DONALD HUMBLE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WAYNE COUNTY SCHOOLS; JOHN DALTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WAYNE COUNTY SCHOOLS; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EDUCATION, ARTS, AND HUMANITIES CABINET
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AUGUST 31, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS.
2000-CA-000882-MR & 2000-CA-001850-MR
DONALD HUMBLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00063
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WAYNE
COUNTY SCHOOLS; JOHN DALTON,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WAYNE
COUNTY SCHOOLS; AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
EDUCATION, ARTS, AND
HUMANITIES CABINET
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Before us are two appeals by Donald Humble, pro
se, from orders of the Wayne Circuit Court.
In appeal no. 2000-
CA-000882, Humble objects on both procedural and substantive
grounds to the circuit court’s March 15, 2000, order upholding a
decision by the Department of Education to terminate Humble’s
employment contract with the Wayne County Board of Education.
appeal no. 2000-CA-001850, Humble challenges a July 12, 2000,
In
order denying his post-judgment motion to introduce newly
discovered evidence.
In both appeals, we affirm.
Humble began his career as an educator in Wayne County
in 1973.
For several years he worked as a middle and high-school
science teacher.
In about 1984 he became an assistant principal,
in about 1990 an itinerant principal for three outlying schools,
and in about 1995 principal of the Turner Intermediate School.
In June 1998, John Dalton, the local superintendent, informed
Humble that he was recommending to the state Board of Education
that Humble’s employment contract be terminated.
Dalton alleged
that Humble had engaged in an extra-marital affair with one of
the intermediate school’s teachers and that, when the teacher had
wanted to end the affair, Humble had used his position to
pressure her to continue it.
According to Dalton, this and
related conduct was unbecoming to Humble’s position and evidenced
immoral character, two of the grounds listed in KRS 161.790(1)
that justify removal of a tenured educator from his or her
position.
Pursuant to section (3) of the same statute, Humble
requested the Department of Education to appoint a three-member
tribunal and a hearing officer to hear the charges.
The administrative hearing commenced in November 1999.
It concluded, after six days of testimony and two continuances,
in February 2000.
Humble did not dispute that he and the teacher
had engaged in an affair, but he denied that he had abused his
position either during the affair’s course or in its aftermath.
On the contrary, he maintained that he had ended the relationship
and that the teacher had complained against him for the sake of
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revenge.
The superintendent, Humble further asserted, was a
political rival who had exploited the situation for purely
political reasons.
The tribunal, finding that Humble had engaged
in wrongful conduct that had borne detrimentally on his job,
upheld the superintendent’s decision to dismiss him.
Pursuant to KRS 161.790(8) and KRS 13B.140 - 150,
Humble appealed from the tribunal’s decision to the Wayne Circuit
Court.
In addition to reiterating his defense and challenging
the sufficiency of the superintendent’s evidence, Humble raised
objections to several aspects of the administrative proceedings.
He complained, for example, that one of the tribunal’s members
had not been qualified to participate and that a transcription of
the superintendent’s case-in-chief, but not a transcription of
his case-in-chief, had been provided to the tribunal.
The
circuit court rejected Humble’s allegations of procedural error-primarily because the alleged errors had not been brought to the
hearing officer’s attention--and held that there was sufficient
evidence of Humble’s detrimental wrongdoing to support the
tribunal’s findings.
no. 2000-CA-000882.
Humble challenges these rulings in appeal
In that appeal he also objects to the
circuit court’s refusal to conduct a trial de novo.
We shall
address first Humble’s claims of procedural error and then his
claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.
2000-CA-000882
The tribunal proceedings were rendered unfair, Humble
contends, by the participation of an unqualified panel member; by
the hearing officer’s having ordered a transcription of the
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superintendent’s case-in-chief, but not one of Humble’s case-inchief; by the violation of the witness separation rule by two of
the superintendent’s witnesses; and by the presence of several
uniformed police officers outside the room in which the tribunal
deliberated.
Only the alleged violation of the witness
separation rule was raised before the hearing officer.
Humble
complained of the other alleged errors for the first time upon
appeal to the circuit court.
As that court correctly noted, the
general rule “requires a party to raise issues before th[e]
particular [administrative] entity . . . before those issues are
available for appellate review.”1
The likeliest possible
exception to this rule would be for palpable errors resulting in
manifest injustice.2
But none of Humble’s allegations meet that
standard.
