The
term
“guess”
is
not
regarded
as
being
a
mere
conjecture or speculation but as a colloquial way of
12
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lankford, 304 Ky. 192, 200 S.W.2d
297, 298 (1947).
13
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Frazier, 302 Ky. 642, 195
S.W.2d 271, 273 (1946).
14
Ky., 282 S.W.2d 133 (1955).
15
314 Ky. 634, 236 S.W.2d 690 (1950).
-11-
expressing
an
estimate
or
opinion.
It
is
a
word
frequently used where a witness is called upon to make
estimates of speed or distance or size or time. Like the
words “suppose” or “think”, it is commonly used as
meaning the expression of a judgment with an implication
of uncertainty.16
Clements expressed his expert opinion as to the cost of repairing
the damage.
The fact that he referred to his opinion as an
“educated guess” is inconsequential. The fixing of damages is this
case was within the exclusive province of the jury.17
We will not
reverse a judgment on the ground that the damages are excessive
unless the award is so excessive as to indicate it was fixed under
the influence of passion or prejudice.18
Because the jury’s award
in this case was supported by substantial evidence, we will not
disturb it.
Anzelmo’s next argument is that the circuit court erred
in having the jury determine the amount owed Anzelmo by the
Childerses, as the master commission had determined this amount by
finding that Anzelmo had a valid lien.
Esentially, Anzelmo argues
that the issue was res judicata because the master commissioner had
found
her
lien
to
be
valid
and
the
court
had
adopted
the
commissioner’s finding.
16
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1955),
citing WEBSTER ’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and Collier v. Commonwealth,
303 Ky. 670, 198 S.W.2d 974 (1947).
17
See Vinson v. Chadwick, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1974).
18
See De Buyser v. Walden, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1953).
-12-
The
master
commissioner
stated
in
his
report
and
recommendation that he would “deal only with [the Childerses’]
motion to dismiss [the lien] alleging that [Anzelmo’s] statement of
lien filed in the office of the Marion County Clerk is fatally
defective.”
Contrary to Anzelmo’s contention, the issue of the
validity of the lien was never actually adjudicated before the
master commissioner.
Further, the parties agreed that referral to
the master commission of the validity of the lien
would be waived.
Even if the master commissioner implicitly found that
Anzelmo’s lien was valid, Anzelmo’s res judicata argument is
without merit.
final
judgment
“[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies only to a
which
underlying action.”19
is
rendered
“upon
the
merits”
of
the
The circuit court’s November 5, 1997, order
overruling the Childerses’ exceptions to the master commissioner’s
report and confirming the report was not a final and appealable
order.
Hence, the court was at liberty to alter its decision
regarding
the
confirmation
of
the
commissioner’s
report
and
submission of the amount of damages to the jury, rather than
relying on the amount of the lien.20
Because the order confirming
the master commissioner’s report was not a final and appealable
order, Anzelmo’s res judicata argument is without merit, and the
circuit court did not err in submitting the issue of damages to the
jury.
19
Davis v. Powell’s Valley Water Dist., Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d
75, 77 (1995), citing Dennis v. Fiscal Court of Bullitt County, Ky.
App., 784 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1990).
20
See Massey v. Fischer, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1951); see
also Kramer v. Kramer, 276 Ky. 504, 124 S.W.2d 744 (1939).
-13-
The Childerses argue that the circuit court erred in not
directing a verdict on Anzelmo’s claim for additional compensation
because no evidence was introduced to counter the express terms of
the building contract.
At the core of this issue is the meaning of
the term “lock and key” contract.
job
was
considered
definition
to
be
a
The contract specified that the
“lock
and
key”
job,
however
of this term was set forth in the contract.
no
The
Childerses contend that “lock and key” is a common term of art in
the construction industry and means that the contractor is required
to build the home for contract price.
Anzelmo argues that “lock
and key” is not an accepted term of art in the construction
industry, that its meaning is subject to interpretation, and that
the issue was properly submitted to the jury.
The
Childerses
cite
several
cases
from
other
jurisdictions and one Kentucky case to support their argument that
“lock and key” is a widely accepted industry term.
The Kentucky
case cited by the Childerses does not say that.
In Wright v.
Monroe Lumber Co.,21 the Court simply stated that the contract for
the building of a house was a “lock and key” job.22
The issue was
not the meaning of a “lock and key” job, and the terms of the
contract were not in dispute.
