USEF MILLINER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 16, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000122-MR
USEF MILLINER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-000724
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Usef Milliner, appeals from his
conviction of possession of a controlled substance with a
firearm, possession of marijuana with a firearm, and loitering,
pursuant to a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to
appeal the trial court's denial of a suppression motion.
Having
determined that the stop and pat-down search of appellant and
subsequent seizure of evidence was constitutionally valid, we
affirm.
Testimony from Louisville police officers Elvis Colbert
(Officer Colbert) and Dominic Fearen (Officer Fearen) at
suppression hearings revealed the following facts.
On
January 16, 1998 at approximately 6 p.m., Officer Colbert, while
patrolling in his police cruiser, observed appellant and three
other individuals standing in front of a grocery store in the
1000 block of South 32nd Street in Louisville, Kentucky, engaged
in what appeared to him to be a drug transaction.
Officer
Colbert pulled closer, and saw one of the individuals start to
hand money to appellant.
As appellant reached out to take the
money, he became aware of the police cruiser, pushed the man with
the money out of the way, and took off running.
Officer Colbert
testified that he did not chase after appellant because he knew
who appellant was, having arrested him before, and knew appellant
frequented the area.
leave the area.
Officer Colbert told the other three men to
Officer Colbert testified that he radioed his
partner, Officer Fearen, who was also patrolling in the vicinity,
advised him of what he had seen, described appellant, and told
Officer Fearen to stop appellant if he saw him.
Officer Colbert testified that about 20 to 30 minutes
later, he saw appellant emerge from the same grocery store, get
on a bicycle, and start riding northbound down 32nd Street.
Officer Colbert testified that he radioed Officer Fearen, who was
just up the street heading southbound, to stop appellant.
Officer Fearen did not testify as to this radio transmission, but
testified that approximately 20 minutes after the first radio
call regarding the suspected drug transaction, he saw a man
matching appellant's description coming southbound on 32nd Street
towards him on a bike.
Officer Fearen testified that he got out
of his police car, and as appellant approached he told appellant
-2-
to "come here", simultaneously grabbing appellant so he could not
get away.
Appellant did not resist or try to flee.
Officer
Fearen radioed Officer Colbert that he had appellant.
Officer
Fearen testified that appellant was wearing gloves, and that he
saw something white in plastic in appellant’s hand.
Officer
Fearen testified that he wasn't certain what it was, but, based
on the information he had received from Officer Colbert, he
thought it could be crack cocaine.
Officer Fearen told appellant
to get up against the police car and drop what was in his hand.
Appellant got up against the car, but would not unclench his
fist.
At that point Officer Colbert arrived.
Officer Colbert
testified that he grabbed appellant’s wrist, which was on the
windshield of the car, and saw something white fall out of
appellant's hand onto the windshield which he thought was crack
cocaine.
Officer Colbert testified that he then said something
to the effect that appellant had some crack cocaine, after which
appellant opened his hand and the rest of the crack cocaine fell
out.
Officer Fearen then conducted a pat-down search,
discovering a handgun and a bag of marijuana.
Both officers
testified that, prior to the pat-down, they had no reason to
believe that appellant had a gun.
Officer Fearen testified that
he conducts pat-down searches of everyone he stops.
On March 18, 1998, appellant was indicted by the
Jefferson County Grand Jury on one count of trafficking in a
controlled substance first degree (cocaine) while in possession
of a firearm; trafficking in marijuana (less than eight ounces)
while in possession of a firearm; carrying a concealed deadly
-3-
weapon; and loitering.
On April 28, 1998, appellant filed a
motion to suppress the items seized during the warrantless search
and seizure of January 16, 1998.
The court held evidentiary
hearings on the motion on May 27, 1998 and November 18, 1998.
On
February 15, 1999, the court entered an order denying the motion.
On October 8, 1999, appellant entered a conditional guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance with firearm, possession
of marijuana with firearm, and loitering, reserving the right to
appeal the court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence seized in
the pat-down search should have been suppressed, as the search
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Kentucky
Supreme Court has held that the Kentucky Constitution affords
individuals the same protections from unreasonable searches and
seizures as the United States Constitution.
See Crayton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 684 (1992).
A trial court’s findings of fact pursuant to a motion
to suppress and a hearing thereon are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence.
RCr 9.78; Davis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 942 (1990).
In Ornelas-Ledesma v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911
(1996), the United States Supreme Court enunciated a new standard
of appellate court review of a trial court’s suppression rulings
on investigative stops and warrantless searches.
Richardson v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 975 S.W.2d 932, 934 (1998).
-4-
The Court
rejected a “clear error” or “abuse of discretion” standard,
stating:
[A]s a general matter determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause
should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having
said this, we hasten to point out that a
reviewing court should take care both to
review findings of historical fact only for
clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.
Richardson, 975 S.W.2d at 934, quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699,
116 S. Ct. at 1663.
Appellant argues that both the investigatory stop and
subsequent pat-down search were invalid under the principles of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968).
We shall first address the issue of the investigatory
stop by Officer Fearen.
Under the standard set forth in Terry,
the police can conduct an investigatory stop of an individual if
they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person
is engaged in criminal activity.
Whether there is a reasonable
and articulable suspicion is a question of fact which must be
determined in each situation from the totality of the
circumstances.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct.
690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981).
Officer Colbert and Officer Fearen were patrolling in
a neighborhood known for drug activity.
