LARRY SABO v. RON PAYNE; ALMA RANDOLPH; JIM TONY FULKERSON; and CITY OF OWENSBORO
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RENDERED: April 6, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000021-MR
LARRY SABO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARLAND HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00829
v.
RON PAYNE; ALMA RANDOLPH; JIM TONY
FULKERSON; and CITY OF OWENSBORO
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Larry Sabo appeals the Daviess Circuit Court order
dismissing his claims of defamation, tortious interference with a
business relationship, and civil conspiracy.
We have concluded
that the appellant's complaint sufficiently states viable causes
of action; therefore, we reverse and remand the dismissal ordered
on the pleadings as premature.
In December 1996, Sabo accepted a position as Director
of Finance and Administration for the City of Owensboro.
In
March 1998, Ron Payne, City Manager and Sabo's direct supervisor,
recommended Sabo's permanent appointment to the position.
Weeks
later, however, the Owensboro City Commission extended the
probationary period of Sabo's employment until October 1998.
In an effort to evaluate Sabo's job performance, Payne
distributed "Supervisor Assessment Surveys" to a number of city
employees.1
On September 17, 1998, following a closed door
meeting, the Owensboro City Commission terminated Sabo from his
position as Director of Finance and Administration.
In July 1999, Sabo filed a complaint against Ron Payne;
Alma Randolph, the City's Human Resources/Community Relations
Specialist; and the City of Owensboro.2
Sabo alleged that on
September 17, 1998, Payne made slanderous and false statements
regarding Sabo's management skills and job performance.
He
alleged that Payne falsely represented the results of staff
surveys and comments.
Moreover, Sabo alleged that Payne's
statements had been made with malice and with the intent that he
be deprived of employment with the City.
With respect to
Randolph, Sabo alleged that she had made malicious, false, and
slanderous statements about him "beginning in at least March and
April 1998."
Complaint at 5.
In addition, Sabo alleged that
Randolph had tortiously interfered with his employment and with
his expectation of becoming a permanent employee of the City of
Owensboro.
1
Sabo alleges that Payne knowingly violated City policy and
procedure, which limits the completion of such evaluations to a
supervisor's immediate subordinates.
2
Allegations were also made against unknown defendants. The
unknown defendants have not been included in the notice of
appeal, however, and are not a part of these proceedings. Sabo
filed a separate action against the City for wrongful
termination.
-2-
Before answering, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
CR 12.02.
The defendants argued that Sabo's claims against Randolph were
barred by the one-year statute of limitations and by the doctrine
of qualified privilege.
They argued that the claims asserted
against Payne were barred by the doctrine of absolute and/or
qualified privilege.
They contended that claims against the City
should be similarly dismissed.
In late August of 1999, Sabo filed his first amended
complaint.
He alleged that Randolph had continued to make
slanderous comments about him after August 1998 and that Payne
had further defamed him outside the City's closed-door meeting of
September 17, 1999.
The defendants' second motion to dismiss
soon followed.
In mid-September 1999, Sabo filed his second amended
complaint.
This amended complaint included allegations against
Jim Tony Fulkerson, former Deputy Director of Finance, and a
claim for civil conspiracy against Fulkerson and Payne.
Sabo
alleged that Fulkerson had maliciously defamed him and tortiously
interfered with his employment and his expectations of becoming a
permanent employee of the City.
Furthermore, Sabo alleged that
Fulkerson, Payne, and others had "conspired to remove [Sabo] from
his position with the City of Owensboro by defaming him and
encouraging other employees to defame him . . . ."
Amended Complaint at 11.
Second
The defendants' third motion to dismiss
followed.
-3-
Although Sabo vigorously contested each successive
motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed this action on
December 20, 1999.
In granting the motion, the trial court
concluded that Payne was entitled to claim an absolute privilege
to defame Sabo; that Fulkerson and Randolph were protected by a
qualified privilege; and that all of the defendants were
insulated from liability by the "intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine."
This appeal followed.
In considering the motion to dismiss, the trial court
was bound to construe liberally the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and to take as true all allegations
contained in his complaint.
S.W.2d 867 (1987).
Gall v. Scroggy, Ky. App., 725
While we sympathize with the trial court's
diligent efforts to unravel the numerous, interconnected
allegations asserted in this case, our review compels us to
reverse the court's order dismissing the action.
We begin our discussion with an analysis of Sabo's
defamation claims.
In its order, the trial court concluded that
Fulkerson and Randolph were entitled to a qualified privilege to
defame Sabo.
Our review of the complaint, however, indicates
that Sabo has alleged that the false and defamatory statements
made against him by these defendants were made with malice — a
fact that would remove the behavior complained of beyond the
protective scope of the privilege.3
3
Contrary to the position
Sabo alleges that the defamatory statements were made with
ill will and improper motives.
-4-
taken by the appellees, that mere allegation couched in terms of
malice is sufficient to avoid dismissal of the claim.
At common law, defamation suits were disfavored and
subjected to a number of pleading technicalities. However, the
modern rules of civil procedure have expanded the opportunity to
state a cause of action through more liberal "notice-pleading."
Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure, §5.16 (1985).
CR
9.02 expressly provides that the presence of malice may be
averred "generally."
