CLAUDE JOHNSON; GRANVILLE JOHNSON, MOLLIE THORNBURY; PRISCILLA STILLNER; ESTATES OF BEN JOHNSON AND HAZEL JOHNSON, MARTHA KINDER AND CHARLIE JOHNSON v. RAY THORNBURY; CHURCH AND MULLINS CORPORATION; APPALACHIAN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND PANTHER LAND CORPORATION
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000328-MR
CLAUDE JOHNSON; GRANVILLE JOHNSON,
MOLLIE THORNBURY;
PRISCILLA STILLNER;
ESTATES OF BEN JOHNSON AND
HAZEL JOHNSON, MARTHA KINDER
AND CHARLIE JOHNSON
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00698
v.
RAY THORNBURY;
CHURCH AND MULLINS
CORPORATION; APPALACHIAN
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND PANTHER
LAND CORPORATION
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Appellants have appealed an order and summary
judgment entered by the Pike Circuit Court on November 22, 1999,
and an order entered January 21, 2000, which denied their motion
for reconsideration as being “filed outside the ten day limit of
CR 52.02 and is ineffective.”
Having determined that appellant’s
CR 52.02 motion was timely made, we vacate the January 21, 2000,
order and remand this matter for reconsideration of the motion on
its merits.
The underlying facts are not necessary to the issue to
be addressed in this opinion and will not be recited in detail.
However, it should be noted that this case involves the mineral
rights on land known as Tract 42 on Three Mile Creek in Pike
County, Kentucky.
John Johnson (Johnson) owned the surface
rights to this 365 acre piece of property.
In 1964, Bethlehem
Minerals Company sued Johnson claiming ownership to the mineral
rights of this property .
During the pendency of that action on
February 21, 1978, Johnson, Ray Thornbury and Church and Mullins
signed the master lease and master sublease agreements which
appellants dispute.
Johnson, who was in his nineties when the
agreements were entered, died in 1984.
In early 1995, the
Bethlehem Minerals Company litigation was finally litigated to a
conclusion.
In that case, Bethlehem Minerals Company was
directed to pay damages to both the Johnson’s estate and Church
and Mullins.
On May 21, 1998, the appellants filed the complaint in
this action challenging the validity of the master lease and
master sublease alleging the incompetency of Johnson, undue
influence, lack of consideration, and unconscionability of the
contract.
On November 22, 1999, the Pike Circuit Court entered
summary judgment in favor of appellees.
The court ruled that
summary judgment was appropriate because the leases in question
had been deemed valid in the prior litigation and because the
action was barred by the statute of limitations.
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What transpired
next is the subject of great controversy and the main issue that
this Court must determine.
On December 3, 1999, appellants,
through counsel, filed what is termed a motion for
reconsideration.
The certificate of service indicates that
counsel for appellants served a true copy of said motion on
opposing parties on December 2, 1999.
The motion states:
The Plaintiffs [appellants], by
Counsel, hereby move the Court to reconsider
the Summary Judgment and Order which was
entered on November 22, 1999. As grounds
therefor, Plaintiffs state that the action
was not barred by the applicable limitations
of actions statute. Further, Plaintiffs
state that the issue of the breach of
contract by the Defendants has not been
addressed in the Judgment.
The motion was scheduled for a hearing on January 14, 2000.
Each
party filed supplemental memoranda regarding the motion prior to
the hearing date.
In appellees’ response, they argued the motion
was untimely in that “CR 52.02 requires a motion to be filed no
later than ten (10) days after the entry of judgment in an
action.”
(Emphasis added).
The record before this Court
contains no audio, video or written transcript of what occurred
at the January 14, 2000 hearing on the motion.
The next entry in
the court record is the order entered January 21, 2000, denying
appellants’ motion for reconsideration because “[the] motion was
filed outside the ten day limit of CR 52.02 and is ineffective.”
See Stallins v. City of Madisonville, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 349,
351 (1986).
(Emphasis added).
The appellants thereafter, on
January 24, 2000, filed a reply (it appears they did not know the
trail court had already entered its order denying the motion) in
which they argued their motion was filed pursuant to CR 59.02
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which permits a motion to be served no later than ten days after
entry of the judgment.
In that the trial court had already
rendered its order denying appellants’ motion to reconsider by
this time, appellants subsequently filed their notice of appeal.
On appeal, appellees filed a motion to dismiss arguing
the appeal was untimely.
They argue that since the trial court
found the motion for reconsideration to be filed untimely and
thus “ineffective”, that the motion therefore did not stop the
running of time for appeal purposes.
Appellees further argue
that:
Kentucky Civil Rule 73.02(1)(e) states
that “The running of the time for appeal is
terminated by a timely motion pursuant to any
of the Rules hereinafter enumerated, and the
full time for appeal fixed in this Rule
commences to run upon entry and service under
Rule 77.04(2) of an order granting or denying
a motion under Rules 50.02, 52.02 or 59,
except when a new trial is granted under Rule
59.”
The plaintiffs/appellants’ Motion for
Reconsideration was found to be untimely by
the trial court and therefore did not
terminate the running of time for appeal of
the summary judgment granted to the
defendants/appellees on November 22, 1999.
Thus, appellees argued that the notice of appeal filed on
February 3, 2000, was untimely.
In response to the motion to dismiss, appellants argued
that the trial court erred in relying on Stallins, supra, and
that the case of Huddleston v. Murley, Ky. App., 757 S.W.2d 216
(1988), is controlling.
