COURTNEY EDWARDS v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO.
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RENDERED: MAY 18, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000022-MR
COURTNEY EDWARDS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-003242
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Courtney Edwards appeals the Jefferson Circuit
Court's dismissal of his civil rights action brought under state
law.
Having reviewed the record, the arguments presented, and
the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that
the court did not err by ordering the action dismissed as the
claim upon which it is based is subject to federal preemption
principles.
We affirm.
We adopt as our own the thorough and well-reasoned
opinion prepared by the trial court:
This matter comes before the Court on a
motion to dismiss brought by Defendant,
United -Parcel Service, Inc. d/b/a United Parcel Service Co.
(Air) (C-R) (hereinafter "UPS").
Courtney Edwards was a pilot employed by UPS as an airline
captain. His employment was terminated on June 6, 1994, based
upon the results of an FAA required random drug test taken by
Edwards on May 12, 1994. The results of the test showed that the
urine specimen contained glutaraldehyde, an adulterating agent
found in products such as UrinAid, to mask evidence of drugs in a
urine test.
Edwards filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") between UPS and the Independent Pilots
Association, Edwards' union representative. The grievance
proceeded to arbitration, and an arbitrator upheld his
termination under the CBA in 1995. The particular provision of
the CBA at issue provided that UPS could terminate any pilot for
just cause for refusing to submit to an FAA required drug test or
failing a drug test, provided the testing conformed with FAA
regulations and the UPS Drug Testing Program. The arbitrator
found that deliberate adulteration of a urine specimen was
effectively the same as a refusal to be tested, which is a
dischargeable offense under the negotiated CBA.
On June 19, 1996, Edwards (who is black) brought suit in federal
court against UPS seeking to vacate the arbitration award and
alleging breach of contract (CBA), and racial discrimination
under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The federal court
dismissed Edwards' (sic) Title VII claim in 1997 for lack of
jurisdiction, and Edwards did not appeal said dismissal.
On June 2, 1999, Edwards brought this civil rights action against
UPS, alleging racial discrimination under KRS 344.040 of the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Edwards' (sic) allegation is based
upon two similarly situated white pilots who tested positive for
drugs but were allowed to continue in the employment of UPS.
UPS filed a notice of removal to federal court on June 28, 1999.
The federal court remanded the case back to this Court on August
18, 1999, as Edwards' (sic) complaint only alleged a state law
civil rights claim. On September 15, 1999, UPS filed a motion to
dismiss. On October 5, 1999, Edwards filed a response to the
motion. UPS was given leave to file a reply on October 19, 1999,
and on October 22, 1999, Edwards filed a sur-reply.
UPS sets forth the following two arguments in its motion to
dismiss: (1) Edwards' (sic) state law civil rights claim is
barred by res judicata since his Title VII claim based on the
same allegation of racial discrimination was dismissed in federal
court; and (2) Edwards'(sic) state law claim is preempted by the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. ("RLA").
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The doctrine of res judicata requires a final adjudication on the
merits and identity of parties and subject matter. Vega v. Kosair
Charities Committee, Inc., Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 895 (1992);
Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Ky. App.,
769 S.W.2d 64 (1989). The doctrine is not only applicable "to the
issues disposed of in the first action, but to every point which
properly belonged to the subject of the litigation in the first
action and which in the exercise of reasonable diligence might
have been brought forward at the time." Egbert v. Curtis, Ky.
App., 695 S.W.2d 123 (1985).
Edwards' (sic) previous federal Title VII claim was dismissed on
August 15, 1997, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
dismissal was based upon Edwards' (sic) failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies in that he never obtained a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC. A dismissal based upon a court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits
as required for res judicata purposes. As stated in Davis v.
Powell's Valley Water District, Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d 75 (1995):
Both Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and CR 41.02(3) indicate that
an action's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not
constitute "an adjudication upon the merits" of an
action. Therefore, the earlier dismissal of appellants'
federal court action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction did not constitute an adjudication upon
the merits of that action, and res judicata did not
attach to the issues raised therein or preclude
appellants from raising the same issues in the instant
action.
Id. at 77.
UPS cites Rivers v. Barberton Board of Education, 143 F.3d 1029
(6th Cir. 1998), to show that the 6th Circuit has now joined
other circuits in holding that a right-to-sue letter is merely a
condition precedent and not a jurisdictional requirement.
However, at the time the federal court dismissed Edwards' Title
VII claim in 1997, obtaining a right-to-sue letter was considered
jurisdictional in the 6th Circuit. [See the August 15, 1997
federal opinion citing Jones v. Truck Drivers Local 299, 748 F.2d
1083 (6th Cir. 1984)]. Consequently, there was no adjudication on
the merits, and the federal court's dismissal of Edwards' (sic)
Title VII claim does not bar his claim under the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act.
Next, UPS argues that Edwards' (sic) state law civil rights claim
is preempted by the RLA and must be submitted to arbitration
under 45 U.S.C., § 184, since it involves interpretation of the
CBA. Both parties agree that the Sixth Circuit has used the
following test to determine when preemption is appropriate. A
court must determine whether the proof of the state law claim
requires interpretation of the CBA's terms. If the right claimed
by the plaintiff is created by state law and does not involve
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contract interpretation, preemption is not required. DeCoe v.
General Motors Corporation, 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994).
Preemption is appropriate if the claim is based upon a matrix of
facts which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance
machinery of the CBA and the RLA. Stephens v. Norfolk and Western
Railway Company, 792 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986).
In this case, Edwards was terminated after an FAA required random
drug test. His urine specimen was found to be intentionally
adulterated with glutaraldehyde to mask any illegal drug usage.
UPS equated the adulteration of a random urine specimen with
refusal to be tested under the CBA. Edwards seeks to equate
adulteration of a urine specimen with testing positive (like the
two retained white pilots) under the CBA, rather than equating it
with a refusal to test. Consequently, the Court finds that
Edwards' (sic) state law civil rights claim necessarily requires
interpretation of and is inextricably intertwined with the CBA.
The claim is thus preempted by the RLA.
Therefore, the Court enters the following Order:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion to dismiss
brought by Defendant, United Parcel Service, Inc. d/b/a United
Parcel Service Co. (Air) (C-R), is GRANTED
on the basis that Courtney Edwards'(sic) state law civil rights
claim under KRS Chapter 344 is preempted by the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
This is a final and appealable judgment and there is no just
reason for delay.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Courtney B. L. Edwards
Louisville, KY
Tony C. Coleman
David L. Hoskins
Louisville, KY
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