Although Sabo will bear the heavier burden
of proving this allegation with "convincing clarity" rather than
by a mere preponderance in order to overcome a motion for
directed verdict when this action proceeds to trial, the mere
allegation that the statements were undertaken with malice
suffices to meet his threshold at this juncture.4
See
Warford
v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 758 (1990).
We shall next consider the defamation claim asserted
against Payne.
After considering the arguments, the trial court
concluded that Payne was entitled to an absolute privilege to
defame Sabo by virtue of his position as city manager as well as
the provisions of KRS 83A.150(7)(b), which authorize him to
report to the city commission regarding personnel matters.
As a
result, the trial court dismissed this cause of action.
4
The appellees contend that Sabo's complaint lacks
sufficient specificity with respect to Randolph's allegedly
defamatory remarks. A motion for more definite statement
pursuant to CR 12.05 would have been the proper means of curing
any concerns relative to the appellees' statute of limitations
defense in lieu of outright dismissal.
-5-
It has long been settled in Kentucky that absolute
immunity from defamation actions is available to certain
governmental officials with respect to matters upon which the law
requires them to act.5
Compton v. Romans, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 24
(1993), citing McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284
S.W.88 (1926).
However, because of the extreme breadth and
nature of this "absolute privilege," the communications to which
it is said to apply are necessarily restricted to few in number.
Id.
In Compton, the Kentucky Supreme Court warned that it
is necessary to examine closely the authority entrusted to the
governmental official and the action taken which gave rise to the
defamation claim in order to determine whether the grace of
absolute immunity is justified.
Examining the authority granted
to the city manager in this case and the actions allegedly taken,
we are not persuaded that his communications regarding Sabo are
absolutely privileged.
Absolute immunity is generally limited to legislative
and judicial proceedings, matters of military affairs, and to the
acts of high ranking executive branch officials in discharging
the duties imposed on them by law.
Administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial powers may also enjoy absolute
immunity.
Compton, supra.
Examining the scope of duties
bestowed upon the city manager by the provisions of KRS 83A.150
5
The privilege exists as a matter of public policy, of
balancing public necessity against individual injury -- "a policy
which regards the ends to be gained by permitting such statements
as outweighing the harm which may be done to the reputation of
others." See 50 Am.Jur 2d Libel and Slander §275 (1995).
-6-
(as further defined by the Owensboro Personnel Policy Manual) in
light of the nature of the allegedly defamatory comments, we
cannot conclude at this preliminary stage of the proceedings that
Payne is entitled to assert an absolute immunity from liability
in this case.
Nor can we conclude the contrary.
However, Sabo's
complaint adequately states an arguable cause of action:
that
Payne’s allegedly defamatory comments may have fallen outside the
scope of his statutory duty and that they were inappropriate to
the exercise of his office.
Consequently, the cause of action
could not be dismissed on this basis at this juncture.6
Next, we consider Sabo's allegations of civil
conspiracy against Payne and Fulkerson.
The trial court
concluded that the defendants were "insulated from any liability
herein based on the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine."
This
doctrine provides that employees of the same entity cannot
conspire together because they are to be regarded as one person.7
See Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.
1994).
The application of this doctrine of presumed corporate
indivisibility is limited by a well-established exception,
however.
If the employees of the corporate entity who are
alleged to be conspiring are acting outside the scope of their
employment, or if they have an independent personal stake or
6
Sabo's allegations of tortious interference with a business
relationship are governed by the same rules of privilege. Gray
v. Central Bank & Trust Co., Ky. App., 562 S.W.2d 656 (1978).
Because neither the trial court nor the parties included a
separate discussion of this cause of action, we have limited our
analysis as well.
7
Kentucky courts have not expressly adopted this doctrine.
-7-
personal motivation in the conspiracy, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine does not insulate them from liability for
engaging in the conspiracy.
Sabo has alleged that Payne and
Fulkerson acted "in violation of Owensboro city policy and
outside of the scope of their authority" when they participated
in a civil conspiracy to defame him and to remove him from his
position.
Second Amended Complaint at 11.
Moreover, Sabo has
alleged that Fulkerson was selfishly motivated to defame Sabo in
order that he (Fulkerson) would be promoted to the position of
Director of Administration and Finance, giving him a personal
stake in the outcome of the conspiracy.
Thus, Sabo has alleged
both sets of circumstances that would preclude application of the
"intracorporate conspiracy doctrine" as an insulator of Payne and
Fulkerson from liability.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court erred by dismissing this cause of action.
Our opinion should not be construed to indicate a
belief that Sabo's claims are well-founded; nor do we express any
conclusions with respect to the appellees' tactical decision to
test the sufficiency of the complaint.
We restrict our holding
carefully to a simple determination that under the facts as
recited in the pleadings, the rules of notice pleading do not
allow for the elimination of this cause of action at this early
stage. It may be that recourse to additional discovery will serve
as a basis for later motions for summary judgment.
However, it
is our carefully considered opinion that the complaint in this
action asserts facts sufficient to survive the motions to
dismiss.
-8-
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Daviess
Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Dennis D. Murrell
James R. Robinson
Louisville, KY
Dave Whalin
Sun S. Choy
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick D. Pace
Owensboro, KY
Dennis D. Murrell
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Patrick D. Pace
Owensboro, KY
-9-
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