CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE SMITH, DECEASED v. GARY W. YATES; COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF ELIZABETHTOWN; JERRY M. HATFIELD; LINDA PETERS; AND SANDRA ASH CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE SMITH, DECEASED v. GARY W. YATES; COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF ELIZABETHTOWN; JERRY M. HATFIELD; LINDA PETERS; AND SANDRA ASH CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002729-MR
CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX
OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE
SMITH, DECEASED
v.
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00024
GARY W. YATES; COCA-COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF ELIZABETHTOWN; JERRY M.
HATFIELD; LINDA PETERS; AND SANDRA ASH
AND
NO.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00024
GARY W. YATES; COCA-COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF ELIZABETHTOWN; JERRY M.
HATFIELD; LINDA PETERS; AND SANDRA ASH
AND
APPELLEES
2000-CA-000041-MR
CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX
OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE
SMITH, DECEASED
v.
APPELLANT
NO.
APPELLEES
2000-CA-000361-MR
CATHERINE WEBB, ADMINISTRATIX
OF THE ESTATE OF HARRY DEWAYNE
SMITH, DECEASED
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00024
v.
GARY W. YATES; COCA-COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF ELIZABETHTOWN; JERRY M.
HATFIELD; LINDA PETERS; AND SANDRA ASH
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
McANULTY, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
In these consolidated appeals by Catherine
Webb, Administratrix of the Estate of Harry Dewayne Smith, we
consider orders of the Hardin Circuit Court granting summary
judgment to the appellees in a negligence lawsuit stemming from a
series of three related automobile accidents.
claimed the life of Smith.
The third accident
Appeal 1999-CA-002729-MR is from an
order granting summary judgment to appellee Jerry M. Hatfield;
Appeal 2000-CA-000041-MR is from an order granting summary
judgment to appellees Gary W. Yates and Coca-Cola Bottling
Company of
Elizabethtown; and Appeal 2000-CA-000361-MR is from
an order granting summary judgment to appellee Linda Peters.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding (1)
the circumstances surrounding the accidents and (2) whether the
various appellees were negligent in causing the death of Smith,
the appellees are not entitled to summary judgment, and, as to
each appeal, we reverse and remand.
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These are summary judgment cases, and, in each
individual case, we are required to review the facts in the light
most favorable to Smith’s estate, and resolve all doubts in favor
of the estate.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Epperson, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 413, 414 (1996).
The material details
of the accidents as set forth in the discovery depositions,
beyond certain superficial facts, vary drastically.
Three
separate appeals are considered herein, and in our review of a
particular appeal, in order to view the facts in the light most
favorable to the estate, we must accept different facts as true
depending upon the appeal under consideration.
There is no
single set of facts most favorable to the estate.
To accommodate
for this problem, we first set forth a general overview of the
accidents.
However, as each individual appeal is addressed, so
as to view the facts in the light most favorable to the estate,
we accept different facts as being true depending upon the
appellee.
Sometime shortly after 6:00 a.m. on December 5, 1997,
in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, appellee Jerry Hatfield was traveling
southbound on the US 31W bypass (Elizabethtown bypass) in a Ford
Ranger pickup truck just south of the College Street
intersection.
The Elizabethtown bypass at this point has three
driving lanes, a paved left shoulder, and a paved right shoulder.
It had snowed the night before, snow and patches of ice were on
the highway, and a freezing rain may have begun to fall.
Hatfield approached and crossed the U.S. 31W bypass bridge
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As
spanning U.S. 62 at a speed of 45 miles per hour, his truck spun
out of control, struck the right concrete bridge railing, and
came to rest angled north and blocking the entire right paved
shoulder1 of the roadway and blocking some portion of the rightmost driving lane.
Hatfield’s vehicle was disabled due to the
accident and had to be towed from the scene.
Linda Peters was following Hatfield’s pickup truck in a
Ford F-150 pickup truck.
According to Peters, she saw the
Hatfield accident and, as a precaution against being struck by
the Hatfield vehicle, she slowed or stopped her truck.
The
Peters vehicle was thereafter rear-ended by a Chevy Cavalier
driven by Sandra Ash.
The point of impact in the Ash-Peters
crash was south of the point of rest of the Ranger.
As a result
of this collision, Ash’s vehicle came to rest blocking the leftmost driving lane, according to Hatfield’s testimony, or,
according to Ash, the entire left shoulder and part of the leftmost lane.
The Peters vehicle came to rest south of the Ranger
parked along the right shoulder.
According to Hatfield, the Ash-
Peters wreck occurred three to four minutes after his wreck;
according to Peters, the accidents occurred contemporaneously.
Meanwhile, Gary Yates, also southbound on the bypass,
approached the accident scene driving a commercial Coca-Cola
delivery truck.