They contend that Huddleston stands for
the proposition that the Kentucky Civil Rules simply require
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service pursuant to CR 5 within ten days, not filing as is
required by the Federal Rules.
They proceed to argue:
CR 52.02 says that a court may amend its
findings, make additional findings, or amend
the Judgment upon a Motion made not later
than ten (10) days after entry of Judgment.
CR 52.02 further states that the Motion may
be made with a Motion for a new trial
pursuant to CR 59.
CR 59.02 says that a Motion for a new
trial shall be served not later than ten (10)
days after the entry of Judgment.
Neither of the above rules require
filing to occur on or before the 10th day.
Since CR 52.02 specifically refers to CR 59,
which requires service no later than ten (10)
days, it would be inconsistent and oppressive
to interpret the word “made” to constitute
filing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are specific and require filing; not the
state rules. Since the certificate was not
challenged, according to Huddleston v.
Murley, supra, the Appellants’ Motion to
Reconsider was timely filed. The
Appellee’s(sic) Motion to Dismiss should be
overruled.
A three-judge motion panel of this Court denied
appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal in an order entered June
26, 2000.
Though that order does not provide any analysis or
legal reasoning for its decision, this Court is bound by its
holding.
It appears that the motion panel held, and we do hold,
that appellants’ motion for reconsideration required service of
the motion within ten days and did not require the actual filing
within ten days.
Despite appellees’ argument to the contrary, CR 52.02
does not require a motion to be filed not later than ten days
after the entry of judgment in an action.
states:
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Specifically, CR 52.02
Not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court of its own initiative or
on the motion of a party made not later than
10 days after entry of judgment, may amend
its findings or make additional findings and
may amend the judgment accordingly. The
motion may be made with a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59.
The rule uses the term “made.”
Since this term is not defined,
it permits the parties to argue their opposing beliefs that it
could mean “served” or “filed” depending on which side one finds
himself.
The outcome of this case depends on the interpretation
this Court gives to the term “made.”
The trial court relied upon Stallins, supra, which
held:
The appellant, ostensibly pursuant to CR
52.02, on June 17, 1985, filed a motion and
amended motion “for additional findings of
fact and/or reconsideration...” which was
overruled by the trial court on July 1, 1985.
The motions are ineffective for the reason
that they were filed beyond ten days after
the original findings and judgment were
entered on June 6, 1985, and they requested
recitation of conclusionry statements rather
than of facts. See CR 52.02 and CR 52.04.
Stallins, Id. at 351.
However, we believe Stallins can be distinguished in
that there is no mention as to whether the motion had been served
within the permitted ten day time frame as in this case.
Appellants contend the Huddleston case, which requires service
pursuant to CR 5 within ten days, is more consistent with the
facts of this case.
However, Huddleston, supra, is a case
dealing with a CR 59.02 motion for a new trial.
CR 59.02
specifically states, “A motion for a new trail shall be served
not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.”
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Though
appellants now argue that their motion for reconsideration was,
in fact, a CR 59.02 motion, we are not so inclined to merely
accept their after-the-fact gratuitous statement to that effect.
However, even without accepting appellants’ motion to be under CR
59.02, the facts in the Huddleston case are somewhat similar to
this case as can be seen by the holding in that case:
We reverse the trial court’s order
overruling appellants’ motion for a new trial
and to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
The appellees and the trial court have
confused the crucial difference between the
filing of a motion and the serving of a
motion.
The requirements for timeliness of a
motion for new trial under CR 59.02, and to
alter, amend, or vacate a judgment under CR
59.05, is that they be served not later than
ten days from the entry of the final
judgment. Counsel for appellants certified
upon his motion that he served it on what was
the tenth day following entry of the
judgment. The circuit clerk file-stamped the
motion the next day, and the envelope
containing the copy mailed to the appellees’
counsel was postmarked the next day, or what
was the eleventh day following entry of
judgment. It was because the motion was
filed on the eleventh day that the trial
court deemed it untimely. However, as we
said, the rules require that the motion be
served within the ten day time frame.
Huddleston, supra, at 217.
(Emphasis in original).
If we had accepted appellants’ argument that their
motion was filed pursuant to CR 59.02, then there would be no
dispute service would have been timely and permitted.
However,
if we accept appellees’ argument that this is a CR 52.02 motion,
then the question becomes what does “made” mean - service or
filing?
As a starting point, we know that a CR 52.02 motion may
be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to CR 59.
-7-
In that
case, service of the CR 59 motion is permitted on the tenth day
following the judgment.
Though not so stated, one would think if
they can be made together that the applicable deadline would be
the same - service within ten days of judgment.
If this is true,
would it make sense that if the CR 52.02 motion were filed by
itself and not in conjunction with a CR 59 motion, that the term
“made” would change to mean filed instead of served?
not.
We think
The terms “served” and “filed” are often confused and used
inter-changeably within the cited cases and in legal treatises
reviewed by this Court.
However, after thorough examination we
believe the use of the term “made” in CR 52.02 is more
appropriately meant in the context of service and not that of
filing.
We believe the prior motion panel in this case based its
order on that construction also.
As such, we believe the trial court erred when it found
otherwise and declined to address the merits of appellants’
motion to reconsider its summary judgment of November 22, 1999.
We, therefore, vacate the Pike Circuit Court’s order of
January 21, 2000, and remand this matter for further action,
consistent with this opinion.
We further believe it would be
premature to address the other issues raised in this appeal until
the trial court has had an opportunity to thoroughly and
adequately address them on remand.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Ronald D. Bowling
Lexington, KY
Herman W. Lester
Pikeville, KY
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