CONSECO FINANCE SERVICING CORP. SERVICING CORP.) v. LANCE PATTON; DAVID PLUNKETT; AND AMERICAN MOBILE HOMES, INC. AMERICAN MOBILE HOMES, INC. AND DAVID PLUNKETT v. LANCE PATTON AND CONSECO FINANCE SERVICING CORP. SERVICING CORP.)
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RENDERED: February 23, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000027-MR
CONSECO FINANCE SERVICING CORP.
(FORMERLY GREEN TREE FINANCIAL
SERVICING CORP.)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01152
LANCE PATTON;
DAVID PLUNKETT; AND
AMERICAN MOBILE HOMES, INC.
AND
NO.
2000-CA-000028-MR
AMERICAN MOBILE HOMES, INC. AND
DAVID PLUNKETT
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01152
LANCE PATTON AND
CONSECO FINANCE SERVICING CORP.
(FORMERLY GREEN TREE FINANCIAL
SERVICING CORP.)
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER; AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
APPELLEES
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In the spring and summer of 1998, Lance Patton
agreed to purchase a mobile home from American Mobile Homes, Inc.
and to finance the purchase with a loan from Conseco Finance
Servicing Corp. (formerly known as Green Tree Financial Servicing
Corp.).
Problems developed and in November 1998, Patton sued,
among several others, Conseco; American; and David Plunkett,
American’s owner.
Against American and Plunkett (collectively
American) Patton alleged fraud and other torts, breach of
warranty, violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (KRS
Chapter 367), and breach of the sales contract.
Patton alleged breach of the financing contract.
litigation ensued.
Against Conseco
Typical
Conseco and American answered Patton’s
complaint; the parties engaged in discovery; Conseco moved
unsuccessfully for summary judgment; Patton amended his
complaint; Conseco and American answered the amendments.
After
all this and approximately a year after Patton filed this initial
complaint, Conseco and American moved to compel arbitration
pursuant both to the sales and financing contracts and to the
Kentucky and Federal Arbitration Acts (KRS 417.045-240 and 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).1
Patton responded by denying that an
1
The federal act applies to
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, . . .
9 U.S.C. § 2.
Kentucky’s applies to
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in [a] written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
(continued...)
-2-
arbitration agreement existed between himself and American and by
asserting that Conseco had waived its arbitration rights.
The
trial court apparently agreed with Patton, for by order entered
December 13, 1999, it denied both motions to compel arbitration.2
Thereupon Conseco and American brought separate appeals pursuant
to KRS 417.050, which allows for interlocutory appeals from
denials of such motions.3
Because of their common provenance,
the two appeals have been consolidated for review.
appeals we affirm.
In both
We agree with the trial court that Conseco
waived its right to compel arbitration, and we further agree that
American had no such right.
2000-CA-000027: CONSECO
1
(...continued)
arising between the parties . . .
KRS 417.050. Conseco is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
Minnesota. Patton is a Kentucky resident. The parties do not dispute, and we have no reason to
doubt, that the written financing agreement was a “transaction involving commerce” to which
both the Kentucky and Federal Arbitration Acts apply. American, on the other hand, is a
Kentucky corporation. The sales contract between it and Patton, therefore, does not come within
the provisions of the FAA. To the extent that American asserts an independent right to have
arbitration compelled, its assertion must be predicated on the UAA. As discussed in the text
below, however, American also claims that it derives a right to arbitrate from the Conseco/Patton
agreement. To that extent, its claim, too, invokes both arbitration acts.
2
The trial court did not declare its summary order final and appealable pursuant to CR
54.02.
3
Neither Conseco nor American rely expressly on this provision. Indeed, both appellants
rely primarily on the Federal Arbitration Act. Both do cite the Kentucky Act, however, and
inasmuch as our authority to entertain these appeals is premised on the Kentucky Act, see
Bridgstone/Firestone v. McQueen, Ky. App., 3 S.W.3d 366 (1999); and cf. In re Conseco
Finance Servicing Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App. 2000) (discussing different channels for
seeking review in state court of decisions construing state as opposed to federal arbitration
rights), we shall infer from the fact that they have brought appeals that American and Conseco
are asserting their Kentucky-based rights as well as their federal rights.
