ROY S. WASSO v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 31, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002417-MR
ROY S. WASSO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00387
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Roy S. Wasso, was indicted for trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine),1 possession
of drug paraphernalia,2 and for being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (PFO II)3 by a Fayette County grand
jury on April 6, 1999.
At a jury trial held on August 24, 1999,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
2
KRS 218A.500.
3
KRS 532.080.
Wasso was found not guilty of the possession of drug
paraphernalia charge, but was found guilty of possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine) and the PFO II
charge.
Wasso has raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the
trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for a directed
verdict; and (2) whether his trial counsel was so ineffective as
to deny him a fair trial.
Having found no grounds for reversal,
we affirm.
On February 10, 1999, several members of the Lexington
Metro Police Department executed a search warrant on a house
located at 857 Darley Drive in Fayette County, Kentucky.
The
search warrant was for the house and the person of Wasso and Joe
Vickers, both of whom resided at the house.
search, Vickers was not present.
On the night of the
During the search of the house,
several crack cocaine pipes were found along various window sills
and one crack cocaine pipe was found inside a clock in Vicker’s
bedroom.
The lead officer on the case was Detective Jack Dawson.
Det. Dawson testified that he was responsible for preparing an
inventory listing each item of evidence and where it was found.
Det. Dawson remained in the house with Wasso while the other
officers conducted their search.
During the search, the phone
rang and Det. Dawson answered it.
Det. Dawson picked up the
receiver and said, “This is Fred, whaddya [sic] need?”
caller replied, “I need a fifty hard.”
The
Det. Dawson testified
that this was drug terminology meaning that the man wanted to buy
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a $50.00 piece of crack cocaine.
Det. Dawson also testified that
the caller asked for “Roy”, and Det. Dawson replied, “he’s busy.”
The call was placed from a local bar, and the caller agreed to
meet at a local gas station to complete the drug deal.
The officers obtained Wasso’s consent to search a
Chevrolet Blazer which he regularly operated and which was parked
in the driveway.
In the vehicle, underneath the front passenger
seat, Detective Shane Ensminger found a cigarette package which
contained a plastic bag.
Inside the plastic bag were four
smaller bags which were later determined to contain cocaine.
Two
of the bags contained crack cocaine and the other two contained
powder cocaine.
Wasso was arrested and taken to police headquarters,
where he was interrogated by Det. Dawson.
Wasso said the
previous week he had found the plastic bag and had put it inside
an empty cigarette package and had placed it underneath his seat.
He claimed that he had forgotten the package was under his seat.
Wasso claimed that it was dark when he found the plastic bag, but
he thought it contained either crack cocaine or “fleece.”
He
explained that “fleece” is melted wax that is used to trick a
buyer into thinking he is purchasing crack cocaine.
Sergeant Mark Simmons testified that the cocaine had a
street value of between $40-$50 per rock, or $200 total.
Sgt.
Simmons also testified that this amount of cocaine and the way it
was prepackaged in individual wrappers indicated that it was
designated for sale rather than personal use.
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On August 24, 1999, Wasso was convicted by a jury of
possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and as a PFO II.
The trial court entered the judgment of conviction on September
22, 1999, and sentenced Wasso to prison for eight years.
This
appeal followed.
Wasso argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
grant his motion for a directed verdict.
The directed verdict
standard was set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham4:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would have been clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then would Wasso be
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.5
In Benham, the Supreme Court held that there was
sufficient evidence for a juror to believe the defendant was
guilty of arson.
The evidence against Benham showed that he was
4
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991)(citing Commonwealth v.
Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983)).
5
Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (1977);
Sawhill, supra at 5.
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in the area of the fire and that he had a motive and the
opportunity to commit the arson.
In the case sub judice, there was sufficient evidence
for a reasonable juror to have concluded that Wasso was guilty of
possession of cocaine.
A person is guilty of possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree:
When he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses: a controlled substance, that
contains any quantity of methamphetamine,
including its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers or, that is classified in Schedules I
or II which is a narcotic drug; a controlled
substance analogue; lysergic acid
diethylamide; or phencyclidine.