For example, the tribunal was to be composed of one
administrator, one teacher, and one layperson.3
The layperson in
this case was a woman who had served for many years as a school
superintendent’s secretary.
Humble contends that her close
association with an administrator disqualified her from sitting
on the tribunal.
Even if that contention be deemed plausible,
however, it is far from obvious, far from palpable.
If Humble
wished to challenge the tribunal on this ground, therefore, he
was obliged, under the general rule stated above, to raise the
1
Swatzell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 866, 868 (1998).
2
Cf. CR 61.02.
3
KRS 161.790(4).
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issue during the administrative proceeding.
The circuit court
did not err by so ruling.
For the same reason the circuit court did not err by
overruling Humble’s belated objections to the allegedly unfair
transcription and to the presence of police officers in the
building during the tribunal’s deliberation.
It is unlikely that
these occurrences could be characterized as error, much less
palpable error.
And it is certain that they did not give rise to
manifest injustice.
Humble’s failure to raise these issues
before the hearing officer, therefore, precluded the circuit
court’s (and this court’s) review.
Nor did the circuit court err by upholding the hearing
officer’s ruling on Humble’s allegation of witness impropriety.
Perhaps the most damaging witnesses against Humble were the
teacher with whom he had had the affair and another teacher at
the intermediate school who had served as the pair’s confidante.
The two teachers claimed that Humble had retaliated against them
when the affair ended.
After one of them testified, the two
witnesses were together for a significant length of time before
the other was called.
Humble objected on the ground that they
had had an opportunity to discuss their testimonies.
When the
hearing officer questioned them, however, both witnesses denied
having discussed the case.
The hearing officer accepted these
statements, although he assured Humble that he would continue to
entertain any substantial evidence to the contrary.
not raise the matter again until he appealed.
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Humble did
In his brief to the circuit court, Humble observed
that, during the testimony of the second of these two witnesses,
she had referred to one of the exhibits by number.
Humble
contended that she could not have known the number unless she had
been told it improperly.
The superintendent responded by
pointing out that at the commencement of the hearing all the
witnesses had been instructed to refer to that particular exhibit
by number, so that nothing improper was implied by this witness’s
having done so.
The circuit court correctly focused on the issue only
to the extent that it had been raised before and addressed by the
hearing officer.
As the court noted, the officer’s finding of no
impropriety was supported by substantial evidence.
Humble’s
challenge of that finding on appeal was both too late and too
little.
In his last objection to a procedural matter, at least
in his direct appeal, Humble contends that the circuit court
unfairly denied him a de novo trial.
Citing Osborne v. Bullitt
County Board of Education,4 he claims that the circuit court was
authorized to supplement the record and that it should have done
so in an attempt to get to the bottom of the two sides’ sharply
conflicting versions of events.
The short answer to this
contention is that Osborne and the other cases upon which Humble
relies refer to a version of KRS 161.790 that has been
superseded.
4
At the time Humble appealed, KRS 13B.150 had become
Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967).
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the operative rule.
That statute and KRS 161.790(8) prescribed
the following form of judicial review:
(1) Review of a final order shall be
conducted by the court without a jury and
shall be confined to the record, unless there
is fraud or misconduct involving a party
engaged in administration of this chapter.
The court, upon request, may hear oral
argument and receive written briefs.
This is the form of review that Humble received.
The trial court
did not err by refusing Humble’s request for a de novo trial.
Finally, Humble contends that the tribunal’s decision
to dismiss him was not supported by substantial evidence and that
the trial court erred by failing to so rule.
As our Supreme
Court explained in Board of Education of Hopkins County,
Kentucky, v. Wood,5
KRS 161.790 provides that the teaching
contract shall remain in force during good
behavior and efficient and competent service
by the teacher.
. . .
The purpose of teacher tenure laws is to
promote good order in the school system by
preventing the arbitrary removal of capable
and experienced teachers by political or
personal whim. It is not to protect those who
violate the criminal law. A teacher is held
to a standard of personal conduct which does
not permit the commission of immoral or
criminal acts because of the harmful
impression made on the students. The school
teacher has traditionally been regarded as a
moral example for the students. See Gover v.
Stovall, 237 Ky. 172, 35 S.W.2d 24 (1931).
. . .
Great care must be taken to ensure that proof
of conduct of an immoral nature or conduct
unbecoming a teacher which is sufficient to
merit discharge of a tenured teacher should
be of the same quality as required by other
subsections of the statute, that is, written
5
Ky., 717 S.W.2d 837 (1986).