-3-
The financing contract between Conseco and Patton
includes an arbitration clause, which provides in part that
[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies
arising from or relating to this contract . .
. shall be resolved by binding arbitration .
. . .
Patton does not dispute the validity of this clause or its
applicability to the claims he has asserted.
He maintains,
however, that Conseco has waived its rights thereunder.
Both Congress and the General Assembly have insisted
that private arbitration agreements be enforced no less readily
than other contractual provisions and that their effect be
determined by reference to ordinary principles of contract law.4
This policy is embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
Kentucky’s version of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), both of
which provide, in essence, that arbitration agreements “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”
U.S.C. § 2.5
9
As the saving clause indicates, courts may refuse
to enforce arbitration agreements on a number of grounds.
“[A]mong those grounds is waiver of the right to arbitrate.”6
Waiver is commonly defined as
4
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, ___ U.S. ___, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373, 121
S. Ct. 513 (2000); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902, 116
S. Ct. 1652 (1996); Valley Construction Company, Inc. v. Perry Host Management Company,
Inc., Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 365 (1990).
5
Cf. KRS 417.050, which provides in part that a written arbitration agreement “is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any
contract.”
6
St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Products Company,
Inc., 969 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
-4-
a voluntary and intentional surrender or
relinquishment of a known right, or an
election to forego an advantage which the
party at his option might have demanded or
insisted upon.7
A waiver may be either express or implied, although waiver will
not be inferred lightly.8
Because Conseco did not expressly
waive its right to arbitrate, the issue here is whether the trial
court could infer waiver from Conseco’s actions.
Traditionally,
waiver, unlike estoppel or laches, has not required a showing of
prejudice to the party asserting it.9
For this reason, among
others, some of the courts addressing claims that an arbitration
right has been waived have not required that the party asserting
the claim prove that it would be prejudiced were arbitration to
be ordered.10
The Seventh Circuit, for example, applying the more
strictly traditional meaning of waiver, has held that “an
election to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for the
resolution of a contractual dispute is a presumptive waiver of
the right to arbitrate.”11
As the Court explained,
7
Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 387, 390 (1995) (quoting Barker v. Stearns Coal
& Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184, 163 S.W.2d 466, 470 (1942)).
8
Valley Construction Company, Inc. v. Perry Host Management Company, Inc., supra.
9
Greathouse v. Shreve, supra.
10
St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Products Company,
Inc., supra; Worldsource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Construction Company, Inc., 946 F.2d
473 (6th Cir. 1991); National Foundation for Cancer Research v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11
Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995).
-5-
[a]n arbitration clause gives either party
the choice of an alternative, nonjudicial
forum in which to seek a resolution of a
dispute arising out of the contract. But the
intention behind such clauses, and the reason
for judicial enforcement of them, are not to
allow or encourage the parties to proceed,
either simultaneously or sequentially, in
multiple forums. Cabinetree, which initiated
this litigation, could, instead of filing
suit in a Wisconsin state court, have
demanded arbitration under the contract. It
did not, thus signifying its election not to
submit its dispute with Kraftmaid to
arbitration. Kraftmaid if it wanted
arbitration could have moved for a stay of
Cabinetree's suit in the Wisconsin state
court. It did not. Instead it removed the
case to federal district court. By doing so
without at the same time asking the district
court for an order to arbitrate, it
manifested an intention to resolve the
dispute through the processes of the federal
court. To resolve the dispute thus is not to
resolve it through the processes of the
American Arbitration Association.
. . . .
There is no plausible interpretation of the
reason for the delay except that Kraftmaid
initially decided to litigate its dispute
with Cabinetree in the federal district
court, and that later, for reasons unknown
and with no shadow of justification,
Kraftmaid changed its mind and decided it
would be better off in arbitration. Neither
in its briefs nor at oral argument did
Kraftmaid give any reason for its delay in
filing the stay besides needing time "to
weigh its options." That is the worst
possible reason for delay. It amounts to
saying that Kraftmaid wanted to see how the
case was going in federal district court
before deciding whether it would be better
off there or in arbitration. It wanted to
play heads I win, tails you lose. Selection
of a forum in which to resolve a legal
dispute should be made at the earliest
possible opportunity in order to economize on
the resources, both public and private,
consumed in dispute resolution. This policy
is reflected in the thirty-day deadline for
removing a suit from state to federal court.
