BART ALLEN ADKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 18, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002666-MR
BART ALLEN ADKINS
and CLELAND BLAKE, M.D.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00126
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, and MCANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: Bart Allen Adkins appeals from an October 6, 1999,
judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court.
A jury verdict found him
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree (Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 507.040), and the court sentenced him to serve
eight years in prison.
Adkins was charged with murder in the death of sixteenmonth-old Breanna Noe.
He claims that the trial court erred in:
(1) denying his motion to change venue, (2) admitting into
evidence his statement to police, and (3) excluding the opinion
of his expert witness concerning the time of the injury to the
child.
Adkins also claims that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to prove the
cause of Breanna’s death according to a reasonable medical
probability.
Finally, Dr. Cleland Blake has joined Adkins’s
appeal in order to address the trial court’s ruling with respect
to the proper amount of his fee.
Our review of the record
convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
any of its rulings challenged in this appeal; thus, we affirm the
judgment in all respects.
Adkins was a twenty-six-year-old police officer
employed by the Pioneer Village Police Force.
He had lived with
Breanna’s mother, Christy Tracy, and Breanna’s twin brother,
Blake Noe, for a little more than a month when Breanna died on
November 26, 1997.
On the day of her death, Adkins had arrived
home from work at about 6:30 in the morning.
An hour later,
Tracy left for work, leaving both Breanna and Blake, who were
asleep in their cribs, in Adkins’s care.
At 12:30 that
afternoon, Adkins called 911 because Breanna was not breathing.
The child was transported to a hospital in Louisville where she
died later that evening.
After Breanna’s death, Adkins exhibited signs of
depression and anxiety and expressed suicidal comments.
He
voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric unit at Norton
Hospital and was placed under a suicide watch.
In the meantime,
an autopsy revealed that Breanna had died from a closed head
injury as a result of having been violently shaken.
The next
evening, Kentucky State Police detectives, Robert Melton and
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David Lee, went to the hospital to talk with Adkins.
He
originally told the police that he had found the child limp and
unresponsive; that he picked her up and shook her in an effort to
revive her; and that he then performed CPR and called for help.
When the investigators intimated their disbelief at this account,
Adkins then admitted that Breanna had been crying and that he
lost control and shook her to get her to be quiet.
The
detectives taped a portion of the interview with Adkins in which
he admitted shaking Breanna.1
He was arrested the next day and
was eventually sent to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center (KCPC) for a psychological evaluation.
Despite his statement to the police detectives, Adkins
nonetheless maintained that he was innocent.
He hired Dr.
Cleland Blake as an expert witness to review the postmortem
examination of Breanna and various other materials.
Dr. Blake
concluded that Breanna did indeed die as a result of having been
shaken.
However, based on the degree of inflammatory response in
the skin and scalp and the development of lamellation (layering)
in the blood clot that formed as a result of the shaking, Dr.
Blake opined that the interval between the shaking of Breanna and
the time of her death had to exceed ten or twelve hours.
After
receiving Dr. Blake’s report, the Commonwealth moved for a
hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509
U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
1
At the
Although the tape-recorded statement was introduced at
Adkins’s trial, there is no transcription of the statement
anywhere in the record. Thus, we cannot assess the full impact
of Adkins’s confession.
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conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Dr. Blake
could not testify “as to a specific dating of the thrombus that
developed as a result of the injury to Breanna.”
Adkins also made two pre-trial motions in limine:
one
to suppress his statement given to police officers the day after
Breanna’s death and the other to obtain a change in venue.
A
hearing on both motions was conducted on November 16, 1998, and
both motions were denied.
1999.
Adkins was eventually tried in August
Instructed that it could find Adkins guilty of murder,
second-degree manslaughter, or reckless homicide, the jury found
him "not guilty" of the crime of murder but convicted him under
the instruction on second-degree manslaughter.
Adkins’s motion
for a new trial was denied on October 6, 1999, at which time the
sentence recommended by the jury was imposed by the court.
Dr.
