DAVID MARSHALL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
August 3, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002232-MR
DAVID MARSHALL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00058
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: David Marshall (hereinafter appellant) appeals
from a final judgment and sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty
plea entered in the Marshall Circuit Court.
On June 7, 1999,
appellant entered a guilty plea to charges of possession of
marijuana, KRS 218A.1422, and possession of drug paraphernalia,
second or subsequent offense, KRS 218A.500.
He was sentenced to
twelve months’ imprisonment for the possession of marijuana
offense and one-and-a-half years for the possession of drug
paraphernalia offense, to be served concurrently.
The trial
court held that KRS 533.060(3) required these sentences to be
served consecutively with sentences imposed on appellant by the
McCracken Circuit Court.
That statute provides in subsection
(3):
When a person commits an offense while
awaiting trial for another offense, and is
subsequently convicted or enters a plea of
guilty to the offense committed while
awaiting trial, the sentence imposed for the
offense committed while awaiting trial shall
not run concurrently with confinement for the
offense for which the person is awaiting
trial.
Appellant committed the offense in this case on
February 23, 1999, after having been arrested on multiple charges
in McCracken County on October 25, 1998.
those offenses on November 20, 1998.
He was indicted for
Appellant subsequently pled
guilty to amended charges in that case on June 4, 1999, and was
sentenced to a total of eight years’ imprisonment.
Appellant now argues that the trial court was not
required to run his sentence in the Marshall Circuit Court case
consecutively with the sentence from the McCracken Circuit Court
because KRS 532.110(4) gives the sentencing court discretion in
this situation.
We disagree.
KRS 532.110(4) states in pertinent
part:
Notwithstanding any provision in this section
to the contrary, if a person is convicted of
an offense that is committed while he is
imprisoned in a penal or reformatory
institution, during an escape from
imprisonment, or while he awaits
imprisonment, the sentence imposed for that
offense may be added to the portion of the
term which remained unserved at the time of
the commission of the offense. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
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Appellant argues that KRS 532.110(4) applies in the case at bar,
and that the term “may” in this statute gives the court
discretion in determining how the sentences will be run.
We do not agree that KRS 532.110(4) applies in this
case.
Appellant was not awaiting imprisonment at the time he
committed the offenses in this case since he had not been tried
nor had he pled guilty to the offenses in McCracken County.
However, once appellant was arrested and indicted for the
offenses in McCracken County, he was considered to be “awaiting
trial” on those charges under 533.060(3).
Ky., 990 S.W.2d 618 (1999).
Moore v. Commonwealth,
Therefore, we do not find any
conflict between the statutes in this case which would require us
to harmonize them as appellant desires.
We believe that KRS
533.060(3) is the controlling statute in these circumstances.
We
conclude that the Marshall Circuit Court correctly ordered
appellant's sentence to run consecutively to his sentence
received from the McCracken Circuit Court.
Therefore, we affirm
the judgment of the Marshall Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tod D. Megibow
Megibow & Edwards, PSC
Paducah, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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