Parties know how important it is to settle on
a forum at the earliest possible opportunity,
-6-
and the failure of either of them to move
promptly for arbitration is powerful evidence
that they made their election--against
arbitration. Except in extraordinary
circumstances not here presented, they should
be bound by their election.12
Other courts have treated the question of “waiver” in
this context as involving an amalgam of waiver, estoppel, and
laches principles and have required a showing of prejudice.13
These courts have inferred the waiver of arbitration rights where
a belated assertion of such rights prejudiced the opposition,
either by imposing undue delay and expense or by conferring an
unfair tactical advantage such as pre-trial discovery not
available in arbitration.
While we certainly agree with the dissent that Kentucky
law favors arbitration agreements, it is no more the purpose of
the UAA than of the FAA to encourage multiple proceedings in
alternative forums.
On the contrary, both acts lend support to
arbitration agreements as means whereby parties can try to
streamline and expedite the resolution of their disputes.
That
goal is undermined, however, if the arbitral forum is not chosen
with reasonable promptness, and substantive litigation is pursued
in the trial court.
Kentucky law, furthermore, as noted above,
12
Id. at 390-91. See also Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Company v.
Wisconsin Central Limited, 154 F.3d 404, 408 (1998) (“The general rule is that a demand for
arbitration, like the invocation of a forum selection clause or any other claim of improper venue, .
. . must be made as early as possible so that the other party can know in what forum he has to
proceed.”).
13
S & R Company of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., 159 F.3d 80 (2nd Cir. 1998); S &
H Contractors, Inc. v. A. J. Taft Coal Company, Inc., 906 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1990); Fraser v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1987); Miller Brewing Co. v.
Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1986).
-7-
recognizes waiver as a principle of contract law distinct from
either estoppel or prejudicial delay.
Howard v. Motorists Mutual
Insurance Company, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 525 (1997).
Under the UAA
therefore, and under the FAA until the Supreme Court or the Sixth
Circuit declares otherwise,14 we agree with the Seventh Circuit
that a party’s indifference to an arbitration agreement, as
evidenced by undue delay in demanding arbitration or by active
participation in litigation, creates a rebuttable presumption
that the party has waived the right to arbitrate.
The
presumption may be overcome by a showing that the delay or the
participation was justified.
The fact that the party resisting
arbitration will suffer no prejudice if ordered to arbitrate is
not, by itself, sufficient to overcome the presumption, although
it is certainly a factor to be considered, as is the contrary
fact that prejudice is apt to result.
Because these
determinations must be based on the circumstances of each
particular case, appellate review will often be limited to
ensuring that the trial court’s decision was not clearly
erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence.
To the
extent, however, that the trial court construes the contract or
makes other purely legal determinations, our review is de novo.15
We are not persuaded that the trial court’s decision in
this case was erroneous.
Conseco waited a year before asserting
14
See Southern Systems, Inc. v. Torrid Oven Limited, 105 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D.
Tenn. 2000) (“In light of the Sixth Circuit's emphasis on inconsistent conduct and no mention of
prejudice, this court will treat prejudice as a significant factor but not a dispositive one.”).
15
Hibbitts v. Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust Company, Ky. App., 977 S.W.2d
252 (1998).
-8-
its right to arbitrate and during that year participated actively
in the litigation.
It twice answered Patton’s complaints without
mentioning arbitration; it sought discovery from Patton; and it
litigated what it hoped would be a dispositive summary judgment
motion against Patton.16
These facts are more than sufficient to
invoke the presumption that Conseco waived its contractual right
to arbitrate.
