DONALD R. DOWNING v. SHARON A. DOWNING
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
April 6, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003086-MR
DONALD R. DOWNING
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-FD-000843
v.
SHARON A. DOWNING
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Donald R. Downing appeals from a March 31, 1999,
order of the Jefferson Family Court which raised his child
support obligation for his two children from $2,112.00 per month
to $3,475.00 per month based upon a substantial increase in his
income.
He also appeals from a November 17, 1999, order which
denied his motion to reduce child support based upon a reduction
in his income.
The primary question presented in this appeal can
be stated as follows:
Where the combined parental gross income
exceeds the highest level set out in the child support
guidelines, may a trial court consider, among other factors, a
mathematical extrapolation of the guidelines in calculating the
appropriate level of child support?
From our review of the
record, we conclude that the trial court gave too much weight to
its projection of the child support guidelines.
In the absence
of sufficient findings regarding the other relevant factors, we
conclude that the trial court’s method of calculating child
support was an abuse of discretion.
However, the trial court’s
findings regarding Donald’s income are not clearly erroneous.
Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
additional hearing and findings.
The appellant, Donald R. Downing (Donald) and the
appellee, Sharon A. Downing (Sharon), were married in 1981.
Two
children were born of the marriage: Earon L. Downing, II (DOB
12/15/83) and Sean L. Downing (DOB 8/7/86).
On April 27, 1992,
Sharon filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the
Jefferson Family Court.
The court granted the decree of
dissolution on July 8, 1992.
The decree incorporated by
reference a property settlement agreement between the parties.
Among other provisions, Sharon received sole custody of the two
children.
Donald agreed to pay Sharon $400.00 per week in child
support, and to pay all of the children’s health care costs.
In
addition, Sharon received the marital residence and her
automobile, with Donald responsible for paying any debt on these
items.
In 1994, Sharon filed a motion to increase Donald’s
child support obligation and to require Donald to pay Earon’s
tutoring expenses.
A hearing was conducted before the Domestic
Relations Commissioner (DRC) in July 1994.
The DRC found that
Donald is the sole owner of a collection agency known as
-2-
Independent Collectors, Inc, (I.C.) and that he had a total
income of $17,491.00 per month from that business.
Based upon
the children’s extraordinary medical and psychological expenses,
as well as the fact that the parties’ combined income exceeded
the child support guidelines, the DRC recommended that the total
monthly support for the children be set at $2,200.00 per month,
of which Donald would be responsible for paying $2,112.00 per
month.
The trial court overruled Sharon’s exceptions to the
DRC’s report, and entered an order raising Donald’s child support
obligation as recommended.
In July 1998, Sharon filed another motion to increase
child support, pointing to a substantial increase in Donald’s
income.1
The matter was referred to a DRC, who conducted a
hearing and thereafter issued a report on February 8, 1999.
In
reviewing Sharon’s motion to increase child support, the DRC
found that, by the end of 1997, Donald’s monthly income had
increased to $57,000.00, almost $40,000.00 per month more than he
was earning in 1994.
In the DRC’s recommendations he noted the
difficulties in setting child support when the parents’ income
greatly exceeds the highest level set in the child support
guidelines:
1
At the same time, Sharon filed several other motions relating to support of the children. She filed
a motion to require Donald to fulfil his oral promise to pay the costs of the children’s private
education. Following the hearing, the DRC concluded that Sharon had not proven with reasonable
certainty the terms of any agreement by Donald to pay for the children’s private high school
education. Sharon also sought to require Donald to participate in family counseling with the children
and to pay the costs of the counseling. Following the hearing, the DRC included a recommended
order requiring Donald to participate in and to pay for the children’s counseling. However, the trial
court struck this portion of the DRC’s tendered order.
-3-
When child support is set outside of the
Guidelines, the Court is required to exercise
discretion in arriving at a fair and
equitable amount of support. In exercising
such discretion, the finder of fact may
consider the needs of the children. In this
case, there was very little evidence heard
dealing with the actual needs of the
children. Also, the finder of fact may
consider the lifestyle the children would
have enjoyed had the parties continued to be
together and married. The finder of fact may
also consider a “projection” of the
Guidelines.