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documentation from impartial sources to
substantiate the charges, as in the present
case, or its substantial equivalent. In
addition, the conduct, when it occurs in a
context other than professional competency in
the classroom should have some nexus to the
teacher's occupation.
. . .
One standard for judging a teacher's conduct
can be found in Morrison v. State Board of
Education, 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) which provides in part
that the Board may consider such matters as
the likelihood that the conduct may have
adversely affected students or fellow
teachers, and the proximity or remoteness in
time of the conduct.
It was not the intention of the legislature
to subject every teacher to discipline or
dismissal for private shortcomings that might
come to the attention of the Board of
Education but have no relation to the
teacher's involvement or example to the
school community. The power of the Board to
discipline teachers is not based on personal
moral judgments by Board members. It exists
only because of the legitimate interests of
the government in protecting the school
community and the students from harm.
Weissman v. Board of Education of Jefferson
City School District, 190 Colo. 414, 547 P.2d
1267 (1976).6
Humble contends that his affair was, at worst, a
private shortcoming that did not bear significantly on his or
anyone else’s job performance.
It has been used as a pretext for
dismissing him, he claims, by his political enemies.
In his
attempt to substantiate this interpretation of events, Humble
presented evidence tending to show that other school district
personnel had been involved in non- or extramarital relationships
and yet had not been disciplined, much less dismissed.
6
And he
Board of Education of Hopkins County, Kentucky, v. Wood, supra, 717 S.W.2d at 839-
40.
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introduced evidence tending to show that his employmentdiscrimination suit against the Wayne County School Board in 1989
had put him on the wrong side of then superintendent Clarence
Boyd.
Humble’s theory is that superintendent Dalton is carrying
on the vendetta of his friend Boyd.
Humble also presented
evidence purporting to show that he rather than the teacher had
ended the affair.
This evidence refutes, he contends, the
teacher’s and the superintendent’s allegations that he used his
position to harass or to retaliate against the teacher.
The tribunal rejected Humble’s version of events.
In
particular, the tribunal concluded that the affair had led Humble
to abuse his position.
It found that Humble had shown favoritism
toward his friend during the affair, and that while it was ending
he had harassed her, evaluated her critically, attempted to have
her transferred, attempted to prevent her contract from being
renewed, and, when she had filed a complaint against him, had
threatened to make the proceedings as embarrassing as he could.
In reviewing the tribunal’s decision, the circuit
court’s standard was to ask whether that decision was arbitrary.7
One factor bearing upon that determination is the evidence upon
which the tribunal relied.
The well established rule is that the
tribunal’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence;
that is, evidence fit “to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable persons.”8
7
It is also well established that the fact
Reis v. Campbell County Board of Education, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 885 (1996).
8
The Gallatin County Board of Education v. Mann, Ky. App., 971 S.W.2d 295, 300
(1998) (citing O’Nan v. Ecklar Moore Express, Inc., Ky., 339 S.W.2d 466 (1960)).
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finder, here the administrative tribunal, “is afforded great
latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the
credibility of witnesses,”9 and that a reviewing court (here the
circuit court as well as this court) may not “substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact.”10
The reform of Kentucky’s public education system, begun
more than a decade ago, has as one of its principal aims the
delivery of the system from political abuse.
We are particularly
sensitive, therefore, to Humble’s allegations that his dismissal
was politically motivated.
Nevertheless, we agree with the
circuit court that the tribunal’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
Numerous witnesses with no apparent
political interest described instances when Humble had misused
his position to pursue purely personal goals.
Numerous witnesses
confirmed the allegation that he had misused his position to
harass and punish his former friend.
Humble denied the
allegations of wrongdoing, or attempted to explain them away, but
the tribunal was well within its discretion by giving the
allegations the weight and credence it apparently did.
Against this conclusion Humble refers us to Harlan
County Board of Education v. Stagnolia.11
In that case the court
upheld a circuit court decision reinstating an assistant
9
Id. (citing Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298 (1972)).
10
Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation
Cabinet, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
11
Ky. App., 555 S.W.2d 828 (1977).
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principle who had been dismissed, the circuit court concluded,
for political reasons.
The court held that circumstantial
evidence of a politically motivated dismissal could be, and in
that case was, sufficient to support an order of reinstatement.
Humble reads this case as standing for the proposition that any
circumstantial evidence of political motivation necessitates a
finding that the dismissal was improper.