While Wasso denied that any of the crack pipes found at
his house were his and while he denied that the substance
contained in the plastic bags was cocaine, there was clearly
sufficient evidence for the jury to find otherwise.
Wasso
admitted that he first had placed the plastic bags inside an
empty cigarette package and then placed the package underneath
the seat in his Blazer knowing it to contain either cocaine or
“fleece.”
Furthermore, the call to Wasso’s phone could clearly
be interpreted as an attempt to purchase cocaine from Wasso.
In
fact, the caller agreed to meet Det. Dawson at a local gas
station to complete the deal.
During his interrogation at police
headquarters, Wasso admitted that he knew the caller and that the
caller had called earlier that night.
Wasso argues that other than his own statement there
was no evidence to connect him to the cocaine.
mischaracterization of the evidence.
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This is a
The phone call and the
cocaine found in the Blazer were also evidence against Wasso.
When looking at the evidence as a whole and the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, it clearly was not unreasonable for
the jury to conclude that Wasso knowingly possessed cocaine.
Wasso was living in a house where cocaine was being used.
His
vehicle contained cocaine that he admittedly had placed under the
seat.
The phone call to his cell phone could create a strong
inference that Wasso was knowingly possessing cocaine, and a
reasonable juror clearly could have disbelieved Wasso’s
testimony.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to find Wasso
guilty of possession of cocaine and his motion for a directed
verdict was properly denied.
Wasso also claims he is entitled to a new trial because
he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Wasso raises a
number of potential errors, but freely acknowledges that they
have not been preserved for appellate review and that a RCr6
11.42 motion is normally used to collaterally attack a judgment
before the trial court after the judgment has been affirmed on
direct appeal.
However, Wasso argues that the alleged errors should be
considered in his direct appeal, because they meet the palpable
error standard as set forth in RCr 10.26.
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
6
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
This approach to attacking a judgment was addressed by our
Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Commonwealth,7 with Justice Lambert
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court and stating, “[a]ppellant’s
wholly unpreserved claims will not be considered on this direct
appeal but this does not preclude their consideration in a proper
collateral attack proceeding.”
The Supreme Court went on to
state, however, that unpreserved errors may be presented on
direct appeal “if such could [be] done in good faith, as palpable
error under RCr 10.26.”8
The palpable error test is a very strict standard.
As our Supreme Court has stated, the
requirement of ‘manifest injustice’ as used
in RCr 10.26 (formerly RCr 9.26) [ ] means[s]
that the error must have prejudiced the
substantial rights of the defendant, Schaefer
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 218 (1981),
i.e., a substantial possibility exists that
the result of the trial would have been
different. Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918
S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996). One federal court
has interpreted FRE 103(e), as requiring that
the error must seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. United States v. Filani, 74
F.3d 378 (2nd Cir. 1996).9
In Partin, supra, the Supreme court stated that “upon
7
Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (1998).
8
Id.
9
Castle v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 44 S.W.3d 790, 793-94
(2000)(citing Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28
(1997)).
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consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must
conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the result
would have been different in order to grant relief.10
We will address Wasso’s alleged errors in the order
they appeared in his case.
First, Wasso claims that a motion
should have been made to suppress from evidence the cocaine found
in the vehicle.
Wasso argues that if he had not consented to the
search, the police would not have been able to search the Blazer
at that time.
The issue to be determined is whether Wasso’s consent
was freely and voluntarily given.11
Applying these rules,
Wasso’s claim fails the first prong of the palpable error test.
The fact that Wasso’s trial counsel did not make a motion to
suppress the cocaine as evidence did not cause a manifest
injustice.
The record is devoid of any evidence to support
10
See also Byrd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 272, 276
(1992); and Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 717 S.W.2d 511, 514
(1986).
11
United States v. Bueno, 21 F.3d 120, 126 (6th Cir. 1994).
“A warrantless search as occurred in the present case is valid if
conducted pursuant to the person’s consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041
(1973). When seeking to justify a search based on consent, the
government has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily given,’ and
was not the result of coercion, duress, or submission to a claim
of authority. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 20
L.Ed.2d 797, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968). The voluntariness of the
consent is determined by the ‘totality of the circumstances,’
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, and must be proven by ‘clear and
positive’ proof. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 721
(6th Cir. 1977). Consent is a question of fact, and the district
court’s decision regarding consent will not be overturned unless
it is clearly erroneous.”