A review of the Child Support Guidelines
under the column headed for two children
indicates that at the high income end, child
support increases at the rate of about 4% of
combined income. Taking into account the
Respondent’s income and the Petitioner’s
income using $57,000.00 per month for the
Respondent and $1,500.00 per month for the
Petitioner, and projecting the Guidelines,
the base monthly support would calculate to
$3,584.00 per month of which the Respondent
would have a 97% responsibility. This
calculates to $3,475.00 per month.2
2
In reaching this calculation, the DRC applied the child support guidelines to the first $15,000.00
of the parties’ combined monthly income. The DRC set additional child support by multiplying the
excess income by 4%, as follows:
$58,500.00
x
$15,000.00
highest income provided by the Guidelines
$43,500.00
S
combined monthly income of the parties
amount the parents’ income exceeds the Guidelines
.04
$ 1,740.00
+
$ 1,844.00
$ 3,584.00
percentage applied to income in excess of the Guidelines
projected base monthly support obligation for two children
for the amount of income exceeding the Guidelines
base monthly support obligation for two children for
parents’ combined monthly income of $15,000.00
projected base monthly support obligation for two children
with combined parental monthly income of $58,500.00
(continued...)
-4-
I will recommend the child support be
increased to $3,475.00 per month effective
July 30, 1998.3
Both Sharon and Donald filed exceptions to the DRC’s
recommendation.
The trial court overruled the exceptions and
increased Donald’s child support obligation as recommended by the
DRC.
In response to Sharon’s motion to increase child
support, Donald filed a motion to decrease his child support.
He
presented evidence that I.C. lost its collections contract with
the local cable company and was no longer able to generate the
high incomes to which he had become accustomed.
While the DRC
agreed that there was some evidence to support Donald’s claim
that his income from the corporation had decreased, the DRC was
not entirely convinced that Donald’s reduction in income was a
“substantial and continuing change” which would warrant a
reduction in his child support obligation.
that Donald had made similar claims in 1994.
The DRC also noted
As a result, the
DRC reserved a ruling on Donald’s motion.
Following an additional hearing, the DRC concluded that
Donald’s income had substantially decreased in the latter part of
1998.
“However, in 1999, it appears that his income train has
fully come up to steam and it further appears that the
2
(...continued)
x
.97
$ 3,476.48
3
Donald’s percentage of parents’ combined monthly income
Donald’s projected child support obligation
Record on Appeal [ROA] at 113-114.
-5-
corporation will have gross receipts to exceed the highest
previous year of 1997."4
Thereafter, the trial court accepted
the DRC’s recommendation that Donald’s motion for a reduction in
child support be denied.
This appeal followed.
Donald first argues that the trial court disregarded
the evidence that his income had decreased.
He contends that the
DRC should have accepted the testimony and documentary evidence
which showed that his income declined substantially after 1998.
For this reason, he asserts that the trial court erred in basing
the modification of his child support obligation on income he no
longer receives.
Furthermore, he also argues that he was
entitled to a reduction of his child support since his income has
now been reduced.
We disagree.
After extensively reviewing the documentary and other
evidence, the DRC determined that while Donald’s income from I.C.
decreased during 1998, his long-term earning capacity has not
changed significantly.
The DRC further expressed skepticism at
Donald’s claims that his business was experiencing difficulties
upon considering that he had made similar, unsupported claims at
the 1994 hearing.
Based upon the total circumstances and the
financial information provided at the hearing, the DRC concluded
that Donald’s reduced income was not a “substantial and
continuing change” which would justify a reduction in his child
support obligation under KRS 403.213.5 The trial court conducted
its own hearing on Donald’s exceptions to the DRC’s report and
4
ROA at 159.
5
See also Snow v. Snow, Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 668, 673 (2000).
-6-
found that the DRC did not abuse his discretion in determining
Donald’s income.
The factual findings of a commissioner, to the extent
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as findings of
the court.
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.6
We find no basis in the record to disturb the trial court’s
findings of fact.
Indeed, even viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Donald, his current income is still
considerably higher than it was in 1994.
Thus, we agree with the
trial court that there was no basis to decrease his child support
below the amount set in 1994.
Donald’s primary argument is that the manner in which
the trial court raised his child support obligation was an abuse
of discretion.
He contends that the trial court erred by
applying a projection or a linear extrapolation of the child
support guidelines as its main basis for setting the amount of
child support.
In addition, he complains that the amount of
child support set by the trial court was not based on any
evidence regarding the reasonable needs of the children.
As a
result, he asserts that the trial court acted arbitrarily by
increasing his child support.
The child support guidelines set out in KRS 403.212
serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support.
6
CR 52.01.
-7-
Courts may deviate
from the guidelines only upon making a specific finding that
application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.7
However, KRS 403.211(3)(e) specifically designates that “combined
monthly adjusted parental gross income in excess of the Kentucky
child support guidelines” is a valid basis for deviating from the
child support table.
Furthermore, the trial court may use its
judicial discretion to determine child support in circumstances
where combined adjusted parental gross income exceeds the
uppermost level of the guidelines table.8
The child support
table ends at the $15,000.00 per month level, so deviation from
the guidelines is clearly appropriate in this case.