We have uncovered no cases in
Kentucky that interpret the term “lock and key” job.
21
156 Ky. 83, 160 S.W. 788 (1913).
22
Id., 160 S.W. at 789.
-14-
Although the
term has been defined by other jurisdictions, we are under no
obligation to adopt those definitions.23
Unfortunately, none of the changes made to the contract
at issue was reduced to writing.
The contract did provide that
“certain changes will be allowed up until final approval of AFSprepared blueprints.
be allowed.
After that time, structural changes will not
Other changes and upgrades will be at the owner’s
expense on a cost plus 20% basis.”
This clause could easily lead
one to believe that Anzelmo was entitled to costs plus a 20%
surcharge on any changes made to the home.
Inasmuch as the
contract was ambiguous as to the amount Anzelmo was to receive in
constructing the home, the issue was properly submitted to the
jury.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the circuit
court is to consider the evidence in the strongest possible light
in favor of the party opposing the motion.
A directed verdict must
not be granted unless there is "a complete absence of proof on a
material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact
exists upon which reasonable [people] could differ."24
Because
reasonable persons could differ as to the interpretation of the
contract at issue, the circuit court did not err in denying the
Childerses’ motion for a directed verdict.
The Childerses next argue that the circuit court erred in
denying their motion for a directed verdict with respect to certain
23
See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, Ky. App., 966 S.W.2d
286, 289 (1998).
24
Everley v. Wright, Ky. App., 872 S.W.2d 95, 96 (1993),
quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
-15-
credits
due
for
items
bought
for
the
home.
Allegedly,
the
construction cost for cabinets, closets, baths and flooring was
$2,730.42 less than the contract’s allowance for these items.
The
Childerses assert that Anzelmo conceded in her testimony that these
credits were owed.
Unfortunately, this assertion cannot be tested
as the taped portion of the trial with Anzelmo’s alleged concession
is blank.
Because we have no record of this evidence, we presume
that the omitted evidence sustains the court’s findings.25
Thus,
we must presume that sufficient evidence existed to support a
finding that the Childerses were not entitled to these credits.
The Childerses next argue that the circuit court erred in
granting Anzelmo interest from the date of the verdict rather that
from the date of entry of the judgment.
on November 12, 1999.
The verdict was rendered
The circuit court did not enter judgment on
the verdict until March 28, 2000. Following the entry of judgment,
the circuit court awarded interest to Anzelmo on the net judgment
amount retroactive to the date the jury rendered its verdict,
November 12, 1999.
KRS 360.040 provides that: “A judgment shall bear twelve
percent
(12%)
interest
compounded
annually
from
its
date.”26
Although Anzelmo argues that the term “date” under the statute is
ambiguous, the statute is clear.
The date of the judgment is
indisputably March 27, 2000, and this is the date from which
interest on the judgment may accrue.
25
Accordingly, the award of
See Burberry v. Bridges, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 583, 585 (1968),
citing Wells v. Wells, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 157 (1966) and Hamblin
v. Johnson, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 76 (1952).
26
Emphasis supplied.
-16-
interest is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit
court for entry of an amended judgment awarding interest from and
after March 27, 2000, rather than November 12, 1999, at the rate of
12% compounded annually.
The Childerses’ last argument is that the circuit court
erred in finding that Anzelmo had a valid lien on their home.
They
argue that the lien was invalid as a matter of law because the
requirements of KRS 376.080 were not met.
merit.
The argument lacks
It is clear from the record that the lien was properly
signed by Anzelmo, and her signature was verified by a notary
public.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and
this case is remanded to Marion Circuit Court for entry of an
amended judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
-17-
NO. 2000-CA-000907-MR
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elmer J. George
Lebanon, Kentucky
Daniel E. Danford
STITES & HARBISON
Lexington, Kentucky
David A. Nunery
Campbellsville, Kentucky
NO. 2000-CA-001225-MR and NO.
2000-CA-001334-MR
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS KENNETH M. CHILDERS
AND SARAH CHILDERS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Joseph H. Mattingly, III
Lebanon, Kentucky
Gerald L. Stovall
Samuel H. DeShazer
Edward L. Schoenbaechler
HALL, RENDER, KILLIAN, HEATH &
LYMAN, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES GREAT
FINANCIAL BANK, F.S.B. AND
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK
Elmer J. George
Lebanon, Kentucky
David A. Nunery
Campbellsville, Kentucky
-18-
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