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Wasso’s claim that his consent was not voluntary and uncoerced.
Thus, the trial court could have properly ruled that the search
was valid and the cocaine would have come into evidence
notwithstanding any motion to suppress it.
While it is true that
this evidence affected the substantial rights of Wasso and that
there is a substantial possibility that the outcome of the trial
would have been different without the evidence, Wasso has failed
to show that it was a manifest injustice to admit the evidence.
The next alleged error is that Wasso’s trial counsel
should have made a motion to suppress as evidence his entire
statement given at police headquarters.
Based on all of the
evidence in the case sub judice, we conclude that Wasso’s
counsel’s failure to make a suppression motion concerning his
statement to the police did not constitute palpable error.
Even
if a suppression motion had been made, there were sufficient
grounds for the trial court to have properly concluded that there
was probable cause for the police to have taken Wasso to police
headquarters for questioning.
Thus, the interrogation did not
cause a manifest injustice that prejudiced the substantial rights
of Wasso.
Wasso’s third claim of error is that certain portions
of the taped interview should have been suppressed by motion or
at least objected to when played to the jury.
Wasso claims his
statement made to Det. Dawson that, “[e]verytime [the police]
come over [ ] they find drug paraphernalia and I’m always to
blame for it[,]” was inadmissible evidence and highly
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prejudicial.
We believe that the admission into evidence of this
statement fails to meet the palpable error test for several
reasons.
Trial counsel must be provided with sufficient leeway
to make decisions about trial strategy concerning which evidence
he wants to object to without the appellate courts secondguessing each of his decisions.
Justice O’Connor in writing the
majority opinion for the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington,12 states,
“[j]udicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.
It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for
a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of
counsel was unreasonable.”
Thus, in the present case, we cannot conclude that it
was palpable error for Wasso’s counsel not to object to this
evidence.
This decision may have been part of an overall trial
strategy to give credibility to Wasso’s story.
It also could
have been a trial strategy to attempt to show that the police
were overreaching and were essentially out to get Wasso.
It is
not proper for this Court to turn back the hands of time and to
say that it was a palpable error for Wasso’s counsel to have
chosen this trial strategy.
Another portion of the tape includes Wasso making a
statement that he had previously been in jail.
12
Although this
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
-10-
evidence should have been excluded at trial, its admission does
not rise to a palpable error.
We cannot conclude that the
exclusion of this evidence would have resulted in a substantial
possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
First of all, the jury was well aware that Wasso had
a previous felony conviction since he was being tried as a PFO
II.
Also, Wasso admitted during his testimony that he had a
previous felony conviction and the jury was given the proper
admonition.
Thus, it is unlikely that this evidence had any
prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial.
Wasso’s last claim of error regarding the tape is that
it was palpable error to admit the portion of the tape where Det.
Dawson concluded that based on the evidence it appeared to him
that Wasso was selling crack cocaine.
Wasso acknowledged in his
brief, however, that this commentary by Det. Dawson might be
argued as a harmless error since he was not convicted of
trafficking cocaine.
We agree and for this reason it does not
rise to a palpable error.
Although it true that an officer’s
opinion of the accused’s guilt is inadmissible,13 the fact that
Wasso was not convicted of the trafficking charge means that his
substantial rights were not prejudiced.
Wasso’s last claim of error is that the trial court and
his trial counsel committed a palpable error by allowing him to
testify in his behalf.
The decision of whether a defendant
should or should not testify is often a difficult one for trial
13
Nugent v. Commonwealth, Ky., 639 S.W.2d 761 (1982).
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counsel and the defendant.
If a defendant testifies, he
naturally opens the door to evidence that would not otherwise be
admitted; but if he chooses not to testify, he will lose the
opportunity to explain his version of the events.
Thus, the
decision for Wasso to testify was a discretionary, strategic
decision and does not constitute palpable error.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, KY
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
J. Hamilton Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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