TODD BLEVINS v. CAROLYN BLEVINS
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RENDERED: MARCH 9, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001845-MR
TODD BLEVINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN N. FRAZIER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CI-00214
v.
CAROLYN BLEVINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
EMBERTON, McANULTY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Todd Blevins appeals the order of the Johnson
Circuit Court which modified his child support payments.
He
argues that it was error for the court to make the arrears
retroactive to 1994 although the motion for modification was
filed in May, 1998.
We agree, and reverse.
Todd Blevins (hereinafter appellant) and Carolyn
Blevins (hereinafter appellee) were divorced in November, 1990.
The trial court entered a decree which established the amount
according to the child support guidelines that appellant was
required to pay until the parties' two minor children reached 18
years of age.
The decree further stated, “[i]n the event there
is any change in economic circumstances such as to entitle either
Party to an increase or decrease in child support under Kentucky
law, the respective party shall make a Motion and ask for a
hearing on same.”
On April 30, 1992, appellant filed a motion to decrease
child support because he had become unemployed.
On June 2, 1992,
the trial court granted appellant's motion and decreased his
child support obligation.
The court required appellant to remain
responsible for the children's medical and dental expenses, and
ordered that appellant “shall further notify this Court and
Petitioner's [appellee's] attorney as soon as he becomes
employed.”
After appellant became employed, however, appellee had
to file a motion on February 30, 1993, to increase child support
payments and to direct appellant to pay outstanding medical
bills.
The domestic relations commissioner held a hearing and
found that appellant had been employed since February, 1993.
Accordingly, on June 3, 1993, the commissioner ordered appellant
to pay $529 a month as child support, and made the payments
retroactive to February 1, 1993, “in light of the fact prior
Court ORDERS had been entered directing the Respondent
[appellant] to inform the Court and Petitioner's [appellee's]
counsel of any change in wages.”
The court affirmed the order as
its final judgment on September 21, 1993.
This judgment was not
appealed.
In 1995, appellee filed motions to compel appellant to
pay medical support and medical insurance.
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Then, on April 9,
1998, appellee filed a motion for an increase in child support,
asserting that both parties had had a change in income.
On June
4, 1998, the domestic relations commissioner denied the motion to
increase child support based on the fact that the parties had not
experienced a change in income.
The commissioner also denied
appellant's motion to allocate medical expenses.
filed exceptions to the commissioner's report.
Both parties
The trial court
found that evidence was required to properly determine the
questions raised by the exceptions, and referred the matter to
the commissioner for recommendations on all pending issues.
The
commissioner held a status conference, then set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
After holding a hearing, the commissioner filed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 10,
1998.
The commissioner found that “[s]ubsequent to the Court's
order of June 5, 1993, directing the Respondent to inform the
Court and Petitioner's counsel of any change in wages; the
Respondent's income increased dramatically . . . .”
commissioner listed appellant's changes in income.
The
Indeed,
appellant's income nearly doubled from 1993 to 1994 and remained
at that level in the succeeding years.
The commissioner noted
that appellant testified at the hearing that he did not inform
the court or appellee's attorney of his change in wages.
The
commissioner concluded that appellant should be assessed
deficiencies in his child support obligation from January 1,
1994, because of his “failure to abide by previous orders of the
Court.”
The court found that appellant's child support
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obligation would have been as follows: 1994 - $836; 1995 - $857;
1996 - $847; 1997 - $889; and January 1, 1998-October 31, 1998 $837.
The commissioner ordered a total judgment against
appellant in the amount of $17,806.
Appellant's exceptions to
these findings and conclusions were denied, and this appeal
follows.
Appellant's central argument is that the trial court
abused its discretion because KRS 403.213(1) does not permit the
retroactive assessment in this case.
KRS 403.213(1) states in
pertinent part: “[t]he provisions of any decree respecting child
support may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification and only
upon a showing of a material change in circumstances that is
substantial and continuing (emphasis added).”
This court has
held that the legislature, by enacting this provision, obligated
trial courts to limit imposition of an increase in child support
to the date the motion was filed.
905 S.W.2d 868 (1995).
Pretot v. Pretot, Ky. App.,
Moreover, we do not find any allowance in
the statute's language for the trial court to exercise the
discretion it assumed herein.
Courts are required to give the
words of a statute their plain meaning.
662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1984).
Bailey v. Reeves, Ky.,
Where the General Assembly has
provided no exceptions to the positive terms of a statute, we
must presume that the General Assembly intended none.
Stone v.
Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Ky. App., 908 S.W.2d 675 (1995).
The
term “only” in KRS 403.213(1) evidences an intention by the
General Assembly to deny the trial court discretion as to when a
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modification may commence.
Thus, we are constrained to find that
the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion.
The court's order imposing an arrearage was based in
part on its finding that appellant violated its order.
We
believe the court's orders as to what was required of appellant
are somewhat equivocal.
We conclude that the court's intent to
impose a “sanction” by assessing an arrearage for failure to obey
its prior orders was misplaced, particularly as there is no
mechanism for doing so by the child support statutes.
We are certainly sympathetic to appellee since her
children were entitled to much more child support over the years
than appellant was willing to part with.
And we do not condone
appellant's attempts to thwart appellee's simple efforts to have
appellant pay the child support and medical expenses which he
properly and fairly owed.
We must note that appellee was not
without a remedy in the four years between the decree and the
order at issue here.
Appellee could have filed a motion for
modification at any time during those years.
However, the
General Assembly did not provide for appellee to recover the
money foregone when she did not file a motion for modification.
Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for a determination by
the trial court of appellant's child support obligation, in
accordance with KRS 403.213(1).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John T. Chafin
Kazee, Kinner, Chafin,
Heaberlin & Patton
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Eugene C. Rice
Paintsville, Kentucky
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