Blake, who had already been paid $6,700 for his services as
Adkins’s expert, filed a motion and affidavit seeking an
additional $11,540.93 for his services.
The trial court approved
only $3000 of the additional amount sought.
Adkins and Dr. Blake
filed a joint notice of appeal on November 3, 1999.
Adkins first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a change of venue.
He contends that the
case was “one of the most, if not the most, publicized case
before the Bullitt Circuit Court in a generation.
was extensive.”
Press coverage
In making his case for a change of venue, Adkins
called several witnesses who testified that they did not believe
that he could get a fair trial in Bullitt County.
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The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the
testimony was “not sufficient” to order a change of venue and
observed that “[m]any of the witnesses who are also law
enforcement officers related that they had heard that the
Defendant would be convicted because he was a police officer and
not because of any pre-trial publicity.”
However, the trial
court’s order provided that if it became apparent during voir
dire that “there has been prejudicial news coverage occurring
prior to trial and that the effect of such news coverage is
reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial,” the court would
“reconsider” granting the motion.
Change of venue is an issue resting soundly within the
discretion of the trial court:
“[w]hether to grant a change of
venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Gill
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 369 (1999); see also, Whitler
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 810 S.W.2d 505, 507 (1991), adding that
“[a]n examination of jurors on their voir dire is considered to
be the best test as to whether local prejudice exists.”
It is
firm precedent that a trial judge’s decision as to whether
pretrial publicity warrants a change in venue is to be accorded
great weight on appellate review.
The trial judge has wide discretion in
granting a change in venue in criminal cases,
on motion either of [the] defendant or [the]
Commonwealth, in situations where it appears
that a fair trial cannot be had. There must
be a clear showing of abuse of that
discretion before we will disturb the action
of the trial court.
Hatton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1969); see
also, Commonwealth v. Averitt, Ky., 241 S.W.2d 989 (1951).
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This
deference to the trial judge is based on the reasoning that he or
she “is present in the county and presumed to know the
situation.”
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 716
(1991).
While there are “exceptional cases” in which “the
degree and the bias of pretrial publicity can be so great so that
prejudice may be presumed,”
Gill, at 369-370, a review of the
record reveals that this is not one of those cases.
Unlike the
situation in the case of Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d
412 (1994), cited by Adkins, the trial court had no trouble
selecting a jury to try Adkins.
Adkins points out that nineteen
of the original thirty-four prospective jurors “admitted knowing
something about the case from media accounts.”
However, as
stated in Montgomery, supra, the test is not whether the juror
“may have heard, talked, or read about a case” but rather whether
“there is a reasonable likelihood that the accounts or
descriptions or the investigation and judicial proceedings have
prejudiced the defendant.”
Montgomery, supra at 716, citing
Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 568 S.W.2d 232, 235 (1978).
We
cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for change of venue.
Foster v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670, 675 (1992).
Adkins next argues that the trial court clearly erred
in failing to suppress his tape-recorded statement made to the
police detectives.
Although Adkins was given his Miranda2
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966).
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warnings and signed a waiver acknowledging that he understood
those rights, he contends that he was in a catatonic state and
that the medical evidence established that he was “not able to
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right[s].”
The record indeed reveals that the psychiatrists who
treated Adkins during his brief stay in the hospital believed
that at the time of his interview with the police, he did not
have the requisite mental ability to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his legal rights.
Dr. Helen Davis
testified that her observation of Adkins revealed that he was in
an acutely distressed and was exhibiting "very disjointed
thinking, poor information processing and poor decision making;”
and that Adkins did not appear "to grasp the significance of what
was going on in his current surroundings.”
When asked whether or
not she believed Adkins was capable of making “a knowing and
intelligent” waiver of his rights before giving his statement,
Dr. Davis responded that the question was a difficult one for her
to answer.
She stated, however, that Adkins’s “thinking at that
point in time was not rational” and that “his capacity for
rational decision making was diminished.”
This opinion was
shared by Dr. Charles Rhoton, a psychiatric resident, who opined
that Adkins was not in a position “to know what he was doing.”