Yates testified that he observed headlights
1
The highway shoulders on the bridge are substantially
narrower than the shoulders along the regular course of the
highway, and are less than the width of a car.
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spinning in the road, turned on his emergency blinkers, slowed,
and then stopped, his truck at the northern entrance to the
bridge.
According to Yates, all driving lanes were blocked by
vehicles, people were mingling in the roadway, and he could not
drive the truck through the accident scene; however, other
testimony states that the middle lane was clear and that Yates
could have driven on through the multiple-accident scene.
In any
event, Yates stopped his delivery truck in the middle driving
lane, shifted to park, and was preparing to exit his vehicle when
the truck was struck in the rear by a car being driven by Harry
Dewayne Smith, the appellant’s decedent.
collision.
Smith was killed in the
Police Officer Eddie McGarrah estimated in his police
report that Smith was traveling 55 - 60 miles per hour at the
time of the crash; the speed limit at that section of the bypass
was 55 miles per hour.
Ash testified that the Yates-Smith accident occurred
within 10 - 15 seconds after the Ash-Peters crash.
Yates
testified that he had been stopped for about one minute prior to
the crash.
Hatfield, on the other hand, testified that he
lingered at the scene for five minutes and then went for help
and, at that time, based upon his observations, the Yates-Smith
accident had yet to occur.
Smith’s estate eventually filed suit against Hatfield,
Yates, Coca-Cola, Peters, and Ash.
On November 3, 1999, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Jerry Hatfield; on
December 29, 1999, the trial court granted summary judgment to
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Yates and Coca-Cola; and on February 4, 2000, the trial court
granted summary judgment to Linda Peters.2
Smith’s estate filed
these three appeals challenging the trial court’s orders granting
summary judgment. The cases were subsequently ordered
consolidated by this court.
Appeal No. 2000-CA-000041-MR
For purposes of reviewing the trial court’s three
summary judgment orders, it is beneficial to begin with the
Yates/Coca-Cola appeal, Appeal No. 2000-CA-000041-MR.
In order to qualify for summary judgment, the movant
must “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
CR 56.03.
On appeal, the standard of review of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The
record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Summary judgment
should only be used when, as matter of law, it appears that it
would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at
2
Summary judgment was not granted to Sandra Ash. Ash was
uninsured at the time of the accident and is in default in the
estate’s lawsuit against her.
-6-
trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.
Id. at 483 (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
The basic facts were stated above; however, for
purposes of this individual appeal, we must consider the facts in
the light most favorable to the estate’s position that the trial
court erroneously granted summary judgment to Coca-Cola and
Yates.
This requires us to accept the testimony which supports
the greatest elapse of time between Yates’s arrival upon the
scene and the Yates-Smith crash.
In this vein we accept (1)
Peters’ testimony that her accident and Hatfield’s accident
occurred contemporaneously; (2) Yates’s testimony that he was
near enough to observe the previous accidents; and (3) Hatfield’s
testimony that he was at the accident scene for as long as five
minutes prior to leaving, during which period, to his
observation, the Yates-Smith crash did not occur.3
Moreover, we
accept Yates’s testimony that he stopped his truck at a distance
of 375 to 400 feet from Hatfield’s Ranger.
In addition, though
Yates testified that he stopped because he could not get through
the accident scene because the road was obstructed by the wrecked
vehicles and mingling people, we accept the conflicting testimony
that the middle lane was clear, and that Yates could have chosen
3
While Hatfield’s testimony may appear extreme in comparison
with other witnesses’ testimony, nevertheless, as the clear
inference to be drawn from his testimony places the Coke truck as
sitting in the middle of the road for the longest period, we must
accept it for purposes of summary judgment.
-7-
to drive his truck safely through the accident scene and
proceeded south.
Further, based upon Yates’s testimony that he
was 375 to 400 feet from Hatfield’s Ranger, we make the inference
that he could have moved his truck to the right shoulder of the
bridge, thereby avoiding blocking the open middle driving lane.
Finally, based upon Officer McGarrah’s testimony that, upon his
arrival, he did not recall observing rear lighting on the Coke
truck, we infer that a jury may conclude that the rear lighting
of the Coke truck was not in operation prior to the Yates-Smith
crash.
Smith’s estate’s claim against Yates and Coca-Cola is a
tort negligence lawsuit. “It is a fundamental rule of tort
liability that for negligence to be established there must have
been (1) a duty owing decedent by appellants, (2) a breach of
that duty which (3) was the proximate cause of the injuries which
resulted in (4) damages.
never be presumed.”
257, 258 (1980);
267 (1997).
Negligence must be proven; it will
Helton v. Montgomery, Ky. App., 595 S.W.2d
Alderman v. Bradley, Ky. App. 957 S.W.2d 264,
"The concept of liability for negligence expresses a
universal duty owed by all to all."
