TIMOTHY THORSEN v. RONALD PENNINGTON
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RENDERED: January 19, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-002730-MR
TIMOTHY THORSEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-CI-00961
v.
RONALD PENNINGTON
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge. Boone Circuit Court granted Ronald Pennington’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
and
dismissed
Timothy
Thorsen’s
complaint seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when
Thorsen was struck by an automobile allegedly owned by Pennington
and driven by Leslie Lawson.
Thorsen’s complaint against Lawson
remains pending in the circuit court.
On March 17, 1997, Thorsen went to the apartment of his
step-daughter, Kristie Miller, where she was engaged in an argument
with Ronald Pennington, with whom she had a romantic relationship,
over property that he felt belonged to him.
Because of the heated
nature of the confrontation, Thorsen called the police and told
Pennington
of
their
pending
arrival.
Thorsen
alleges
that
Pennington forced his way into Miller’s apartment and verbally
threatened him.
When the police arrived at the scene, Pennington
left the area on foot leaving behind the automobile in which he had
driven to the apartment complex parked near the apartment.
The
police attempted to capture Pennington but were unsuccessful and
left the area.
A short time later, Leslie Lawson appeared and attempted
to remove the vehicle.
Thorsen asked her to give him the key to
Miller’s apartment that was on the key ring he believed belonged to
Pennington but was in Lawson’s possession.
request and left without the car.
Lawson refused the
Approximately twenty minutes
later, Lawson reappeared and again attempted to move the vehicle.
While she was driving out of the parking lot, Miller jumped onto
the rear of the vehicle and Thorsen tried to block its path at the
front.
While attempting to leave the scene, Lawson grazed Thorsen
with the side of the vehicle knocking him down.1
Lawson then
stopped the vehicle and gave Miller a key to the apartment from the
key ring.
Lawson then left in the car.
Thorsen call the police,
who returned and took a report of the incident.
Thorsen did not
seek immediate medical attention but was treated a few days later
for pain in his lower back and leg.
An MRI indicated that Thorsen
apparently had suffered an injury to his lower spine from the
incident.
1
Thorsen filed a criminal complaint against Lawson
charging the misdemeanor offense of wanton endangerment in the
second degree (Ky. Rev. Stat. 508.070).
-2-
On September 17, 1998, Thorsen filed a civil complaint
against both Lawson and Pennington which, inter alia, included a
count
against
Pennington
for
negligent
entrustment.
Thorsen
alleged that Pennington had entrusted his vehicle to Lawson and
that he “actually knew or by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known that [Lawson] was reckless in the operation of
motor vehicles.”
On January 28, 1999, Thorsen was deposed by
Pennington and admitted that he did not know the nature of the
relationship between Lawson and Pennington and had no information
that Pennington knew that Lawson had acted recklessly in operating
vehicles in the past.
On August 5, 1999, Pennington filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56
alleging that Thorsen had failed to present sufficient factual
evidence to support his claim of negligent entrustment.
Thorsen
filed a response to the motion asserting that genuine issues of
material fact existed sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Pennington filed a reply to the response.
On August 26, 1999, the
circuit court granted Pennington’s motion and dismissed Thorsen’s
complaint against him.
On September 7, 1999, Thorsen filed a CR
59.05 motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
After
Pennington responded, the court summarily denied the CR 59.05
motion, and this appeal followed.
CR 54.02(1) provides that:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or
third-party
claim,
or
when
multiple
parties
are
involved, the court may grant a final judgment upon one
-3-
or more but less than all of the claims or parties only
upon a determination that there is no just reason for
delay.
The judgment shall recite such determination and
shall recite that the judgment is final.
In the absence
of such recital, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates less than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims
or
parties,
and
the
order
or
other
form
of
decision is interlocutory and subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
The summary judgment granted by the circuit court recites
that it is “a final and appealable judgment.”
It does not,
however, recite, as required by CR 54.02(1), that “there is no just
reason for delay.”
That recitation is a prerequisite to the
invocation of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.2
Accordingly, this appeal from an interlocutory summary
judgment is dismissed and this case is remanded to Boone Circuit
Court for further proceedings
ALL CONCUR.
2
See Signer v. Arnold, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1969);
Fruchtenicht v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Ky., 451
S.W.2d 835, 837 (1969); Bellarmine College v. Hornung, Ky. App.,
662 S.W.2d 847, 848 (1984) “when a judgment or order is made final
as to less than all parties or claims, the judgment or order must
recite that it is final and appealable and that there is no just
cause for delay”); and see generally Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., 7
Kentucky Practice - Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, Rule 54.02,
Cmt. 7, p. 271 (1995).
-4-
Entered: January 19, 2001
/s/ Joseph R. Huddleston
Judge, Court of Appeals
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel R. Braun
Covington, Kentucky
Robert C. Cetrulo
Covington, Kentucky
-6-
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