PAUL D. YORK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
March 16, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002689-MR
PAUL D. YORK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CR-00003
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Paul Dwayne York, appeals from an
October 28, 1999 order by the Bracken Circuit Court, denying his
motion to expunge the criminal records associated with his
indictment in Action No. 88-CR-00003.
We find that the trial
court’s denial of the motion without elucidation and in the
absence of any evidence in the record constituted an abuse of
discretion.
Hence, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand
for further factual findings.
On March 7, 1988, York and a co-defendant, William
Turner, were indicted by the Bracken County Grand Jury on two
counts of burglary in the second degree.
Following a jury trial,
York was acquitted of the charges.
In October 1990, York filed a
motion pursuant to KRS 17.142 to order segregation of the records
from that arrest and indictment.
The trial court denied the
motion, but this Court, in a published opinion, reversed and
remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of an order
segregating the records.1
The trial court entered an order directing all law
enforcement agencies to segregate the records, but the court
concluded that it did not have the authority to order the
Corrections Cabinet or the Department of Probation and Parole to
do so.
In response, York brought an original action in this
Court seeking a writ of mandamus.
This Court agreed with York
that KRS 17.142 applies to all public agencies, and the trial
court was ordered to enter the segregation order sought by York.2
The trial court issued the orders as directed.
However, in
August 1992, York filed a motion seeking to hold the Corrections
Cabinet in contempt for failure to comply with the order.
The
trial court denied the motion for sanctions after determining
that the Department of Corrections had no records relating to the
indictment.
On May 22, 1999, York filed a motion, pursuant to KRS
431.076, for expungement of his court records relating to
Indictment No. 88-CR-00003.
On May 28, 1999, prior to any
response by the Commonwealth, the trial court denied the motion
1
York v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 815 S.W.2d 415 (1991).
2
York v. Richard L. Hinton, Judge, Ky. App., No. 92-CA007-OA (Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandamus entered
March 16, 1992).
-2-
on a form order.
Thereafter, York renewed his motion and
requested that the trial court make specific findings of fact
pursuant to CR 52.01.
On October 28, 1999, the trial court
overruled the motion without making any findings.
The
Commonwealth did not file a response to this motion.
On appeal, York argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion.3
We agree.
KRS 431.076(4)
grants the trial court considerable discretion in determining
whether a motion for expungement of records should be granted.
However, the trial court’s ruling must be accompanied by some
articulation on the record of the court's resolution of the
factual, legal, and discretionary issues presented.4
The
Commonwealth asserts that there were valid reasons for the trial
court to deny York’s motion to expunge the records of his
indictment.
However, given the current state of the record, this
Court is not required to guess what those reasons might have
been.5
3
York also makes much of the fact that on two prior appeals
this Court reversed the trial court’s rulings denying his motions
to segregate his records. However, the prior two appeals arose
from orders issued by the Hon. Richard L. Hinton. In 1994, the
Hon. Robert I. Gallenstein succeeded Judge Hinton as circuit
judge for the 19th Judicial Circuit. Hence, York’s inference of
recalcitrance on the part of the trial judge is not warranted.
4
Greathouse v. American National Bank and Trust Co., Ky.
App., 796 S.W.2d 868, 870 (1990).
5
According to the Commonwealth, York and Turner were also
indicted in Mason and Fleming Counties on unrelated burglary
charges. The Commonwealth states that York was convicted of the
burglaries in those cases, but the Kentucky Supreme Court set
aside the Mason County convictions. The Commonwealth argues that
this Court is entitled to take judicial notice of York’s other
court records. KRE 201(f); Newberg v. Jent, Ky.App., 867 S.W.2d
(continued...)
-3-
Furthermore, we do not find the cases from other
jurisdictions which are cited by the Commonwealth to be
persuasive.
In Earle v. District of Columbia,6 the trial court
was applying a judicially created rule allowing for expungement
of arrest records where the charge is dismissed prior to trial.
As previously established by the District of Columbia courts, the
rule requires the movant to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he did not commit the crime charged.7
Likewise,
in United States v. Bagley,8 the Federal courts follow a commonlaw rule which allows expungement of criminal records in unusual
and extreme cases.
The movant’s indictment was dismissed after
weapons seized during an illegal search were excluded, and
thereafter he moved to expunge the records of the charges.
A
federal district court held that the movant had failed to prove
that expungement was warranted under these circumstances.
The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding that “we
‘find[] it difficult to imagine that expun[ction], a remedy to be
used in extreme circumstances, should be exercised every time a
case is dismissed because evidence is suppressed’."9
5
(...continued)
207 (1993). However, it is inappropriate for this Court to take
judicial notice of records which are not included in the record
under review. Samples v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 151, 153
(1998).
6
479 A.2d 877 (D.C. App., 1984).
7
See also District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175
(D.C. App., 1979).
8
9
899 F.2d 707 (8th Cir., 1990).
Id.
at 708.
-4-
Earle and Bagley are clearly distinguishable from the
present case.
First, our expungement proceeding is a statutorily
created proceeding.
There is nothing in KRS 431.076 which
requires the movant to show exceptional circumstances or to prove
that he or she did not commit the offense charged.
Furthermore,
the charges which York seeks to have expunged were not dismissed
prior to trial.
Rather, he was acquitted on the charges
following a jury trial.
We see no basis for requiring him to now
prove that he did not commit the offense.
In addition, unlike
Earle or Bagley, in which the trial court explained why
expungement would not be allowed, the trial court in this case
stated no basis for its decision to deny the motion to expunge
the records.
Chesler v. People,10 involved a statutory expungement
proceeding and is more instructive to this case, although not in
the manner suggested by the Commonwealth.
The Illinois court
held that a trial court may consider post-disposition behavior if
that conduct is relevant to the charges for which the movant
seeks expungement.
However, the court also held that a trial
court abuses its discretion if its decision to deny a expungement
petition is not based upon any evidence of substance.
Illinois’s statutory expungement procedure11 sets out
more specific criteria under which a movant may establish
eligibility for expungement than does KRS 431.076.
10
Nevertheless,
309 Ill. App. 3d 145, 722 N.E.2d 668, 242 Ill. Dec. 884
(Ill. App. 1st Distr., 1999).
11
20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2630/5
-5-
both Illinois and Kentucky grant the trial court considerable
discretion in determining whether expungement is appropriate.
However, the trial court’s exercise of this discretion must be
based upon evidence in the record.
As the record in this case
now stands, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s
decision.
We recognize that KRS 431.036 does not require the
trial court to conduct a hearing on a motion to expunge records.
However on remand, the trial court must state its reasons for
denying the motion based on the record.
In the alternative, the
Commonwealth may submit evidence in opposition to York’s motion
to expunge the records of his indictment in Action No. 88-CR00003, and the trial court could be within its discretion to deny
York’s motion based upon that evidence.
However, and
particularly in light of York’s motion under CR 52.01 for
specific factual findings, the trial court’s failure to set out
its reasons for denying the expungement motion renders any
meaningful appellate review impossible.
Therefore, we must set
aside the trial court’s order and remand for further factual
findings.
Accordingly, the order of the Bracken Circuit Court is
vacated and this matter is remanded for further factual findings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.