Similarly, Dr. Candace Walker, the psychiatrist who
evaluated Adkins at KCPC, addressed the issue of Adkins’s mental
state at the time he had given his statement in her report:
From the evidence we have, it does not appear
that the patient was suffering from such a
mental disease or defect that would invoke an
insanity defense in any case at the time of
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the alleged crime. However, regarding the
patient’s mental status at the time that he
gave the statement to the police, his status
had markedly deteriorated after the child’s
death. He was described as “near catatonic”
by physicians, unresponsive, and he was felt
to be of such a high suicide risk that he was
placed on maximal precautions under one to
one observation at all times. His treating
physicians did not consider him to be
rational or acting in his own self-interest,
and noted that his attention and
concentration were impaired. . . Thus, my
opinion about his incompetency at the time
the statement was taken is in agreement with
the treating physicians.
At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Lee testified that
when he and Detective Melton arrived at the hospital the evening
after Breanna died, a nurse requested that they obtain permission
from Adkins’s doctor before questioning him.
Sgt. Lee contacted
Dr. Davis by phone and obtained such permission.
He stated that
when he first entered Adkins’s room, he informed Adkins of his
rights and obtained a signed waiver of those rights.
He further
testified that Adkins willingly answered questions about the
events of the day before.
With reference to the issue of
voluntariness, Sgt. Lee testified as follows:
Q. Was there any reason for you to believe,
at the time that you questioned him there in
the hospital, that he was not able to give
you -- or, that he was not able to understand
his rights?
A. No, sir, if I had thought that, I would
have terminated the interview.
Q. Did you feel that he didn’t understand
what he was telling you?
A. No, sir, he didn’t fail to answer a
question. He didn’t seem incoherent. As a
matter of fact, when we left, he gave us
rather lengthy directions. He wanted us to
go to his mother’s home and tell her what had
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happened, which we did, but there was nobody
at home.
. . .
Q. Did he ever, at any time, ask you to stop
the questioning?
A.
No, sir.
Q. Did he ever, at any time, ask that an
attorney be present?
A.
No, sir.
Q. Did you, in any way, coerce or put any
pressure on him to talk to you?
A.
No, sir.
Sgt. Lee’s testimony was corroborated by that of Nurse
Don Price, who was on duty in the psychiatric unit when the
officers arrived to question Adkins.
It was at Price’s request
that Sgt. Lee telephoned the attending physician for permission
to talk to Adkins.
Dr. Davis told Price that the officers could
approach Adkins if Adkins agreed.
Price accompanied the officers
to Adkins’s room and described the events which transpired then
as follows:
Q.
Who talked to Mr. Adkins about it?
A.
I did, sir.
Q.
And, what did you tell him?
A. I told him that there was two state
police officers outside the unit, and I asked
him if he wanted to meet with those
individuals and answer questions.
Q.
And, do you recall what he told you?
A. He wanted to answer -- he wanted to visit
with the officers and answer questions.
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Q. Okay -- now, initially, as the officer
testified earlier, you went to the room with
them?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. What was the purpose of you going to the
room?
A. One is, as Dr. Davis mentions in her
testimony, he was on high risk precautions,
and there’s usually a staff member with that
individual at all times. And, I wanted to
observe additionally whether or not the
questioning was going to be adversarial in
nature.
Q.
Now, at some point, you left the room?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q. Did you feel that the questioning was
appropriate?
A.
I did not feel it was adversarial.
Q.
Okay — what do you mean by adversarial?
A.
That they were coercive — being forceful.
Q.
And, it didn’t seem that way to you?
A.
No, sir.
Q. While you were there, did they ever tell
him that he was under arrest, or that they
were going to arrest him?
A. They gave him his rights. They did not
arrest him at that time, no, sir.
Q. Describe what you can recall about them
giving him his rights.
A. That was initial thing that they did upon
entering the room with Mr. Adkins.
Q. And, do you recall how they went about
advising him of his rights?
A. They informed him that — they made a
reference to the fact that he was a police
officer, and that he — read him his rights.