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion
in considering a parent's assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support.9
A reviewing court should defer to
the lower court's discretion in child support matters whenever
possible.10
As long as the trial court’s discretion comports
with the guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in
writing, this Court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling in
this regard.11
unlimited.
However, a trial court’s discretion is not
The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
7
KRS 403.211(2).
8
KRS 403.212(5).
9
Redmon v. Redmon, Ky.App., 823 S.W.2d 463 (1992).
10
See Pegler v. Pegler, Ky. App., 895 S.W.2d 580 (1995).
11
Commonwealth v. Marshall, Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 396, 400-01 (2000).
-8-
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.12
Donald argues that the method used by the DRC in
calculating child support was arbitrary, leading to an arbitrary
amount.
The DRC set out three considerations for his
determination of the appropriate level of support: (1) the
reasonable needs of the children; (2) the standard of living
enjoyed by the parents; and (3)
a mathematical projection of the
child support guidelines.
Donald agrees that the first two
criteria are appropriate.
However, he notes that the DRC found
very little evidence regarding the actual needs of the children
or the lifestyle which the children would have enjoyed had the
parents remained married.
Rather, Donald contends that the DRC
based the amount of child support almost entirely on his
mathematical extrapolation from the child support guidelines.
As pointed out by both Donald and Sharon, the Kentucky
Child Support Guidelines are based on the “Income Shares Model.”
The basic premise of this model is that a child should receive
the same proportion of parental income that the child would have
received if the parents had not divorced.13
A review of the
Kentucky child support table further shows that it is based upon
12
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2000); Commonwealth
v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
13
See Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. 318, 609 A.2d 319 (Md. App., 1992); In re Marriage of Nimmo,
891 P.2d 1002 (Colo., 1995). See also Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation
and Application, § 407(b)(2) (1999 Supp.).
-9-
the assumption that as parental income increases, the proportion
of income spent on child support decreases.14
The more difficult question is whether child support
should continue to increase at the same rate when parental income
exceeds the highest amount set out in the guidelines.
Sharon
takes the position that this Court should adopt a “share the
wealth” approach.
Other courts adopting this approach have held
that children are entitled to share in the fruits of one parent’s
good fortune after a divorce.15
While support must be reasonable
under the circumstances, what amount is "reasonable" is defined
in relation to a child's "needs" and varies with the
circumstances and resources of the parties. The standard of
living to which a child is entitled will be measured in terms of
the standard of living attainable by the income available to the
parents rather than by evidence of the manner in which the
parents' income is expended and the parents' resulting
lifestyle.16
Under this “share the wealth” model, the trial
court may determine the reasonable needs of the children by
mathematically calculating child support over and above the
14
An examination of the child support table in KRS 403.212 bears out this model. Where the
combined monthly adjusted parental gross income is $1,000.00, the base child support for two
children is $303.00, or 30.3%; At $5,000.00, the base child support is $1,010.00, or 20.2%; At
$10,000.00, the base child support is $1,515.00, or 15.15%; And at the highest income on the chart,
$15,000.00 per month, the base child support is $1,844.00, or 12.23%. In this case, the DRC’s
calculation of the base monthly support works out to approximately 6.1% of Donald and Sharon’s
combined gross income ($3,584.00 / (57,000 + 1,500) = .0612). This percentage of income is about
one-half of the percentage used at the highest income level of the child support table.
15
Harris v. Harris, 714 A.2d 626, 633 (Vt., 1996).
16
White v. Marciano, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1032, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (Cal. App. 2 Distr,
1987).
-10-
maximum guidelines without entering specific findings as to the
needs of the children and their standard of living.17
We reject this approach and have great difficulty with
using a projection of the child support guidelines as the primary
basis for calculating child support.
An increase in child
support above the child’s reasonable needs primarily accrues to
the benefit of the custodial parent rather than the children.18
In addition, this approach effectively transfers most of the
discretionary spending on children to the custodial parent.
Furthermore, a strict reliance on linear extrapolation could
result in vast increases in child support unwarranted by the
children's actual needs.19
Beyond a certain point, additional
child support serves no purpose but to provide extravagance and
an unwarranted transfer of wealth.
While to some degree children
have a right to share in each parent’s standard of living, child
support must be set in an amount which is reasonably and
rationally related to the realistic needs of the children.
is sometimes referred to as the “Three Pony Rule.”
This
That is, no
child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs to be provided
more than three ponies.20
We recognize that the DRC did not use a straight-line
extrapolation to calculate Donald’s child support obligation.
Rather, as noted above, the DRC applied a considerably lower
17
Jones v. Jones, 472 N.W.2d 782, 784 (S.D., 1991).