Stagnolia does not hold
that such a result is necessitated, however, but merely allowed-if indeed the circumstantial evidence is strong enough.
The
evidence of politics in this case, although certainly
disheartening, was not that strong and was not such as to compel
a finding in Humble’s favor.
Humble also seeks relief on the ground that the school
board had not promulgated a rule or regulation prohibiting sexual
harassment.
Citing Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of
Education,12 a case in which the court reversed a disciplinary
order because of insufficient evidence, Humble contends that no
action by an educator can be considered misconduct unless it
violates a rule lawfully enacted by the board.
Humble has read the case too broadly.
Again, however,
The Osborne court stated
that one could not be found insubordinate under the then current
version KRS 161.790, the charge involved in that case, unless one
had violated a rule or regulation established by the board.
It
did not say that board rules and regulations similarly mark the
boundary of immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher.
As Board of Education of Hopkins County, Kentucky, v. Wood,
12
Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967).
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supra, makes clear, they do not.
Even if the board had not
established a rule against sexual harassment (the superintendent
claims that it had), surely Humble realized that he was not to
use his public authority to further his private relations.
If he
did not, he should have.
2000-CA-001850
About three months after the circuit court affirmed the
tribunal’s decision, in June 2000, Humble moved for relief
pursuant to CR 60.02.
Subpart (b) of that rule authorizes trial
courts to grant relief from a final judgment on the ground of
“newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59.02.”
Humble claimed to have recently discovered that the
administrative hearing officer, Scott Majors, had formerly worked
in a law firm with one of the attorneys who had represented the
Board of Education.
This was sufficient evidence of a biased
proceeding, Humble argued, to require at least that the circuit
court hear additional evidence on the question.
By order entered
July 12, 2000, the circuit court summarily denied Humble’s
motion.
In appeal no. 2000-CA-001850, Humble contends that the
denial was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
We
disagree.
CR 60.02 creates an extraordinary remedy, one that is
to be cautiously applied.
Relief is only appropriate where,
without it, there is a substantial likelihood of pronounced
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injustice.13
This court reviews CR 60.02 rulings deferentially
according to an abuse of discretion standard.14
We are not
persuaded that Humble has met the high burden of proof for CR
60.02 relief.
Even were the circumstances to show that the
hearing officer should not have, for the sake of appearances,
overseen a case involving his former partner,15 there is simply
no indication in the record that the hearing officer or the
proceedings were in fact biased against Humble.
On the contrary,
the hearing officer made every effort to see to it that Humble
had a full and fair opportunity to explain and to present
evidence supporting his side of the matter.
It is true, as Humble notes, that the first three days
of the proceedings, when the Board presented its case, were
transcribed and made available to the tribunal.
The
transcription was necessitated, however, by the fact that there
was nearly a two month continuance between those three days in
November 1999 and the resumption of the hearing in January 2000.
The transcription was a reasonable means of reminding the
tribunal what had been said and what had happened at the outset
of the proceedings.
It did not prejudice Humble.
In fact, it
gave counsel who entered the case on Humble’s behalf in early
13
Board of Trustees of Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Fund of the City of
Lexington v. Nuckolls, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 183 (1974).
14
Bethlehem Minerals Company v. Church and Mullins Corporation, Ky., 887 S.W.2d
327 (1994).
15
Cf. SCR 4.300(E)(1)(a).
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January a better than could be expected means of preparing for
the representation.
It is also true that the hearing officer excluded some
of the evidence Humble wished to present concerning unpunished
extramarital affairs by other school board employees.
The
evidence was properly excluded, however, as cumulative and unduly
sensational.16
The exclusion did not prejudice Humble’s defense;
he was given a more than adequate opportunity to make his point.
The adverse rulings do not suggest that the hearing officer was
biased, and they certainly do not entitle Humble to CR 60.02
relief.
In sum, although we regret this conclusion to Humble’s
long career as a Wayne County educator, we agree with the circuit
court that the administrative proceeding leading to his dismissal
was fundamentally fair and that the dismissal itself was based on
substantial evidence.
Accordingly in appeals no. 2000-CA-000882
and no. 2000-CA-001850, we affirm the orders of the Wayne Circuit
Court, entered respectively on March 15, 2000, and June 19, 2000.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF WAYNE COUNTY AND
JOHN DALTON:
Donald Humble, pro se
Monticello, Kentucky
Larry G. Bryson
London, Kentucky
Gordon Germain
Monticello, Kentucky
16
Cf. KRE 403.
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