Conseco offers no justification at all for its
delay and attempts to justify its participation in the litigation
by asserting that it was obliged to make some response to
Patton’s complaint and that its summary judgment motion was a
device by means of which it hoped merely to simplify and to
clarify the issues.
Neither assertion provides an explanation,
much less a justification, for Conseco’s participating in the
litigation instead of promptly demanding arbitration.
The fact
that Conseco was obliged to respond to Patton’s complaint does
not explain why that response could not at the outset have
included a demand for arbitration.
have “clarified” the issues?
And could not an arbitrator
In short, Conseco has failed to
rebut the presumption of waiver.
Conseco contends that it should not be found to have
waived its right to arbitrate unless its delay in demanding
16
Despite Conseco’s discovery requests and summary judgment motion, the dissent would
characterize Conseco’s role in the litigation as essentially that of a passive observer until Patton’s
amended complaint clarified the fact that he was asserting direct and not merely derivative
liability against the finance company. Patton’s original complaint alleged that Conseco had
wrongfully released funds to the seller, American, contrary to his request that it not do so and
with full knowledge of the alleged defects to the mobile home. This wrongful release of funds,
Patton asserted, constituted Conseco’s own breach of contract. This complaint should have put
Conseco on notice that it was being sued for its own alleged wrongdoing and that a prompt
decision regarding its choice of forum was therefore in order.
-9-
arbitration prejudiced Patton.
contention.
There is some merit to this
KRS 417.240 provides that
This chapter [the UAA] shall be so construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact
it.
Although we have not attempted an exhaustive survey of our sister
states, many of them, if not most, have held that prejudice is an
element of “waiver” in this context.17
KRS 417.240 lends to such
holdings a considerable persuasive weight.
Nevertheless, for the
reasons discussed above, we believe the better rule is the one we
have stated.
It gives no less effect to the UAA and comports
better with ordinary contract and forum-selection principles.
This variation on the prejudice requirement, moreover, although
different from the rule in some other states, is only a minor
aspect of the UAA’s overall scheme.
This small difference does
not mark a genuine disunity between us and our sister states.
Furthermore, even if prejudice to Patton were required,
that requirement would be met. The disclosures Patton has made in
responding to Conseco’s discovery requests and in defending
Conseco’s summary judgment motion and the expense Patton bore in
responding to that motion, not to mention the twelve month delay
itself, are precisely the detriments, tactical and practical,
most often cited as prejudicing a party confronted with a belated
motion to compel arbitration.18
17
See J. Wise Smith and Associates, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 925 F.
Supp. 528 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (collecting cases).
18
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts, Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1997); S &
(continued...)
-10-
Conseco next contends that the issue of waiver should
have been submitted to arbitration.
It has been held, however,
that the question of waiver is one for the trial court once the
party seeking arbitration has engaged in the litigation.19
It
would seem, moreover, that, where a presumption of waiver has
arisen, a trial court could not relinquish jurisdiction to an
arbitrator without first determining that the presumption is not
to be given effect.20
The trial court therefore did not err by
declining to submit the issue of waiver to arbitration.
The arbitration clause itself, Conseco contends,
precludes a finding of waiver.
This contention is apparently
based on the following portion of that clause:
Notwithstanding anything hereunto [sic] the
contrary, you [Conseco] retain an option to
use judicial or non-judicial relief to
enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other
security agreement relating to the real
property secured in a transaction underlying
this arbitration agreement, or to enforce the
monetary obligation secured by the real
property, or to foreclose on the real
property. Such judicial relief would take
the form of a lawsuit. The institution and
maintenance of an action for judicial relief
in a court to foreclose upon any collateral,
to obtain a monetary judgment or to enforce
the mortgage or deed of trust, shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of any party
18
(...continued)
R Company of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., supra; S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft
Coal Co., supra.
19
S & R Company of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., supra.
20
Cf. Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Company v. Wisconsin Central
Limited, 154 F.3d at 409 (“But like other rules of venue it [the rule of presumptive waiver] is not
a rule limiting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, so if there is a good reason for delay
[in demanding arbitration] the district judge can excuse noncompliance with the rule.”)
(emphasis added).
