MICHAEL OSBORNE, in his capacity RAYMOND OSBORNE, deceased v. KENACRE LAND CORPORATION
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RENDERED:
April 20, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-002829-MR
MICHAEL OSBORNE, in his capacity
as Executor of the Estate of
RAYMOND OSBORNE, deceased
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE, JR., JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-CI-00100
KENACRE LAND CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Michael Osborne appeals from a Pike Circuit
Court order which denied a motion by Michael to revive an action
originally filed by Raymond Osborne as time barred by Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 395.278.
Raymond Osborne originally filed suit on January 25,
1988, against Kenacre Land Corporation for trespassing upon and
removing minerals from Raymond’s property.
While the action was
pending, Raymond died testate on September 13, 1997.
Raymond’s nephew, was named executor of Raymond’s estate.
Michael,
Michael
sought to revive Raymond’s action, by motion, pursuant to KRS
395.278, on September 12, 1998.1
The motion, however, was not
filed with the court until September 16, 1998.
The circuit court granted Osborne’s motion to revive the
action on September 18, 1998. Upon motion by Kenacre to reconsider
the ruling in favor of reviving the action based upon the running
of the allowable time period under KRS 395.278, the circuit court
set aside the original order reviving the action and granted
Kenacre’s motion to dismiss.
The sole issue on appeal is whether KRS 395.278 requires
that an application to revive an action be filed, consistent with
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 3.01, within one year after
the death of the deceased party, or be served, consistent with CR
5.02, within one year after the death of the deceased party.
KRS
395.278 states that “[a]n application to revive an action in the
name of the representative or successor of a plaintiff, or against
the representative or successor of a defendant, shall be made
within one (1) year after the death of a deceased party.”
Osborne
contends that the word “made” should be construed to mean that the
action is complete upon mailing of the motion, whereas Kenacre
urges that “made” should be construed to mean filed.2
1
September 12, 1998, was the date Michael allegedly served,
by mail, the application to revive Raymond’s action on Kenacre.
Kenacre alleges that Michael’s application bore a Monday, September
14, 1998, postmark. This distinction is immaterial because Michael
would have had until Monday, September 14, 1998, to mail the
application, if mailing was sufficient, because September 12, 1998,
fell on a Saturday. See Ky. R. Civ. Pro. (CR) 6.01.
2
See Ky. R. Civ. P.(CR) 5.02, which provides that “[s]ervice
by mail is complete upon mailing.”
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Osborne’s argument is premised on the mistaken assumption
that an application to revive an action after the death of a
deceased party is a pleading or other paper, therefore requiring
that CR 5 apply.
“a
statute
of
This Court has held, however, that KRS 395.278 is
limitation,
rather
than
a
statute
relating
to
pleading, practice or procedure, and the time limit within this
section is mandatory and not discretionary, thereby preventing a
party or the court from extending such time via CR 6.02.”3
An
action which is not revived within the one-year statutory period of
KRS 395.278 must be dismissed.4
Having determined that KRS 395.278 is a statute of
limitations, the next question is whether an action pursuant to KRS
395.278 must be filed or served within the one-year statutory
period.
Because KRS 395.278 does not fall within the ambit of a
pleading, practice or procedure, CR 5 does not apply.
Therefore,
mailing of the motion within the one-year statutory period is
inadequate to meet the time limit.
“A statute of limitations limits the time in which one
may bring suit after the cause of action accrues . . . .”5
According to CR 3.01, “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a summons or
3
Snyder v. Snyder, Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1989),
citing Mitchell v. Money, Ky. App., 602 S.W.2d 687 (1980).
4
5
See Snyder, supra, n. 3, at 72.
Coslow v. General Elec. Co., Ky., 877 S.W.2d 611, 612
(1994).
-3-
warning order thereon in good faith.”6
Construing these two rules
together, it is apparent that Michael had one year from the date of
Raymond’s
death
Raymond’s action.
in
which
to
file
his
application
to
revive
Because Raymond died on September 13, 1997, and
Michael’s application to revive Raymond’s action was not filed
until September 18, 1998, Michael failed to apply within the
applicable time frame.
Hence, Michael’s application to revive
Raymond’s action is time barred.
The order of Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joe F. Childers
Lexington, Kentucky
Joseph L. Hamilton
John A. Bartlett
STITES & HARBISON
Louisville, Kentucky
Calvin R. Tackett
BOLLING & TACKETT
Whitesburg, Kentucky
6
Emphasis supplied.
-4-
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