18
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. App., 1992).
19
Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1014 (Utah App., 1996).
20
Matter of Marriage of Patterson, 920 P.2d 450, 455 (Kan., 1996).
-11-
percentage to the parents’ combined income above $15,000.00 than
the child support table uses.
Indeed, we cannot say that the
amount of child support ordered by the trial court was
unreasonable per se considering Donald’s income and other
resources.
Nevertheless, the DRC set child support based almost
entirely on the mathematical calculation.
In the absence of any
other supporting findings or evidence in the record, we must
conclude that the amount set by the DRC was arbitrary.
We do not agree with Donald that the highest applicable
amount set by the guidelines is the presumptively correct amount
of support.
To the contrary, once the trial court finds a valid
basis under KRS 403.211(3) for deviating from the guidelines
chart it has considerable discretion in setting child support
above the guidelines.
Had the legislature intended to make the
highest award in the schedule the presumptive basic support
obligation in all cases with combined monthly income over
$15,000.00, it would have so stated and would not have granted
the trial judge discretion in fixing those awards.
At the same time, we must note that discretion is a
two-edged sword.
The trial court may not substitute a mechanical
calculation for the exercise of its discretion.
While such a
calculation may be a useful tool in determining an appropriate
amount of child support, the amount reached through such a
calculation is not entitled to presumptive weight.
In this case,
we believe that the DRC gave presumptive weight to the amount
reached through his calculation.
-12-
At a minimum, any decision to set child support above
the guidelines must be based primarily on the child's needs, as
set out in specific supporting findings.21
There was no evidence
that the needs of the children decreased since Donald’s child
support was adjusted in 1994.
But likewise, the DRC found very
little evidence that the needs of the children had increased
since 1994.
Sharon contends that the evidence regarding the
children’s counseling and private school education expenses
supports the DRC’s conclusion.
However, the DRC considered those
issues separately from the motion to increase child support.
In determining the reasonable needs of the children,
the trial court should also take into consideration the standard
of living which the children enjoyed during and after the
marriage.
The fundamental premise of the income shares model is
that a child's standard of living should be altered as little as
possible by the dissolution of the family.
Consequently, the
concept of “reasonable needs” is flexible and may vary depending
upon the standard of living to which they have become
accustomed.22
Any assessment of the child’s reasonable needs should
also be based upon the parents' financial ability to meet those
needs. Factors which should be considered when setting child
support include the financial circumstances of the parties, their
station in life, their age and physical condition, and expenses
21
Stringer v. Brandt, 128 Or. App. 502, 506-07, 877 P.2d 100, 102 (1994).
22
Harris v. Harris, supra; White v. Marciano, supra.
-13-
in educating the children.23
The focus of this inquiry does not
concern the lifestyle which the parents could afford to provide
the child, but rather it is the standard of living which
satisfies the child’s reasonable and realistic needs under the
circumstances.
Thus, while a trial court may take a parent’s
additional resources into account, a large income does not
require a noncustodial parent to support a lifestyle for his
children of which he does not approve.24
Our recitation of factors which a trial court may
consider in modifying child support above the guidelines is by no
means exhaustive.
Rather, the court should take into account any
factors which affect the reasonable needs of the child under the
circumstances. Since Sharon seeks a modification of an existing
child support award, the trial court may factor in any increase
in the cost of living.
The trial court may also take into
account the period of time that the children reside with each
parent in setting child support.25
So long as there is evidence
in the record and a reasonable basis for setting child support
above the guidelines, this Court will not interfere with the
trial court’s discretion.
But we hold that a trial court abuses
its discretion when it relies primarily on a mathematical
23
Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. at 329, 609 A.2d at 324-25.
24
Donald claims that the trial court “usurped his parental authority to make lifestyle choices for his
children.” Yet a child is not expected to live at a minimal level of comfort while the noncustodial
parent is living a life of luxury. Moreover, Donald has not provided any evidence that his standard
of living has diminished, or what lifestyle he would deem appropriate for his children.
25
Downey v. Rogers, Ky. App., 847 S.W.2d 63 (1993).
-14-
calculation to set child support without any other supporting
findings or evidence.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Jefferson
Family Court increasing Donald’s child support obligation to
$3,475.00 per month, and we remand this matter for a further
hearing and findings as set out in this opinion.
The trial
court’s order denying Donald’s motion for a reduction in child
support is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Diana L. Skaggs
Sandra Ragland
Diana L. Skaggs & Associates
Louisville, Kentucky
John H. Helmers, Jr.
Rebecca L. Adams
Howard & Helmers, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Diana Skaggs
Louisville, Kentucky
John H. Helmers, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.