-11-
to compel arbitration regarding any other
dispute or remedy subject to arbitration in
this contract, including the filing of a
counterclaim in a suit brought by you
pursuant to this provision.
Conseco claims that under this provision its
participation in the judicial forum can not be construed as a
waiver of its right to arbitrate.
The clause plainly, however,
does not give Conseco the right both to litigate and to arbitrate
the same matter.21
Even assuming that this non-waiver provision
applies to a claim brought against Conseco (a doubtful
assumption), it would mean only that Conseco could acquiesce in
litigation of that claim without waiving its right to demand
arbitration of “any other dispute or remedy,” not the matter
litigated.
The non-waiver provision of the arbitration clause,
therefore, does not preclude a finding that Conseco waived its
right to demand arbitration of Patton’s already-much-litigated
complaint.
Conseco alleges that it “informally” requested
arbitration in February 1999.
This informal request, it
contends, relieved it of the duty to make a “formal” demand of
arbitration in a timely manner.
The contention is without merit.
Assuming that the February request was timely, Patton’s
repudiation of that request should have been immediately
apparent; he did not, after all, discontinue the litigation.
It
behooved Conseco at that point, therefore, for all the reasons
21
Cf. S & R Company of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., 159 F.3d at 85 (finding that a
non-waiver clause was not to be construed “to allow a party to seek solely judicial relief of its
controversy and later to switch course and demand arbitration.”).
-12-
discussed above, promptly to assert it rights “formally” or risk
the very result that has occurred.
Finally, Conseco complains that it was denied a fair
opportunity to present its case on the arbitration issue.
complaint, too, is without merit.
This
It seems that the trial court
issued its denial of Conseco’s motion to compel before Conseco
had had a chance to file a brief replying to Patton’s response.
Rather than call the matter to the trial court’s attention,
however, and request reconsideration in light of its reply,
Conseco simply proceeded with its appeal.
Conseco waived the
issue by failing to call it to the trial court’s attention.22
The trial court’s error, furthermore, was harmless.
Conseco’s
reply, which was entered in the record after the trial court
issued its order, does no more than supplement the memorandum
Conseco filed with its motion.
case fully and ably.
The memorandum presents Conseco’s
Neither the initial memorandum nor the
reply, moreover, can change the fact that Conseco actively
litigated this case for a year.
The trial court did not err by
ruling that it thereby waived its right to demand arbitration.
2000-CA-000028: AMERICAN
Much of what we have said regarding the waiver of
Conseco’s right to demand arbitration would apply with equal
force to American’s similar demand.
Although prior to its motion
to compel arbitration American had not made discovery requests of
its own or advanced any substantive motions, it nevertheless had
sat by for twelve months as the litigation proceeded, giving no
22
CR 52.
-13-
indication during that period that it preferred to arbitrate.
In
the meantime, it gained access to Patton’s disclosures to
Conseco, and put Patton to the expense of obtaining an order
compelling discovery.
As did Conseco’s, American’s year-long
acquiescence in the litigation raises a presumption that American
waived whatever right it had to demand arbitration.
And, like
Conseco, American has failed to offer any convincing
justification for its tardiness.
American, moreover, had no right to demand arbitration
to begin with.
It bases its claim to such a right on the
arbitration clause in Conseco’s contract with Patton and on a
forum selection clause in its own contract with him.
Neither
contract gives American the right it claims.
The clause upon which American relies in its sales
contract with Patton provides in its entirety as follows:
CONTROLLING LAW AND PLACE OF SUIT. The law
of the State, in which I [Patton] sign this
contract, is the law which is to be used in
interpreting the terms of the contract. You
and I agree that if any dispute between us is
submitted to a court for resolution, such
legal proceeding shall take place in the
county in which your principle offices are
located. If under state law a special
dispute resolution procedure or complaint
process is available, I agree to the extent
permitted by law that procedure shall be the
only method of resolution and source of
remedies available to me.23
Although American’s argument is anything but clear, it
seems to contend either that the UAA is itself a “special dispute
23
Patton asserts that this clause does not appear in the contract he executed; American
asserts that it appears on the back of the two-sided form. We need not address the factual
dispute, however, because, as explained in the text below, even if American’s assertion is correct
the quoted clause does not entitle American to the relief it seeks on appeal.