While appellant’s
presence in a high drug trafficking area, standing alone, is not
sufficient for an investigatory stop, the fact that a location is
a high crime area is a relevant factor which may be considered in
a Terry analysis.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct.
-5-
673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000);
Simpson v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 834 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (1992).
Officer
Colbert, who had been a Louisville police officer for five years,
testified that he observed appellant standing with three other
individuals, engaged in what appeared to him to be a drug
transaction.
Appellant contends that this conduct - standing
with a group of people in front of a grocery store and being
handed money by another person - was insufficient to support a
reasonable belief that he was engaging in criminal activity.
However, as did Officer Colbert, a police officer “may draw
inferences of illegal activity from facts that may appear
innocuous to a layman.”
Richardson, 975 S.W.2d at 934, citing
Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657.
“Reviewing courts should
give due weight to the trial court’s assessment of the officer’s
credibility and the reasonableness of the inference.”
Id.
Upon seeing Officer Colbert’s police cruiser, appellant
fled.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145
L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a Terry stop, involving a similar fact
situation.
In Wardlow, police officers patrolling in an area
known for heavy drug trafficking noticed the respondent, Wardlow,
standing next to a building holding an opaque bag.
the officers, Wardlow fled.
Upon seeing
Two officers caught up with him, and
conducted a pat-down search of Wardlow and his bag.
In finding
that Wardlow's conduct gave rise to a reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity justifying a Terry stop, the Court
stated:
-6-
[I]t was not merely respondent's presence
in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking
that aroused the officers' suspicion, but his
unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.
Our cases have also recognized that nervous,
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion. [Citations
omitted.] Headlong flight — wherever it
occurs — is the consummate act of evasion: it
is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
but it is certainly suggestive of such. . . .
[I]n Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), [] we
held that when an officer, without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, approaches an
individual, the individual has a right to
ignore the police and go about his business.
Id. at 498. And any "refusal to cooperate,
without more, does not furnish the minimal
level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 437, 15 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S.
Ct. 2382 (1991). But unprovoked flight is
simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.
Flight, by its very nature is not "going
about one's business"; in fact, it is just
the opposite. Allowing officers confronted
with such flight to stop the fugitive and
investigate further is quite consistent with
the individual's right to go about his
business or to stay put and remain silent in
the face of police questioning.
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 577.
The
aforementioned factors - high drug trafficking area, suspected
drug transaction attempt, and flight - considered as a whole,
supported a reasonable suspicion by Officer Colbert that
appellant was engaging in criminal activity in front of the
grocery store.
Hence, Officer Colbert, as well his partner
Officer Fearen to whom he had relayed the information, were
justified in making an investigatory stop when spotting appellant
a short time later.
-7-
Having determined that the investigatory stop was
proper, we must next determine if the pat-down search was proper
as well.
A police officer, for his protection, may conduct a
reasonable search for weapons “where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.”
Ct. at 1883.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.
Appellant argues that there were no specific and
articulable facts from which either officer could have concluded
that appellant was armed and dangerous, particularly in light of
both officers' testimony that neither one of them believed he was
armed.
However, Terry does not require that the officer be
absolutely certain that an individual is armed before conducting
a pat-down search for weapons.
Id.
"[T]he issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger."
Id.; see also, Docksteader v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 802 S.W.2d
149, 150 (1991).
This Court has observed that "narcotics
investigations are fraught with dangers", and police officers
have a right and duty to check suspects for weapons to protect
themselves and others.
S.W.2d 110, 112 (1978).
Johantgen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 571
Officer Colbert witnessed appellant
engaging in what he believed was a drug transaction and appellant
fled upon becoming aware of the police car.
The area was high
crime, and Officer Fearen saw what he believed was a bag of crack
cocaine in appellant's hand.
Accordingly, we cannot say that it
was unreasonable for the officers to assume that appellant was
-8-
involved in illegal drug activity and to conduct a pat-down
search for their protection.
Id.; see also Docksteader, 802
S.W.2d 149. (Terry pat-down search can be appropriate even where
individual suspected of committing a non-violent misdemeanor
offense.)
“[I]f while conducting a legitimate pat-down of a
stopped individual within Terry, the officer discovers contraband
other than weapons, he should not be required to ignore it, and
the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression. (citations
omitted.)”
Dunn v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 689 S.W.2d 23, 27
(1984); see also Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649 (1994).
With regard to Officer Fearen's testimony that he pats down every
individual he stops, we agree with the trial court that this is
inappropriate, however, under the circumstances of this case, the
pat-down of appellant was constitutionally permissible.
Additionally, we believe that the officers had probable
cause to conduct a search of appellant's person when Officer
Fearen saw appellant holding what he reasonably believed was a
plastic bag of crack cocaine.
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983), the Supreme
Court stated:
[P]robable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the
facts available to the officer would "warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief,"
[citation omitted] that certain items may be
contraband or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such belief be correct or more
likely true than false. A "practical,
nontechnical" probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required.
[citation omitted].
-9-
The facts available to Officer Fearen - high drug trafficking
area, and the suspected drug transaction and flight relayed by
Officer Colbert - combined with Officer Fearen’s direct
observation of what appeared to be crack cocaine in appellant’s
hand, warranted such a reasonable belief that appellant possessed
crack cocaine.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the stop,
search and seizure were proper, and thus, the trial court did not
err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
The judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.