Wemyss v. Coleman, Ky., 729
S.W.2d 174, 180 (1987) (quoting Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City of
London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1985)).
“The rule is that
every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise
ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury."
Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d
328, 332 (1987); Seigle v. Jasper, Ky. App. 867 S.W.2d 476, 483
-8-
(1993).
Motorists owe each other a duty of ordinary care.
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. V. Kelley, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 535,
536 (1970).
Among the specific duties imposed upon a driver are
the duties
(1) to refrain from crossing the center line; (2) to
have his automobile under reasonable control;
speed no greater than was reasonable;
care generally to avoid collision;
(3) to drive at a
(4) to exercise ordinary
and (5) to keep a lookout.
See Bass v. Williams, Ky. App., 839 S.W.2d 559, 561 - 562 (1992).
Aside from the general automobile negligence principles
cited above, in the case of the Yates-Smith crash, an additional
important tort negligence principle applies, negligence per se.
KRS 189.450 provides that
(1) No person shall stop a vehicle, leave it
standing or cause it to stop or to be left
standing upon any portion of the roadway;
provided, however, that this section shall
not be construed to prevent parking in front
of a private residence off the roadway or
street in a city or suburban area where such
parking is otherwise permitted, as long as
the vehicle so parked does not impede the
flow of traffic. This subsection shall not
apply to:
. . . .
(d) Any vehicle required to stop by reason of
an obstruction to its progress.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that violation
of a traffic statute is negligence per se, or negligence as a
matter of law.
(1971);
Woosley v. Smith, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 737, 738
Ross v. Jones, Ky.,
316 S.W.2d 845 (1958);
Parham, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 945 (1952).
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Saddler v.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
estate, upon Yates’s arrival at the accident scene he had a clear
and open lane through which to drive the Coke truck.
Alternatively, Yates had sufficient room, 375 to 400 according to
his own testimony, and ample time, five minutes based upon the
inferences to be drawn from Hatfield’s testimony, to move his
truck onto either the left or right shoulder of the bridge.
It
is not impossible that a jury would conclude that Yates breached
his duty of ordinary care by failing to remove his truck from the
open middle lane and by, instead, remaining parked in the only
open driving lane in violation of a statute proscribing such
conduct.
Further, in light of the testimony that there was an
open lane, a jury may conclude that the exception provided by KRS
189.450(d) is not applicable, thereby affixing fault upon Yates
and his employer under the principles of negligence per se.
In support of summary judgment, Yates and Coca Cola
rely heavily upon Clardy v. Robinson, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 651 (1955).
In Clardy, a grain truck headed northbound came upon a hay truck
broke down along the southbound side of the road.
The hay truck
driver, while examining his truck, was waving around a
flashlight.
The grain truck driver saw the disabled hay truck
and the waving flashlight, thought he was being waved down, and
stopped.
Within a matter of seconds a coal truck, which had been
following the grain truck some distance behind, struck the grain
truck in the rear, killing a coal truck passenger.
All of the
witnesses, except the driver of the coal truck, testified that
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stop lights and other lights on the back of the grain truck were
burning at the time of the accident and after.
The trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the driver of the grain truck and
this was affirmed in the Clardy opinion.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
estate, however, the present case is distinguishable from Clardy.
In this case, Yates testified that he was near enough to observe
Hatfield’s spinning vehicle, thereby placing Yates at the scene
contemporaneously with the Hatfield wreck.
Hatfield testified
that he was at the bridge for as long as five minutes following
his accident and that, during this period, he did not observe the
Smith-Yates accident. In light of other testimony that the SmithYates crash occurred in close proximity to Hatfield’s vehicle, it
may be inferred from the foregoing that Yates sat in the middle
lane for as long as five minutes. This case, therefore, involves,
at least for purposes of summary judgment, a truck stopped for
minutes, not seconds, as in Clardy.
this case.
Clardy is not controlling in
We believe Butts v. Wright, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 653, 654
(1967) provides a better rule in this case:
[T]here is no hard and fast rule which can be
laid down in determining the question of
negligence of a person failing to observe the
presence of a standing vehicle ahead in time
to stop or avoid it in safety. The
surrounding conditions and circumstances of
the particular case should be considered by
the jury. The driver of the approaching
vehicle is under the duty to exercise
ordinary care, having regard for any unusual
or extraordinary circumstances.
-11-
While a jury may ultimately find that Yates exercised
ordinary care in his conduct when he came upon the accident
scene, and that Smith was solely responsible for the crash,
nevertheless, because it would not be impossible for the jury to
find Yates partially at fault under the principles of comparative
negligence, see Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), Yates
and Coca Cola were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s December 29, 1999 order
granting summary judgment to Yates and Coca Cola and remand for
further proceedings.