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Q. And, I’m not asking you what each and
every right was, but . . .did they just read
them off to him, did they give them to him
one at a time, and discuss these things with
him — how did they go about doing that?
A.
I believe one was given at a time. . .
. . .
Q. Okay — and, you say they began talking to
him and did not seem coercive or adversarial?
A.
No, sir.
. . .
Q. Okay — did Mr. Adkins seem to have any
problem answering the questions that were
being asked of him?
A.
Not at that time.
Q. Did he seem responsive more so than what
he had been previously?
A. He was able to answer questions a little
more than what he was for [the] nursing
staff, as far as when we would approach him.
Again, he was — he affect [sic] was flat. It
was very difficult to get any — he didn’t
respond very well to any questions.
Q. All right — I’m sorry, he didn’t respond
very well to whose questions?
A.
The nursing staff questions.
Q.
The nursing staff?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Did that seem different with the police
officers?
A.
Yes.
After weighing the testimony, the trial court denied
the motion to suppress and determined that the statement had been
voluntarily given and that Adkins “was able to coherently relate
his version of the events that took place that resulted in his
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indictment.”
Adkins focuses on his arguably impaired mental
state exclusively without citing coercive activity by the two
investigators.
We can find no argument before the trial court or
in his brief in this Court suggesting that the two police
investigators engaged in any overreaching or coercive behavior.
From our review of the record it appears that the officers were
respectful of Adkins’s rights and that their conduct during their
questioning of him was in no way provocative or improper.
Adkins relies on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), in arguing that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
He contends:
“[t]he statement of a mentally ill defendant is involuntary and
is inadmissible.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
However, rather
than supporting his argument, Connelly actually undermines it.
In that case, the defendant suffered from “chronic schizophrenia
and was in a psychotic state” the day before he confessed to
police.
479 U.S. at 161, 93 L.Ed.2d at 480.
Medical experts
testified that his mental state interfered with his “ability to
make free and rational choices.”
L.Ed.2d at 481.
Id., 479 U.S. at 161, 93
Although the trial court found that “the police
had done nothing wrong or coercive in securing the confession,”
it also found that the defendant’s “mental state vitiated his
attempted waiver of the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination” and suppressed the confession.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.
In reversing, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that
[t]he cases considered by this Court
over the 50 years since Brown v.
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Id.
Mississippi[, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)] have
focused upon the crucial element of police
overreaching. While each confession case has
turned on its own set of factors justifying
the conclusion that police conduct was
oppressive, all have contained a substantial
element of coercive police conduct. Absent
police conduct causally related to the
confession, there is simply no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived
a criminal defendant of due process of law.
Respondent correctly notes that as
interrogators have turned to more subtle
forms of psychological persuasion, courts
have found the mental condition of the
defendant a more significant factor in the
“voluntariness” calculus. See Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). But this fact
does not justify a conclusion that a
defendant’s mental condition, by itself and
apart from its relation to official coercion,
should ever dispose of the inquiry into
constitutional “voluntariness.”
. . .
[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant
to an individual’s susceptibility to police
coercion, mere examination of the
confessant’s state of mind can never conclude
the due process inquiry. . .
Respondent
would now have us require sweeping inquiries
into the state of mind of a criminal
defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite
divorced from any coercion brought to bear on
the defendant by the State. . . .
We hold that coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not “voluntary” within the
meaning of the due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Emphasis added.)
Id., 479 U.S. at 165-167, 93 L.Ed.2d at 482-484.
A similar result was announced more recently in Price
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.2d 885, 890 (2000), in which the
Court upheld the voluntariness of a confession by a defendant who
claimed that he had confessed while in a “suicidal mental state.”
Reiterating that, absent a claim of “abuse, threats or
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intimidation” perpetrated upon the defendant by police, the Court
held that “the trial court’s finding that the confession was
voluntarily given is supported by substantial evidence and, thus,
is conclusive.”
Id.
There is no allegation of police coercion or
intimidation in the case before us — nor is there any evidence of
improper conduct by Sgt. Lee and Detective Melton.
