PAUL C. WILLIAMS v. JODY M. WILLIAMS AND MICHAEL L. JUDY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 30, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002090-MR
PAUL C. WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00192
v.
JODY M. WILLIAMS AND
MICHAEL L. JUDY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Paul C. Williams ("Paul") appeals from an
order of the Mercer Circuit Court denying his request to modify a
joint custodial arrangement, and granting the request of his
former wife, Jody M. Williams ("Jody"), for reimbursement of
costs and fees.
We affirm.
Paul and Jody were divorced by way of a decree of
dissolution rendered by the Mercer Circuit Court in July, 1998.
The marriage produced one child, Dylan ("Dylan"), who was born in
1995.
The parties' were awarded joint custody of Dylan, with
each party serving as primary custodian for rotating three-week
periods.
This arrangement continued after Paul moved from
Kentucky to Michigan, with Dylan traveling between the states
every third week.
When Dylan reached pre-school age, it became apparent
to the parties that the system of rotating custody was no longer
viable.
On March 1, 1999, Paul filed an action in Michigan
apparently seeking sole custody or the appointment as primary
custodian.
The following month, Jody filed a similar action in
Mercer Circuit Court (Kentucky).
Paul's action in Michigan was
dismissed on October 5, 1999.
Jody's action continued in Mercer Circuit Court, with
the court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).
On August 2, 1999, the court
rendered an order continuing joint custody, with Jody serving as
primary custodian. The court also granted Jody's request for
reimbursement of costs associated with defending the Michigan
proceeding.
As a basis for this award, the court opined that it
was troubled because Paul sought to resolve the matter in
Michigan when he knew or should have known that jurisdiction
vested in Kentucky.
This appeal followed.
Paul now offers two claims of error.
He first argues
that the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction in this
case.
Specifically, he maintains that Kentucky was not Dylan's
home state as defined by the UCCJA, because Dylan did not reside
in Kentucky for the six-month period immediately preceding
commencement of the action.
Paul also contends that the exercise
of jurisdiction under the UCCJA is not warranted because there
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was no evidence upon which the court could properly conclude that
it was in the child's best interest to exercise jurisdiction.
As
such, he seeks to have the matter remanded to the trial court so
that it may act in accordance with the statute's requirements.
We have closely studied the record, the law, and the
arguments of counsel, and find no error on this issue.
KRS
403.410 and 403.420 provide in relevant part that Kentucky may
exercise jurisdiction in a child custody modification proceeding
if Kentucky is the child's home state or has been the child's
home state within six months before commencement of the
proceeding.
KRS 403.410 goes on to provide that periods of
temporary absence from the home state are counted as part of the
six-month period.
The trial court found in the order on appeal that Dylan
" . . . has spent virtually his entire life in Kentucky."
While
it is clear that Dylan resided for substantial periods of time in
Michigan pursuant to the agreed upon custodian arrangement, Paul
does not assert, nor does the record support, the proposition
that Dylan was absent from Kentucky for the six-month period
immediately preceding the commencement of the instant action.
While it is arguable that jurisdiction could conceivably vest
concurrently in both Michigan and Kentucky, it is clear that the
Michigan court ceded jurisdiction and that the Mercer Circuit
Court properly exercised jurisdiction.
Jody was the primary
custodian, and the circuit court so found.
Paul has not overcome
the strong presumption that the trial court's rulings are
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correct, City of Louisville v. Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179 (1964),
and accordingly we find no error on this issue.
Paul's second argument is that the court erred in
ordering him to reimburse Jody for her costs and attorney fees
incurred in the Michigan action.
He maintains that the award is
tantamount to a sanction under CR 11, and argues that the court
acted improperly in awarding said sanctions for proceedings which
occurred in Michigan.
We are not persuaded by Paul's argument.
It is
uncontroverted that the award of costs and attorney fees may be
exercised under the sound discretion of the trial court.
KRS
403.220; Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512 (1975).
Paul
has offered nothing upon which we may conclude that the Mercer
Circuit Court abused its discretion in awarding to Jody her costs
and fees, and we do not share his belief that the award is akin
to sanctions under CR 11.
The award is supported by the law and
the record, and we will not tamper with it.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Mercer Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andrew Mudryke
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Michael L. Judy
Laura K. Stratton
Frankfort, KY
William R. Erwin
Danville, KY
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