Appeal 1999-CA-002729-MR
Next, we consider the trial court’s granting of summary
judgment in favor of appellee Jerry Hatfield.
Viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to the estate’s position that the
trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Hatfield, it
may reasonably be inferred that the events of the morning of
December 5, 1998, amounted to a single chain-reaction accident
which was triggered when Hatfield lost control of his truck.
Hatfield testified that while crossing the bridge at 45
mph his truck slid on the ice and he lost control of his vehicle.
Peters testified that she was immediately behind the Hatfield
truck, that she applied her breaks to avoid hitting the Hatfield
truck, and that she was hit by Ash before the Hatfield truck came
to rest.
Ash testified that the Coke truck approached to within
10 ft. of the Ranger, stopped within 10 to 15 seconds after the
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Ash-Peters wreck, and that Smith crashed into the Coke truck 5
seconds after that.
Accepting the foregoing testimony as true,
the elapsed time between the Hatfield accident and the SmithYates crash was only 15 to 20 seconds, and the three individual
wrecks amounted to, in effect, a single chain-reaction accident
precipitated by the initial Hatfield wreck.
In addition to the foregoing, we accept Hatfield’s
testimony that he was driving 45 miles per hour when his truck
spun out of control; the testimony that the highways were covered
with patches of ice and snow that morning; Yates’ testimony that
a freezing rain had begun to fall; and Investigating Officer
Eddie McGarrah’s testimony that the bridge was so slick it was
difficult to walk on it.
Hatfield had a duty to observe the hazardous road
conditions and to keep his truck under control.
Under the
principles of comparative negligence, it would not be impossible
for a jury to conclude that Hatfield was partially at fault in
causing a chain-reaction accident on the basis that he was
driving too fast for the road conditions as they existed the
morning of December 5, 1997.
Drawing all inferences in favor of
the estate, Hatfield breached his duty to keep his vehicle under
control by driving too fast for the road conditions.
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
Hatfield’s comparative fault in causing the series of accidents
that led to Smith’s death, the trial court erred in granting
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summary judgment to Hatfield, and we reverse the trial court’s
order of November 3, 1999, and remand for further proceedings.
Appeal 2000-CA-000361-MR
Lastly, we turn to the appeal granting summary judgment
in favor of Linda Peters.
As with the above defendants, the
trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Linda Peters.
For purposes of the Peters summary judgment appeal, we
accept Hatfield’s testimony that the Peters-Ash wreck occurred
several minutes after his accident, and that when the Hatfield
truck came to rest, it blocked at most the right shoulder and
part of the right-most driving lane, leaving two driving lanes
and the left shoulder open.
We further accept the testimony of
Ash that Peters came to a complete stop south of the disabled
Hatfield truck.
If Hatfield and Ash’s testimony on these points
is taken as true, it would not be impossible for a jury to
believe that Peters was negligent for stopping and blocking the
highway rather than continuing south on the bypass.
Under these
facts, the jury may believe that Peters was “rubbernecking”
rather than, as Peters testified, avoiding the spinning Hatfield
truck.
In addition, Ash testified that the break-lights on the
Peters vehicle did not work, implicating negligence per se, which
a jury may believe was a contributing factor in the Ash-Peters
crash.
As with the Hatfield appeal, we also accept the testimony
of Peters that the Coke truck arrived 10 to 15 seconds after the
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Ash-Peters wreck and that Smith crashed into the Coke truck
within 5 seconds after that.
Based upon the foregoing, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether any portion of the fault in Dewayne
Smith’s December 5, 1998 accidental death should be assessed to
Peters.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s February 4, 2000
order granting summary judgment to Linda Peters and remand for
further proceedings.
Summary
The discovery in this case reflects a tremendous
disagreement regarding the facts surrounding the December 5, 1997
accident, particularly as to timing, road conditions, distances,
and whether the middle driving lane was open.
There are an
abundance of genuine issues of material fact.
Under our
comparative fault system, depending upon which facts are
ultimately believed by a jury, any, all, or none of the appellees
could bear some portion of fault for the accidental death of
Harry Dewayne Smith.
To summarize, as to each of the appeals considered
herein, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment is
vacated, and the cases are remanded for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
GARY W. YATES AND COCACOLA BOTTLING COMPANY
OF ELIZABETHTOWN:
Kim F. Quick
Arnett, Quick, Coleman & Shaw
Elizabethtown, KY
William P. Swain
Phillips Parker Orberson &
Moore, PLC
Louisville, KY
Kenneth F. Smart
Leitchfield, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JERRY
HATFIELD:
David S. Strite
Quang D. Nguyen
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LINDA
PETERS:
Beth A. Lochmiller
Coleman Easton Lochmiller &
Hall
Elizabethtown, KY
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