On the other
hand, there is sufficient evidence that Adkins was aware of his
right to remain silent and that he understood that his right to
request a lawyer when he gave his statement to police.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing
to suppress the statement.
Adkins next argues that the trial court erred in
excluding the opinion of Dr. Blake with respect to the interval
of time between the injury sustained by Breanna and her death.
Dr. Blake had studied the degree of layering in the blood clot in
Breanna’s head and the degree of inflammatory response.
Based on
that study, he believed that the shaking producing the
convergence of fatal symptoms must have occurred more than 10 to
12 hours prior to her death.
At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Blake’s
opinion had become even more favorable to Adkins.
He testified
that the shaking causing the injury took place “[w]ell beyond 12
hours. . . and possibly even longer than that;” he also
testified:
“I would say that it [the lamellation] would have
been more than twelve or fifteen hours.”
This testimony is quite
critical to Adkins’s defense as it identified the assault to the
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child as having occurred at a time when Adkins was at work and
when Breanna was in her mother’s care.
In limiting the scope of Dr. Blake’s testimony, the
trial court concluded as follows:
The Court agrees with the Commonwealth
and Dr. Blake, an eminently qualified
pathologist, has an ability to be very
convincing both with his demeanor and
credentials, however, he bases his opinion
that the injury to Breanna Shane Noe on his
experience in the field of forensic pathology
and on numerous tests, which he claims
support his theory. On cross-examination,
however, he was unable to site [sic] any
authority that allows him to “date” a
thrombus with a specificity that he gives in
his opinion. None of the authorities sited
[sic] by Dr. Blake discussed the formation of
a thrombus and are not studies of exact times
that which certain physical characteristics
can be seen. Conversely, the very test on
which he relies indicate [sic] that it is
impossible to time the events relating to the
development of the thrombus precisely and
that all that can be expected is an
approximation, most often expressed as days,
weeks, or months.
The Court further agrees with the
Commonwealth that Dr. Blake’s testimony does
not meet the reliability factors as set out
in Mitchell [ v. Commonwealth, Ky., 908
S.W.2d 100 (1995)]. There are no indications
that the theory or method being proposed has
been tested, peer reviewed, or published.
Likewise, Dr. Blake is unable to provide any
known rate or error or provide information
that the evidence has a particular degree of
acceptance in the forensic pathology
community.
This alleged error is subject to review under the
abuse-of-discretion standard.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.2d 575, 577-578 (2000).
“A trial
court’s ruling on the admission of expert testimony is reviewed
under the same standard as a trial court’s ruling on any other
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evidentiary matter.”
Id. at 578.
However, in Daubert, supra,
the United States Supreme Court articulated a more particularized
standard for admissibility of scientific testimony.
Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d at 482.
Pursuant to
Daubert, the trial court is now required to perform a two-step
gatekeeping function when determining whether expert testimony
should be admitted.
The “basic gatekeeping obligation applies .
. . to all expert testimony.”
Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 147-149, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
Specifically, the trial court must ensure that the
proffered evidence is based on scientific knowledge, that it is
reliable, and that it will assist the trier of fact.
Goodyear,
11 S.W.3d at 578.
The consideration of reliability entails an
assessment into the validity of the reasoning
and the methodology upon which the expert
testimony is based. It is the inquiry into
the reasoning and methodology where
application of the Daubert and Mitchell
factors comes most into play. We emphasize
that the inquiry into reliability and
relevance is a flexible one. The factors
enumerated in Daubert and Mitchell are
neither exhaustive nor exclusive. A trial
court may apply any or all of these factors
when determining the admissibility of any
expert testimony.
Id., at 579.
In the case before us, the trial court applied the
Daubert analysis in its evaluation of Dr. Blake’s testimony.
While recognizing Dr. Blake’s impressive credentials, it
concentrated its inquiry on whether his opinion with respect to
the age of the thrombus — or clot — was reliable.
The trial
court examined the various treatises offered into evidence by
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Adkins to support Dr. Blake’s opinion that the clot was at a
minimum older than twelve hours.
Its order specifically recited
that the necessary support was absent.
Adkins argues that Dr.