-14-
resolution procedure or complaint process” available under state
law, or that the arbitration provision in the Conseco/Patton
contract is such a procedure, which is somehow made available to
American under the UAA.
Plainly, however, the UAA itself does
not provide a dispute resolution procedure.
It provides rather a
means for the enforcement of private agreements adopting such
procedures.
Nor, for the following reasons, is the
Conseco/Patton arbitration agreement available to American, under
the UAA or otherwise, at least with respect to Patton’s
complaint.
Ordinarily, of course, a stranger to a contract
acquires no rights thereunder.24
A broad exception to this very
general rule has been recognized with respect to so called thirdparty beneficiaries, non-parties for whose actual and direct
benefit the contract is made.25
There are two types of such
beneficiaries, donees and creditors, both of which are to be
distinguished from mere incidental beneficiaries: strangers to
the agreement who benefit from it, but whose benefit is not a
principle objective of any party.26
A person is a donee
beneficiary
if the purpose of the promisee in buying the
promise is to make a gift to the beneficiary.
A person is a creditor beneficiary if the
promisee’s expressed intent is that the third
party is to receive the performance of the
contract in satisfaction of any actual or
24
Sexton v. Taylor County, Kentucky, Ky. App., 692 S.W.2d 808 (1985).
25
Id.
26
King v. National Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 33 (6th Cir. 1975).
-15-
supposed duty or liability of the promisee to
the beneficiary.27
Finally, a third-party beneficiary is entitled to enforce duties
bargained for on his behalf.28
American is a creditor beneficiary of Patton’s
financing agreement with Conseco.
As such it is entitled to
enforce Conseco’s promise to lend money to Patton because Patton
acquired that promise on its behalf.
American’s status as third-
party beneficiary does not, however, give it rights against
Patton under the Conseco/Patton agreement.
Any such right would
have to be derived from Conseco, but American is neither
Conseco’s creditor nor its donee.
American’s rights against
Patton, therefore, are limited to those acquired under its own
sales contract with him.
That contract, we have seen, does not
create a right to demand arbitration except under procedures
provided by state law, and no such procedures have been
identified.
American has referred us to two other situations in
which strangers to arbitration agreements have been deemed
entitled to assert rights thereunder.
In McBro Planning and
Development Co. v. Triangle Electrical Construction Co., 741 F.2d
342 (11th Cir. 1984), and Hughes Masonry Company, Inc. v. Greater
Clark County School Building Corp., 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981),
the plaintiff sued a sub-contractor on the basis of a
construction contract that referred to the sub-contractor but to
27
Id. at 33.
28
Id. at 33 nt. 6; 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 459 (1991).
-16-
which the sub-contractor was not a signatory.
When the sub-
contractor invoked arbitration rights under the construction
contract, the plaintiff was deemed to be estopped from resisting
arbitration on the ground that the sub-contractor was not a party
to the arbitration agreement.
Patton’s claims against American,
however, are not based on his agreement with Conseco.
There is
thus no ground to estop him from asserting the general rule that
American, a stranger to that agreement, derives no rights
thereunder.
The other situation American cites in which non-parties
have been included in an arbitration agreement is represented by
Napier v. Manning, 723 So.2d 49 (Ala. 1998); J.J. Ryan & Sons,
Inc. v. Rhone Pulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988);
and Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Company v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679
(5th Cir. 1976).
In these cases the claim against the non-party
has been deemed so intertwined with the claim against the party
as to necessitate that the two claims be addressed jointly.
Arbitration of the claim against the party, therefore, has been
held to entail arbitration of the claim against the non-party as
well.
As discussed above, however, Patton’s claim against
Conseco is to be litigated rather than arbitrated.
This fact, of
course, renders American’s point in citing these cases moot.
Finally, as did Conseco, American complains that the
trial court did not give it a chance to reply to Patton’s
response to the motion to compel arbitration.
