CURTIS DANSBY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 25, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000654-MR
CURTIS DANSBY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-01112
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Curtis Dansby ("Dansby") appeals from an order
of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for relief under
CR 60.02.
We affirm.
On October 7, 1997, Dansby was indicted by the Fayette
County Grand Jury on one count each of first degree trafficking
in a controlled substance, unlawful possession of marijuana,
unlawful possession of alcohol for sale without a license, and
first degree persistent felony offender ("PFO").
The matter
proceeded to a jury trial on January 15, 1998, after which Dansby
was found guilty on the underlying charges.
pled guilty on the PFO charge.
Thereafter, Dansby
On February 19, 1998, he
received a 10 year sentence which was enhanced to 15 years .
On
August 6, 1999, his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to
this Court.
During the pendency of the direct appeal, Dansby
instituted a series of collateral attacks on his conviction.
May, 1998, Dansby filed a motion seeking CR 60.02 relief.
motion was later voluntarily withdrawn.
filed a pro se
In
That
In September, 1998, he
motion under RCr 11.42 alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial.
He then received court-
appointed counsel who, after examining the motion, opined that it
was without merit and sought to withdraw as counsel.
That motion
was granted, and Dansby's RCr 11.42 motion was eventually denied
on March 15, 1999.
Two days later, the Commonwealth filed a response to
the RCr 11.42 motion.1
Dansby then filed a motion seeking leave
to withdraw the RCr 11.42 motion.
On June 15, 1999, the trial
court denied Dansby's motion, noting that the court had already
ruled on the merits of the RCr 11.42 motion.
On November 22, 1999, Dansby again filed a motion
pursuant to CR 60.02 attacking his judgment and sentence.
On
February 22, 2000 the trial court denied the motion concluding
that Dansby had not raised any issues justifying relief under CR
60.02.
This pro se appeal followed.
Dansby now raises two claims of error.
He first argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint
1
We assume that the Commonwealth was not aware of the March
15, 1999 order.
-2-
counsel or conduct a hearing on the CR 60.02 motion.
Second, he
argues that he was denied due process of law when the prior
convictions forming the basis of the PFO charge were not properly
verified.
We have closely examined the record, the law, and the
written arguments, and affirm the order on appeal for a number of
reasons.
First, and most important, Dansby has previously
availed himself of a direct appeal, an aborted CR 60.02 motion,
and a RCr 11.42 motion which was examined by the trial court and
denied.
It is well-established that the final disposition of a
RCr 11.42 motion forecloses the defendant from raising any issues
via CR 60.02 which could reasonably have been presented
11.42 proceeding.2
in a RCr
RCr 11.42(4) states, "[F]inal disposition of
the [RCr 11.42] motion shall conclude all issues that could
reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding."
See
also, Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
Clearly, the collateral attack on the judgment could have been
raised (and, in part, was raised) in the direct appeal and
simultaneous RCr 11.42 motion.
Second, even if Dansby was acting in compliance with
RCr 11.42 (4) and Gross, relief under CR 60.02 requires a " . . .
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief."
The trial
court found that Dansby had presented no such proof, and Dansby
has not overcome the strong presumption that this ruling was
correct.
City of Louisville v. Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179
(1964).
Similarly, Dansby did not request either the
2
Dansby was forewarned of this fact in a letter from his
appointed counsel dated January 4, 1999.
-3-
appointment of
counsel or a hearing on his CR 60.02 motion, and
as such cannot now complain that he received neither.
Lastly, Dansby maintains that his trial counsel and/or
the trial court failed to investigate the underlying offenses
which gave rise to the PFO charge and conviction.
Again, this
issue either was presented or should have been presented on
direct appeal or via the aborted CR 60.02 motion or in his RCr
11.42 motion.
Accordingly, we find no error on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying Dansby's motion for relief under CR
60.02.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Curtis Dansby
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-4-
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