Blake’s opinion was based on “well and clearly established”
principles: “Blood clots lamilate over time.
at the site of trauma over time.”
Neutrophils appear
(Emphasis added.)
However,
while those general principles may be valid, the element of time
involved in the clotting lacks the specificity upon which Adkins
necessarily relies.
The Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Tracy Corey
Handy, testified that Dr. Blake’s attempt to date the clot to
such a degree of certainty was not possible given the current
state of forensic knowledge:
Q. Doctor, we have gone through probably
some seven documents there and all of that to
say what?
A. The bottom line is that medicine cannot
be as precise as we would like it. We cannot
say that something is — must be over twelve
hours old and couldn’t be eight hours old.
We are not at that point in our scientific
discovery to be able to differentiate with
that degree of certainly.
Q. Do you know of any reference, any text,
that is relied upon by the medical community
to determine the interval of injury to death
within the specificity as has been done by
Dr. Blake?
A.
No, sir.
Q. So, there are no peer-reviewed
publications or articles that you know of
that would allow such?
A.
I know of none, sir.
Q. And do you know whether such evidence has
any degree of acceptance in the medical
community?
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A. The medical community — in the forensic
pathology community in general states that
the dating of injuries is imprecise. The
dating of contusions is imprecise and the
dating of injuries is imprecise. We can give
generalized statements as multiple
publications showed such as hours, or days,
or weeks. But we cannot be as precise as the
legal system would like us to be.
Q.
And as was presented by Dr. Blake?
A.
Yes, sir.
In his brief, Adkins refers to two articles which he
claims support Dr. Blake’s attempt to date the thrombus as more
than twelve hours old.
The first, entitled “Histological Aging
of Thrombi and Emboli,” was published in 1963 and concerns the
evaluation of 143 thrombi, of which only 68 were of value for
purposes of the study.
The article begins with the admission:
“The aging of thrombi and emboli comprises substantial
theoretical problems.”
The article as a whole does not suggest
that it is actually possible to date thrombi in general with
scientific certainty or precision — even though it alludes to the
age of various thrombi in terms of hours.
We are unable to find the second article to which
Adkins refers.
He has provided a citation to the Internet;
however, he has not provided a citation to the record on appeal.
We have scoured the entire record — including the materials
introduced at the Daubert hearing — and have not discovered the
article to which he refers.
However, assuming, arguendo, that
the article would provide a basis for Dr. Blake’s opinion, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
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excluding Dr. Blake’s hypothesis in light of the medical
literature in the record and in the testimony of Dr. Handy.
Adkins next contends that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to establish
the cause of Breanna’s death within a reasonable medical
probability.
We do not agree.
Whether an expert’s testimony is
expressed in terms of a “reasonable probability” concerning the
cause of death does not depend upon the semantics employed by the
expert.
See Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 119, 122
(1999), which holds that the recitation of the “magic words
‘reasonable probability’” are not required.
Dr. Handy testified
quite explicitly that the cause of Breanna’s death was a closed
head injury resulting from her having been shaken.
Adkins’s own
expert, Dr. Blake, testified that “[a]ll findings are consistent
with shaking.”
While the two experts disagreed on the time
between the shaking and the onset of symptoms, there was no
disagreement that Breanna’s symptoms and death were the result of
violent shaking.
There was ample evidence for the jury to
conclude that Adkins was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus,
there was no error in the refusal of the trial court to direct a
verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3
(1983).
Finally, Dr. Blake contends that the trial court erred
in failing to compensate him fully for his assistance in
presenting Adkins’s defense.
We agree with the Commonwealth that
much of Dr. Blake’s time and effort were spent in an attempt to
offer an opinion which we have held to have been properly
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excluded.
In all, Dr. Blake was paid $9,700 for his services.
Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the trial
court abused its discretion in its determination of the amount of
the “reasonable and necessary” fees to be allowed.
See McCracken
County Fiscal Court v. Graves, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 307 (1994).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
John E. Spainhour
Shepherdsville, KY
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Perry T. Ryan
Frankfort, KY
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