For the reasons we
discussed in denying Conseco relief on this ground, no relief is
due American either.
-17-
In sum, Conseco and American have both allowed active
litigation of the claims against them to proceed for a year.
There has been significant discovery and, in Conseco’s case,
resolution of a substantive summary judgment motion.
So advanced
is the litigation, indeed, that Patton has requested a trial
date.
Conseco and American’s unjustified delay in calling for
arbitration during these twelve months and their participation in
the judicial proceedings adequately supports the trial court’s
apparent conclusion that they have waived their rights to demand
arbitration, whether on the ground that the delay and
participation raise a presumption of such waiver and that neither
party rebutted the presumption, or on the ground that the delay
and participation are unduly prejudicial to Patton.
In
American’s case, moreover, we agree with the trial court that
American enjoyed no independent right to demand arbitration, and
any such right it may have derived from the Patton/Conseco
agreement has been rendered null by Conseco’s waiver.
For these reasons, we affirm, in both 2000-CA-000027
and 2000-CA-000028, the December 13, 1999, order of the Boone
Circuit Court.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
GUDGEL, C.J., DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING BY SEPARATE OPINION.
I
respectfully dissent because in my view the record before us does
not support the court’s finding that Conseco and American waived
their right to compel arbitration.
-18-
Further, I believe that the
majority opinion simply ignores longstanding Kentucky principles
which favor arbitration and disfavor waiver of that right.
We noted in Valley Construction Co., Inc. v. Perry Host
Management Co., Inc., Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 365, 367 (1990), that
although “[p]articipation in a judicial proceeding may act as a
waiver of arbitration,” the mere filing of pleadings does not
serve to waive a contractual arbitration provision.
In my
opinion, the court abused its discretion by finding that Conseco
and American participated in this litigation to such a
significant degree that their right to compel arbitration was
waived.
Other than filing appropriate responsive pleadings,
Conseco merely served appellee Patton with a set of ten written
interrogatories and made a motion for summary judgment.
These
latter pleadings were only filed because Conseco believed it was
entitled to have the action dismissed on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a claim for relief.
Indeed, Patton
subsequently addressed this argument by filing amended complaints
asserting new and different claims against Conseco and American.
Moreover, although Conseco and American participated in one
discovery deposition noticed by Patton, they did not schedule any
of their own.
Given the fact that this jurisdiction does not
encourage the waiver of contractual arbitration provisions, and
given the apparent insufficiencies in the allegations of the
initial complaint, I perceive no basis for finding that a waiver
occurred herein merely because Conseco, in addition to filing
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responsive pleadings, served ten written interrogatories and a
motion for summary judgment.
This is especially true since
Conseco’s motion to compel arbitration was filed only
thirty-seven days after Patton’s last amended complaint was
filed.
Moreover, as it is clear that the one-year delay in the
litigation proceedings stemmed from the number of parties and
pleadings herein, rather than from any conduct on Conseco’s part,
no prejudice stemmed from Conseco’s delay in seeking to enforce
its right to compel arbitration.
I would conclude, therefore,
that Conseco’s limited participation in this judicial proceeding
prior to seeking arbitration was not significant enough to
justify a finding that its right to arbitration was waived.
I
would reach a similar conclusion as to American, as its
participation in the judicial proceedings evidently was even less
than that of Conseco since American apparently only filed
appropriate pleadings and attended the deposition noticed by
Patton.
For the reasons stated I would hold, contrary to the
majority, that the trial court abused its discretion by finding
that Conseco and American waived their right to compel
arbitration.
Therefore, I dissent.
-20-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT CONSECO
FINANCE SERVICING CORP.:
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE LANCE PATTON:
Linda J. West
Christopher M. Hill & Assoc.
P.S.C.
Frankfort, Kentucky
Julie A Reinhardt
Marcus S. Carey and Associate
Erlanger, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS AMERICAN MOBILE
HOMES, INC., AND DAVID
PLUNKETT:
Gailen W. Bridges
Covington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT
CONSECO FINANCE SERVICING
CORP.:
Christopher M. Hill
Frankfort, Kentucky
-21-
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